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ASRS CALLBACK includes excerpts from ASRS incident reports with supporting commentary. In addition, CALLBACK may contain summaries of ASRS research studies and related aviation safety information. CALLBACK is one of the ASRS's most effective tools for improving the quality of human performance in the National Aviation System (NAS) at the grass roots level.
Updated: 55 min 47 sec ago

CALLBACK 453 - October 2017

Tue, 10/17/2017 - 10:28
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Issue 453 October 2017 The application of team management concepts in the flight deck environment was initially known as cockpit resource management. As techniques and training evolved to include Flight Attendants, maintenance personnel, and others, the new phrase “Crew Resource Management” (CRM) was adopted. CRM, simply put, is “the ability for the crew…to manage all available resources effectively to ensure that the outcome of the flight is successful.”1 Those resources are numerous. Their management involves employing and honing those processes that consistently produce the best possible decisions. Advisory Circular 120-51E, CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TRAINING, suggests that CRM training focus on “situation awareness, communication skills, teamwork, task allocation, and decisionmaking within a comprehensive framework of standard operating procedures (SOP).”2

Aircrews frequently experience circumstances that require expert CRM skills to manage situations and ensure their successful outcomes. Effective CRM has proved to be a valuable tool to mitigate risk and should be practiced on every flight. This month CALLBACK shares ASRS reported incidents that exemplify both effective CRM and CRM that appears to be absent or ineffective. Who Has the Aircraft? A B737 Captain had briefed and instituted his non-standard method to transfer aircraft control when the FO performed takeoffs. When he did not employ his own technique, confusion was evident and aircraft control was questionable.■ [As we were] pushing back in Albuquerque, ATC switched the airport around from Runway 26 to Runway 8. The Captain and I ran the appropriate checklist and proceeded to taxi…. I was the Pilot Flying (PF) [for this leg]. The Captain stated previously that he likes to spool the engines up and transfer controls while the aircraft is moving.

Once cleared for takeoff, the Captain spooled the [engines]. I was expecting him to transfer controls. I monitored him spool them up to takeoff power. While he was accelerating, my comment was, “I’m not flying the aircraft. You have the controls.” He seemed confused briefly, and we took off with the Captain in full control without incident. The Captain needs to [abandon] the habit of transferring thrust levers to the First Officer while moving. It’s a bad habit. It can be confusing if one of the crew members is saturated.… Under no circumstance should transfer of thrust levers and aircraft happen while saturated in the takeoff phase while moving. Freedom of Speech This Captain received uncommon, simultaneous inputs from two unexpected sources. An accident may have been averted when the Heavy Transport crew exercised simple, effective CRM in a critical situation and high workload environment.
■ This was a night takeoff,…and it was the FO’s first flying leg of Initial Operating Experience (IOE). Two Relief Pilots were assigned for the flight. We were cleared onto the runway…after a B737 [had landed]. The FO taxied onto the runway for takeoff. Once aligned for takeoff, I took control of the throttles. At this point I thought we were cleared for takeoff, but apparently we were not. I advanced the power to 70% and pressed TOGA. At about that same time, a Relief Pilot alerted the flying pilots that the other plane that had just landed was cleared to [back-taxi]…on the runway, and the Tower alerted us to hold our position. I disconnected the autothrottles and immediately brought them to idle. [Our speed was] approximately 30 knots, and we had used up approximately 200 to 400 feet of runway. The back-taxiing B737 exited the runway.

Looking back, somehow the clearance to take off or the non-clearance was lost in the translation. The Controllers in ZZZZ most often use non-standard phraseology with an accent not easily understood.… Higher than normal workloads [existed] due to a new hire first leg, and the flight was late and had been delayed from the previous day. I had assumed situational awareness with the airport and runway environment. Generally in past practice, ZZZZ holds the landing traffic in the holding bay after landing and does not have two airplanes on the runway at the same time. What “saved” the situation was good CRM and situational awareness by the Relief Pilots.
Finishing Strong This MD80 crew finished the last leg of their trip, but distractions degraded the performance of their duties. Unmanaged threats had contributed to the misperception that the job was done when it was clearly incomplete.From the Captain's report:
■ The landing was uneventful, and we were given an expedited crossing of the departure runway. We accomplished the after landing checklist, but due to the expedited crossing, I wasn’t sure if the First Officer started the APU (which had been consistent/standard practice so far in the trip). We were cleared to enter the ramp, and I consciously elected to leave both engines running (which was contrary to my standard practice during the trip). As we turned to pull into the gate,…an unmarked van cut across our path. We saw him coming, so no immediate stop was necessary.… At the gate,…we pulled to a stop normally, parked the brakes, and I believe I commanded, “Shut down engines.” The FO believes he heard, “Shut down the left engine” (which had been the standard command throughout the trip). He shut down the left engine. The right engine continued to run and we finished the Parking Checklist and departed the cockpit.

Minutes later…I received a page…requesting that I return to the gate. I returned to find the right engine running. I immediately shut off the fuel lever. No damage or injuries occurred. The aircraft was chocked and the brakes parked. In my estimation, there are three distinct contributing factors in this event. 1. Complacency when reading the checklist. I assumed items had been accomplished and felt no need to follow up the response with a tactile and visual check. 2. Complacency when relying on past actions as a predictor of future actions. We had done things the same way each leg, therefore we would continue to do them the same way on every leg. 3. Distractions. The expedited crossing to the ramp side of the runway, compressed time frame for completing the after landing checklists, and vehicular traffic all led to this event.… These issues…still keep happening. Strict, unyielding adherence to policy and procedures is a must. No one is perfect, and that is why policies and procedures exist. An event like this WILL happen if you allow yourself to become too comfortable.
From the First Officer's report:
■ We arrived at the gate, and the parking brake was parked. The Captain remarked, “Shut down the Number 1 Engine, Parking Checklist.” I read the checklist as the Captain responded. At the end of the checklist, I exited the aircraft.… I had walked about 10 gates down from the aircraft…when I heard an announcement asking the flight crew inbound from our flight to please return to the gate.… No one was there when I returned.… About 5 minutes later the agent walked up…and told me that one of the engines had been left running. She let me on the jet bridge and the Captain was walking off the aircraft.…

I believe this problem came about because of a pattern we developed during all our flights.… I started the APU…after landing, and…about two to three minutes [later], would shut down the Number 2 Engine at the Captain’s request. We did this every flight. After landing on this flight, it got very busy.… When…at the gate, the Captain called for me to shut down the Number 1 Engine, I didn’t think about the Number 2 Engine still running.… I read the checklist and listened to the Captain’s responses. I should have been double checking him, but I didn’t.… This has never happened to me.…I’m just grateful that no one was hurt…. Here, Here! and Hear, Hear!This Dash 8 crew experienced a flight control problem that required extensive coordination. Thorough, effective CRM contributed to the orderly sequencing of their decisions and to the successful completion of their flight.
■ We had to deice prior to takeoff, and we checked all flight control movements twice before we took off. At the beginning of the cruise portion of the flight, the…Master Caution Annunciators…and two amber Caution [lights] illuminated: ROLL SPLR INBD HYD (Spoiler Inboard Hydraulics) and ROLL SPLR OUTBD HYD (Spoiler Outboard Hydraulics). We completed the associated Spoiler Failure Checklist, including confirming that all spoilers [indicated] retracted at the PFCS (Primary Flight Control System) indicator. The Pilot Flying, the Captain, continued to hand fly the aircraft (as our autopilot was [inoperative] for all legs). We evaluated all facts, discussed all of our options, and [advised Center of our flight control situation]. We informed them that we were not requiring any assistance (upon landing or elsewhere).

The Captain talked to Dispatch and Maintenance, while I hand flew the aircraft. The Captain, Dispatch, and I all agreed that ZZZ, with its long runways, was the best place to land. I informed our Flight Attendant that we were planning on a normal, uneventful landing with no delays. ATC issued [our runway], and we executed a visual approach. [We accomplished] a normal landing and taxi. We thanked ATC for all of their help. At the gate, the maintenance write up was completed. The smooth outcome can be attributed to very good CRM exhibited today.
1. https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/
    airplane_handbook/media/airplane_flying_handbook.pdf
2. https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/
    AC120-51e.pdf
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ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 453 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more » August 2017 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,349 General Aviation Pilots 1,391 Controllers 598 Flight Attendants 516 Military/Other 321 Mechanics 203 Dispatchers 196 TOTAL 8,574 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 2 ATC Equipment or Procedure 1 TOTAL 3
NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 453
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Categories: News

CALLBACK 452 - September 2017

Tue, 10/17/2017 - 10:28
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Issue 452 September 2017 This month, CALLBACK again offers the reader a chance to “interact” with the information given in a selection of ASRS reports. In “The First Half of the Story,” you will find report excerpts describing an event up to a point where a decision must be made or some direction must be given. You may then exercise your own judgment to make a decision or determine a possible course of action that would best resolve the situation.

The selected ASRS reports may not give all the information you want, and you may not be experienced in the type of aircraft involved, but each incident should give you a chance to refine your aviation decision-making skills. In “The Rest of the Story…” you will find the actions that were taken by reporters in response to each situation. Bear in mind that their decisions may not necessarily represent the best course of action. Our intent is to stimulate thought, training, and discussion related to the type of incidents that were reported. The First Half of the StoryWhat’s All the Flap?  B737 First Officer’s Report■ As the Pilot Flying while maneuvering in the busy terminal area, I didn’t notice that the flap indicator did not match the [flap] handle (2 indicated, 30 selected) until the Captain identified it with the…Before Landing Checklist. We checked the Leading Edge Device [LED] indicator on the overhead panel; the LED’s [indicated] FULL EXTEND. We discussed how the aircraft felt as it was being hand flown. The feel was normal.… The airspeed indicator was normal. The aircraft flew normally in all aspects except for the flap indication. All this occurred approaching the final approach fix.. What Would You Have Done?
Takeoff Face-Off  C182 Pilot’s Report ■ [The] airport (with a single runway) was undergoing major construction and had no parallel taxiway.… The only exit from the runway was a single narrow taxiway at the [approach] end of Runway 02 leading between some hangars to and from the FBO. [There was] no operating Control Tower, only UNICOM. Before departure I asked…the FBO what the active runway was, and the reply was, “People are taking off on Runway 02 and landing on Runway 20 to avoid a back taxi on a long runway.” Taxiing out to Runway 02 for departure I encountered another…single engine airplane near the runway end taxiing in on a narrow taxiway…, so we talked ourselves past each other on UNICOM. I had apparently not heard the radio call…of a small jet landing on Runway 20, so I started my takeoff roll on Runway 02.… The aircraft that had [just] landed…was at taxi speed. During my takeoff roll, I only saw that aircraft when I was near rotation speed.
What Would You Have Done?
The Weak Side  B767 Captain’s Report ■ While on climb out, [we] noticed the aircraft was having difficulty climbing through 30,000 feet. We checked the engine instruments and noticed that the right engine fuel flow was indicating 700 pounds per hour. We checked the other engine indications and noticed that they were significantly below the left engine indications.
What Would You Have Done?
Keep the M in MDA  CRJ Captain’s Report ■ We were flying the localizer approach to [Runway] 24L. As we started down to the MDA, we broke out and I started looking for the airport. I was making the callouts to MDA and thought the First Officer was stopping the descent at the MDA. I looked out and back;… he was still descending.…
What Would You Have Done?
An Approach to Remember  B737 Captain’s Report ■ The First Officer (FO) was flying his first arrival to Corpus Christi, and I believe the last time I was there was more than a decade ago, so needless to say, we were not familiar with the Corpus Christi environment. We had been kept high on the arrival by ATC and were hurrying to descend to be stabilized for the approach. We realized that we would be too high for the approach.…
What Would You Have Done?The Rest of the Story
What’s All the Flap?  B737 First Officer’s Report The Reporter's Action■ The Captain elected to continue to land. We used flaps 15 Vref [speed for the approach] and added 10 knots. Landing was uneventful. The flap indicator moved to match the [flap] handle shortly after clearing the runway during taxi. We notified maintenance on gate arrival.
First Half of "Takeoff Face-Off"
Takeoff Face-Off  C182 Pilot’s Report The Reporter's Action■ I thought the best option was to immediately lift off with a slight turn to the right to laterally clear the runway in any case, and that worked. I missed him vertically by 50 feet and laterally by more than 150 feet. Was that the best split-second decision? I thought so - I am an [experienced] pilot. In my opinion, the airport management had made some bad decisions concerning their improvement construction (reconstructing the parallel taxiway), and the airport was dangerous considering their heavy corporate jet traffic. I had not heard the small jet on UNICOM - possibly due to my conversation on UNICOM with the…plane taxiing in (opposite direction) just prior to takeoff. The wind was…light, and Runway 20 was apparently chosen by the jet traffic to, likewise, avoid a back taxi since the only runway exit was at the [departure] end of Runway 20.
First Half of "The Weak Side"
The Weak Side  B767 Captain’s Report The Reporter's Action■ I [requested] to level off at FL350, then to descend to FL320. I was the pilot monitoring. I did not [request priority handling] at this time because we received no EICAS messages or alerts telling us of this situation.

After rechecking the engine instruments and conferring with the pilot flying, I made the decision to shut down the engine inflight via the QRH Engine Failure/Shutdown Checklist.… I also made the decision that we would attempt to restart the engine because no limitations or engine parameters or engine vibrations were present or were exceeded. At this time we were about 20 minutes into the flight.… The inflight shutdown checklist was completed, and the engine inflight start checklist was completed. The engine started and accelerated normally,…and all parameters [remained within] limitations.… I contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control…. After speaking with them and informing them of our situation and what transpired, I made the decision to continue to destination.

First Half of "Keep the M in MDA"
Keep the M in MDA  CRJ Captain’s Report The Reporter's Action■ [I] told him to stop the descent. We stopped 150 feet below the MDA, continued the approach, and landed. Looking back at the approach, I should have called for a missed approach and received vectors for another approach. The only reason for continuing was…poor judgment or just a bad decision at the time.
First Half of "An Approach to Remember"
An Approach to Remember  B737 Captain’s Report The Reporter's Action■ [We] requested a 360 degree turn for our descent from the Tower. They approved us to maneuver either left or right as requested, and we initiated a go-around and a 360 degree left turn in VMC conditions. We initiated the go-around above 1,000 feet but descended slightly during the first part of the turn. I directed the FO to climb to 1,000 feet, which he slowly did. I had referenced the approach plate and noticed that the obstacles on the plate in our quadrant were at 487 feet and our climb ensured clearance from them. During the 360 [degree] maneuver, the FO lost sight of the airport, but I had it in sight and talked him through the turn back to the landing runway.

The FO completed the maneuver, but we were, again, not in a position to make a safe landing, as we were not well aligned with the landing runway.… We initiated another go-around, again getting approval to stay with Tower, but we maneuvered in a right hand pattern so the FO could see the runway in the turn. I directed a climb to 1,500 feet for the 579 foot towers west of the field. The FO…had lost sight of the field and wasn’t sure what maneuver we were doing while on downwind.… I had not adequately communicated my intentions for the pattern we were flying. We were maneuvering visually, so I took control of the aircraft and directed the FO to re-sequence the FMC…and extend the centerline. I completed the base and final turns and landed uneventfully on Runway 18.










The ASRS Database is a rich source of information for policy development, research, training, and more. Search ASRS Database »CALLBACK Issue 452 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS View ASRS Report Sets ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more » July 2017 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,224 General Aviation Pilots 1,261 Controllers 622 Flight Attendants 451 Military/Other 345 Mechanics 204 Dispatchers 179 TOTAL 8,286 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 1 ATC Equipment or Procedure 1 TOTAL 2 NOTE TO READERS:  ■ or ■ Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 452

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Categories: News

CALLBACK 451 - August 2017

Tue, 10/17/2017 - 10:27
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Issue 451 August 2017 In June 2016 the NTSB conducted a forum on Pilot Weather Reports (PIREPs) with the goal of “improving pilot weather report submission and dissemination to benefit safety in the National Airspace System” (NAS).1 To that end, pilots and dispatchers, ATC personnel, atmospheric scientists, and NWS meteorologists use PIREPs extensively in real time. All require good fidelity weather feedback to validate and optimize their products so that pilots have accurate foreknowledge of current weather conditions.

The NTSB’s Special Investigative Report1 (SIR) that documents the forum’s proceedings is comprehensive and makes for excellent reading. Many PIREP behind-the-scene needs are identified. Problem areas are diagnosed. Weaknesses in the PIREP system are pinpointed in categories of solicitation, submission, dissemination, and accuracy. Conclusions are drawn from top level philosophical thinking through component level hardware to enhance the PIREP system, and recommendations for improvement are prescribed.

ASRS presented data at this forum about reported incidents revealing complications with PIREPs that affected flight operations. ASRS reported incidents are offered this month to illustrate issues that were addressed by the NTSB’s recent PIREP forum and recorded in the associated SIR. What Did these Captains Really Mean? This air carrier Captain landed in actual conditions that did not mirror the Field Conditions Report (FICON). He made required PIREP reports, but challenged the aviation community to become better, more accurate reporters using standardized tools and appropriate descriptors.■ The Providence Field Condition (FICON) was 5/5/5 with thin snow, and ATIS was [reporting] 1/2 mile visibility with snow. The braking report from [the] previous B757 was good. Upon breaking out of the clouds, we saw an all-white runway with areas that looked as if they had previously been plowed in the center, but were now covered with snow. Landing occurred with autobrakes 3, but during rollout I overrode the brakes by gently pressing harder. However, no matter how hard I pressed on the brakes, the aircraft only gradually slowed down. Tower asked me if I could expedite to the end.… I said, “NO,” as the runway felt pretty slick to me. I reported medium braking both to the Tower and via ACARS to Dispatch. A follow-on light corporate commuter aircraft reported good braking.

I was a member of the Takeoff And Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) advisory group…and am intimately familiar with braking action physics as well as the Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM). There was no way the braking was good or the snow was 1/8th inch or less in depth.

I would [suggest that] data…be collected from the aircraft…to analyze the aircraft braking coefficient.… It would also be of value to ascertain the delivered brake pressure versus the commanded pressure for this event, as there can sometimes be a large disparity in friction-limited landings. I think that pilots do not really know how to give braking action reports, and I don’t think the airport wanted to take my report of medium braking seriously. I also think pilots need to know how to use the RCAM to evaluate probable runway conditions that may differ from the FICON. Additionally, there is no such description as “thin” in the RCAM. None of the FAA Advisory Circulars that include the RCAM have thin snow as part of depth description. Don’t Wait to Disseminate; Automate A Phoenix Tower Controller experienced and identified a common problem while disseminating an URGENT PIREP. He offers a potential solution, technique, and rationale.
■ While working Clearance Delivery, I received an URGENT PIREP via Flight Data Input/Output General Information (FDIO GI) message stating, “URGENT PIREP...DRO [location] XA30Z [time] 140 [altitude] BE40 [type] SEV RIME ICING….” This was especially important to me to have this information since we have several flights daily going to Durango, Colorado. My technique would be to not only make a blanket transmission about the PIREP, but also specifically address flights going to that location to advise them and make sure they received the information. The issue is that…I did not receive this URGENT PIREP until [1:20 after it had been reported]. Severe icing can cause an aircraft incident or accident in a matter of moments. It is unacceptable that it takes one hour and twenty minutes to disseminate this information.

[A] better PIREP sharing system [is needed.] PIREPs should be entered in AISR [Aeronautical Information System Replacement] immediately after receiving the report and should automatically be disseminated to facilities within a specified radius without having to be manually entered again by a Traffic Management Unit or Weather Contractor, etc.
Informing the Intelligent Decision This C402 Pilot encountered icing conditions in conjunction with a system failure. Teamwork and accurate PIREPs allowed him to formulate a plan, make an informed decision, and successfully complete his flight.
■ During my descent I was assigned 6,000 feet by Approach.… I entered a layer of clouds about 8,000 feet. I turned on the aircraft’s anti-icing equipment. I leveled at 6,000 feet and noticed the propeller anti-ice [ammeter] was indicating that the equipment was not operational. I looked at the circuit breaker and saw that the right one was popped.

I informed ATC of my equipment failure. Approach requested and received a PIREP from traffic ahead of me indicating that there was ice in the clouds, but the bases were about 5,500 to 5,000 feet. Some light mixed ice was developing on my airframe. My experience [with] the ice that day was mostly light [with] some pockets of moderate around 5,000 to 6,000 feet. I informed [Dispatch] of my situation and elected to continue to [my destination] as I was close to the bottom of the icing layer, and a climb through it to divert would have prolonged exposure to the ice.
If the Controller’s Away, the Pilots Can Stray This Tower Controller experienced a situation that resulted in a hazard. He identified a potential risk associated with a Controller entering a new PIREP into AISR.
■ I was working alone in the tower cab, all combined Tower and Approach positions, at the beginning of a midshift. Weather had been moving through the area with gusty winds and precipitation in the area.… Aircraft X checked [in while] descending via the SADYL [arrival] and immediately reported moderate turbulence.

I issued a clearance to…JIMMI as a vector for sequencing with a descent to 9,000 feet. The instruction was read back correctly, and I observed Aircraft X turn left toward the fix and continue descending. I obtained some additional information from Aircraft X concerning the turbulence. At that point I went to the computer in the back of the room and logged on to the AISR website to enter a PIREP for the moderate turbulence. After successfully [completing that task,] …I walked back to the radar scope and observed Aircraft X descending through 8,000 feet. I instructed them to climb to 9,000 feet. The Pilot replied that they were descending to 6,000 feet. I again instructed them to climb to 9,000 feet and informed them that they were in a 9,000 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) area. They began climbing and reached approximately 8,400 feet before they crossed into a 7,000 foot MVA [area.] The 6,000 foot altitude is the final altitude on the arrival, and I suspect they missed entering the new altitude into the FMS.

The responsibility to enter the PIREP into AISR instead of transmitting it verbally to FSS resulted in my being away from the radar scope as the aircraft descended through their assigned altitude.… [We should] return the responsibility of computer based PIREP entry to FSS to allow Controllers to focus on the operation.
The Effective Party-Line PIREP A B787 Crew experienced a severe, unexpected weather phenomenon that had not been forecast. Their situation and immediate actions illustrate the importance of both the PIREP process and the pilot response that it demands.
■ The [aural] warning…sounded like the autopilot disconnect button. We immediately looked at the instruments and noticed that the airspeed was in the red zone and our altitude was off by -500 feet. The Captain reduced the throttles, but airspeed continued to increase, so [he] opened the speed brakes slightly. I noticed that yellow slash bars were indicated on both LNAV and VNAV. I told the Captain, “No LNAV or VNAV, engines look fine.” The Captain disconnected the autopilot while continuing to get the airspeed under control and regain our altitude back to FL380. I reset the flight directors, selected Heading Select, and set V/S to +300. I reengaged LNAV/VNAV and informed the Captain that these systems were available.…

…We were both stunned as to what had happened because the ride was smooth and had no bumps or chop at all. I immediately got on the radio and told another aircraft behind us (one that we had been communicating with and passing PIREP information) that we had just experienced something very erratic and strange. As I was making this call, a printer message came across the printer about a B777 that had experienced severe wave turbulence at FL350 in the same vicinity as [our encounter.] I relayed this information to the aircraft behind us. They informed us that, yes, they had just encountered the same and gained 1,000 feet and 50 knots. There were other aircraft in the area who later confirmed that they experienced the same wave, however were better prepared to handle it due to our detailed PIREPs, and [those crews] were very appreciative.

We sent a message to Dispatch. Dispatch did not show any unusual activity such as horizontal windshear or unusual jet streams in the area and was…surprised to get our [PIREP].
1. https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/SIR1702.pdf
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ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 451 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more » June 2017 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,194 General Aviation Pilots 1,246 Controllers 593 Flight Attendants 429 Military/Other 405 Mechanics 223 Dispatchers 154 TOTAL 8,244 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 1 Airport Facility or Procedure 1 Company Policy 1 TOTAL 3 NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 451
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NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189
Categories: News