News

Update on this years Mx Competition

AskBob News - Fri, 04/28/2017 - 15:54

We’re searching for the words to sum up this year’s competition and all we can come up with is “WOW!”

 We wish that every single aircraft maintenance professional could be so fortunate to be able to attend and compete in the Aerospace Maintenance Competition. For those of you who were able to be there in person or view the live stream delivered by AireXpert, you saw and felt the camaraderie and professionalism of these teams. There’s simply nothing like it, and all of those teams (both pros and students) set a great example for the next generation of mechanics.

 All eyes were on Orlando and we’re not joking. We were absolutely blown away not only by the number of viewers who signed up to view the broadcast, but from their locations. By the end of the ceremonies yesterday, over 8000 viewers in 39 countries tuned in to the competition. From St. Lucia to Australia and Ukraine to Zimbabwe, the AMC was on display for the entire world to see.

 We’ll be returning to Orlando to broadcast the 2018 AMC and we’ll be making some changes to improve the production and make it more interactive. We’re so inspired to shine a light on the incredible work that happens within the global aircraft maintenance community and we want to share it with the world.

 A sincere thank you to all of the men and women who work behind the scenes and who are responsible for every flight.

 From the entire AireXpert Team

 www.engio.mx

www.eng.io

 

Categories: News, US

FAA Cautions on off-the-shelf Checklists

FAA & FAASTeam News - Thu, 04/27/2017 - 13:58

 

Subject: Safety Concerns with Using Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) or Personally Developed Checklists

Purpose: This SAFO warns pilots and operators of the risks of purchasing a commercially available checklist, obtaining a free download, or developing their own aircraft checklist in lieu of using the checklist contained in the manufacturer’s Pilot Operating Handbook (POH)/Airplane Flight Manual (AFM).

Background: Recently, a pilot was unable to lower the aircraft’s landing gear and referred to a COTS checklist for the specific type of aircraft. The aircraft landed with the landing gear partially extended. On contact with the runway, the landing gear collapsed, and the aircraft sustained substantial damage.

Discussion: The post-accident investigation compared the POH/AFM and the COTS checklist used. The investigation found that the COTS checklist did not match the manufacturer’s checklist relating to the landing gear failure and manual gear extension. The omission of steps within the COTS checklist significantly contributed to the pilot’s inability to fully extend the aircraft’s landing gear. Further, the CAUTION statement in the POH/AFM was not present on the COTS checklist. The CAUTION states: "Do not re-engage landing gear operating motor in flight. To reduce landing gear side loads to a minimum, avoid crosswind landing and high speed turns while taxiing."

Recommended Action: Pilots and operators, other than those operating an aircraft under 14 CFR Part 121 or 135 that choose to use COTS or personally developed checklists should meticulously compare them to the manufacturer’s checklist and placards contained in the POH/AFM to confirm they are consistent. This action will ensure the pilot has all pertinent manufacturer’s information during aircraft flight operations.

Contact: Questions or comments regarding this SAFO should be directed to the General Aviation’s Commercial Operations Branch (AFS-820) at (202) 267-1100.

Link to SAFO 17006

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

Basic Medical Begins

FAA & FAASTeam News - Mon, 04/24/2017 - 10:11

April 24- General aviation pilots can now prepare to fly under BasicMed without holding a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) medical certificate as long as they meet certain requirements. They can fly under BasicMed beginning on May 1, the effective date of the January 10 final rule. It offers pilots an alternative to the FAA's medical qualification process for third class medical certificates, while keeping general aviation pilots safe and flying affordable.

General aviation pilots may take advantage of the regulatory relief in the BasicMed rule or opt to continue to use their FAA medical certificate. Under BasicMed, a pilot will be required to complete a medical education course every two years, undergo a medical examination every four years, and comply with aircraft and operating restrictions. For example, pilots using BasicMed cannot operate an aircraft with more than six people onboard and the aircraft must not weigh more than 6,000 pounds.

A pilot flying under the BasicMed rule must:·     

  • possess a valid driver's license;
  • consent to a National Driver Register check;
  • have held a medical certificate that was valid at any time after July 15, 2006;
  • have not had the most recently held medical certificate revoked, suspended, or withdrawn;
  • have not had the most recent application for airman medical certification completed and denied;
  • have taken a BasicMed online medical education course within the past 24 calendar months;
  • have completed a comprehensive medical examination with any state-licensed physician within the past 48 months;
  • have been found eligible for special issuance of a medical certificate for certain specified mental health, neurological, or cardiovascular conditions, when applicable; and
  • not fly for compensation or hire.

Pilots can read and print the Comprehensive Medical Examination Checklist and learn about online BasicMed online medical courses at www.faa.gov/go/BasicMed.

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

Got Safety Culture?

FAA & FAASTeam News - Mon, 04/17/2017 - 11:00

By Bill Johnson, PhD Chief Scientific and Technical Advisor for Human Factors in

Aircraft Maintenance Systems, FAA.

Capitalizing on selected questions, used for discussion in an FAA Airworthiness

Inspector’s Human Factors Workshop, Johnson

helps you to be introspective as you reconsider

your corporate safety culture.

The mere thought of another Ph.D. writing about

“Safety Culture” could cause you to flip to the next

article in this AMT magazine. Don’t do that! Try a

couple more paragraphs.Look for definitions of

safety culture. There are many. The good news is

that the definitions are redundant, containing the

same words and concepts.

Safety culture, like organizational culture, is founded on an organization’s shared

beliefs, attitudes, values, and commitment regarding the importance of safety at

every level of the organization. A strong safety culture requires unilateral knowledge

and commitment. Every person in the organization should be able to express, with

varying levels of detail, their personal commitment and job/task related contribution

to worker safety and safe flight.

While definitions of safety culture are abundant safety culture is intangible. It is not

an object or a written policy. An organization cannot “hold up and show” their safety

culture. While intangible, an organization’s safety culture is manifested by employee

attitude and behavior. It is visible based on how corporate leaders from every level

of management demonstrate their understanding of culture and their commitment to

safety. Demonstrated commitment can include training programs, voluntary

reporting with a just culture, establishment of formal measures to identify and

manage hazards, and sufficient equipment and procedures to enhance continuing

worker and flight safety.

Aviation Safety Inspectors Consider Safety Culture During Human

Factors Training

Regulatory compliance is one of many ways to ensure safety. A primary role of the

FAA Airworthiness Aviation Inspector is to ensure that the regulated entity, any

certificate holder, follows the rules. FAA’s Compliance Philosophy helps the ASI to

work with you to ensure compliance. Of course, mere compliance does not

guarantee a quality safety culture. Your FAA Inspector is not a safety culture

assessor. However, an insightful ASI can work with you to help identify challenges

and solutions before they evolve to a noncompliance or an undesirable event.

All FAA Airworthiness ASIs take a three-day maintenance human factors course.

FAA is one of the few regulators that offer such a course for their workforce. This

author sees the course as one of many demonstrated FAA Flight Standards

management commitments to organizational safety culture. The mere existence and

support of the three-day class shows that FAA management sees the importance of

the maintenance human factors topics. The class is a tangible demonstration of

safety culture.

The course covers the usual maintenance human factors fundamentals, like human

error, communication, fitness for duty, failure to use technical procedures, event

investigation, voluntary reporting, and more.

The course is structured around the PEAR Model, standing for People, the

Environment on which they work, the Actions that they perform, and the Resources

necessary to complete the work. Yes, the Dirty Dozen is included.

There is considerable discussion throughout the course proceedings. Average

aviation years of experience for this class are always greater than 25. Thus,

experience and aviation wisdom ensures powerful story telling. One unit of the

course considers safety culture by looking at demonstrated ways to consider an

organization's commitment to safety (aka, safety culture). Here are a few sample

ASI questions and expected company answers.

Voluntary Reporting Question

ASI Question: Show me the published written “Just Culture” policy and

steps for voluntary reporting

Sample Excellent Corporate Answer: Here is the policy. It is part of our Aviation

Safety Action Program, or a similar reporting method. It clearly explains the

voluntary reporting process and how such reports are processed. It delineates a

timely just culture decision-making process that protects workers who make

mistakes. It makes it clear that blatant procedural noncompliance, reckless behavior,

unfitness for duty, or falsification of records, and other actions are not protected by

the policy and not immune from regulatory or corporate punitive action. This

program has been instrumental in identification and management of hazards and

risk before it becomes an undesirable event. To maximize the value of this

voluntarily reported information we publish a quarterly newsletter of significant

reports. In addition we use voluntary reports as discussion items for shift change

and other safety meetings. We are working on a program to push this information to

worker mobile phones.

Human Factors Training Question

ASI Question: Show me the course outlines for your maintenance

human factors training

Sample Excellent Corporate Answer: We have three courses for maintenance

human factors. One is a two-hour introduction for new hires. The second is an eighthour

course for all employees. That course includes about two to four hours of

computer-based training of fundamentals.

It is followed by a four-hour event investigation and discussion class, with an

instructor. Our third class is the two-hour recurrent training which includes

information from our voluntary reporting, other event-based reports, and any

description of new practices/procedures. It is aligned with the EASA recurrent

training requirements and takes place on a 24-month recurring basis.

All employees, managers, and executives must take the human factors training. Our

instructors are usually promoted from the maintenance or maintenance training

ranks. Usually they have a college degree and an Airframe and Powerplant

Certificate but neither are firm requirements. All HF instructors must have taken a

train-the-trainer class and some human factors training outside of our organization.

We encourage our HF trainers to attend at least one human factors related meeting

at least annually.

Shift Turnover Question

ASI Question: Show me your shift turnover practices/process

Sample Excellent Corporate Answer: Of course, the shift turnover question is

somewhat dependent on the size and complexity of the shop/location. Our various

departments match the turnover to meet their specific requirements. There is no one

size fits all. In most cases we have designated lead mechanics who have the

responsibility to document the status of jobs from one shift to another. They have the

responsibility and are given sufficient shift overlap time to convey the status of all

tasks that transfer from one shift to the next. If there are complex procedures in

progress, the lead mechanic can ask personnel from the outgoing shift to stay on to

ensure proper handover. There is a shift turnover office at the worksite where the

meetings take place for every turnover. Job cards are used as the primary

documentation for job status. We have documentation to ensure that all appropriate

handover communications are clearly discussed and documented accordingly.

Incoming workers are required to check the last task performed prior to the shift

change. In our company the management and the workers recognize that shift

change, or within shift task turnover, presents a hazard. We treat shift and task

turnover very seriously.

Safety Culture Question

ASI Question: What evidence do you have to indicate that your company

has a positive safety culture?

Sample Excellent Corporate Answer: You can ask any worker on this floor and you

will get an answer to this question. We have had a lot of training about risk

assessment. The training is backed up with newsletters, signage, and plenty of heart

felt talk from company leadership. Every worker knows their particular jobs and can

talk about how their job performance affects overall attention to worker and flight

safety. We celebrate accident-free worker safety as much as we celebrate

schedules and maintenance quality performance. When a worker sees or perceives

a serious issue they are encouraged to report the potential hazard immediately. We

have seen management rush to buy new equipment when workers identify potential

safety risk. Voluntary reporting on safety-critical matters is always perceived as a

positive step toward continuing safety in our departments and for the company at

large. As workers we appreciate the quest for continuing safety. We get it!

Size Matters for a Safety Culture

The FAA Aviation Safety Inspectors human factors class includes inspectors from

the airlines, larger repair stations, and small general aviation organizations. That

diverse group of inspectors knows that one size safety culture does not fit all. Large

organizations have multiple shops and locations to manage and there may even be

a designated person to manage activities that foster culture. Small shops have fewer

people and fewer resources to help cultivate the right culture. Size does matter but

that is OK. As stated at the outset the key words include: shared beliefs, knowledge,

values, and commitments where every person in the organization can express their

personal commitment and demonstrated contribution to worker safety and safe

flight. Got safety culture?

 

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

CALLBACK 447 - April 2017

ASRS Callback - Thu, 04/13/2017 - 09:45
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Issue 447 April 2017 This month, CALLBACK again offers the reader a chance to “interact” with the information given in a selection of ASRS reports. In “The First Half of the Story,” you will find report excerpts describing an event up to a decision point. You may then use your own judgment to determine possible courses of action and make a decision regarding the best way to resolve the situation.

The selected ASRS reports may not give all the information you want, and you may not be experienced in the type of aircraft involved, but each incident should give you a chance to exercise your aviation decision-making skills. In “The Rest of the Story…” you will find the actions actually taken by reporters in response to each situation. Bear in mind that their decisions may not necessarily represent the best course of action. Our intent is to stimulate thought, discussion, and training related to the type of incidents that were reported.

The following reports chronicle situations where pilots, once their decisions were made, operated their aircraft into a critical phase of flight. Choices are not always clear-cut, decisions are always second guessed, and no number of rules or checklists can cover the range of decisions that a pilot may be required to make. Our hope is that thoughtful discussion of these incidents might benefit the judgment that a pilot employs while making decisions that may or may not be dictated by a regulation, rule, or checklist. The First Half of the StorySituation # 1  Beech 1900 Captain’s Report■ Early during the takeoff roll, the pilot noted a right hand LOW FUEL PRESS annunciator and associated Master Warning.… All [other] aircraft instruments and indications remained normal.
What Would You Have Done? Situation #2 Air Carrier Flight Crew Report ■ The marine fog bank had just come in. As we were intercepting the course for the RNAV Y RWY 27 approach, several planes ahead of us all went around. Tower gave us a short delay vector off the course and re-cleared us on the LOC RWY 27 approach. We did a very quick and dirty brief, noting…managed/selected [speeds] and [a potential] missed approach. I loaded the FMC while the Captain flew. I felt we were being rushed with the last minute approach change, and…it was only my third flight [in the last month]. I was slower than normal and a bit rusty as well. I didn’t notice that the Derived Decision Altitude (DDA) I set was above the 500 feet AGL call. As we neared the minimums, I was looking to make the 500 feet call and completely missed the 100 feet above “Approaching Minimums” call and subsequently was late with the “Minimums” call also. The Captain called “Minimums” for me followed by his “Going Around” call. He pushed the thrust levers up to the go around detent, called “Flaps 3,” and began to pitch up. I was still a second or two behind him thinking about the minimums call I just missed and didn’t immediately retract the flaps. Before I could set the flaps to three, the Captain said that the runway was in sight.
What Would You Have Done? Situation #3  ERJ170/175 Captain’s Report ■ We departed with good weather forecast for Salt Lake City with no alternate needed. We were planned with 600 pounds of taxi fuel and 1,471 pounds of contingency fuel. The flight was uneventful until we began the descent to SLC. We were being vectored north around the airport to get around a storm that was over the airport. As we broke out north of the airport, I looked down and saw it raining on the east side with more storms east of the airport. We were on downwind vectors for [runway] 16L and had just been cleared for the approach when ATC said that aircraft were reporting a loss of 20 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) on final and were going around. I told the FO to tell them we will be discontinuing the approach and would like to hold for a bit. We were still doing alright on fuel then and had 3,800 pounds on board. I figured we had 10 to 15 minutes before we had to do an approach to SLC or divert.… I was focused on whether or not we could hold long enough to get into SLC. ATC said that the storm was passing at SLC, and the winds were 16 knots and steady with no Low Level Windshear alerts. They asked if we would like to do an approach. We decided that we would try a single approach, and if we went missed, [then we would] go to ZZZ. We setup for the approach, intercepted final, and started configuring flaps. ATC advised heavy precipitation between us and the runway.

We were on the glideslope at 190 KIAS with flaps 2 passing through 7,500 feet MSL when it seems we might have encountered a microburst.… Within 5 seconds our indicated airspeed rapidly increased to 234 KIAS.
What Would You Have Done? Situation #4  B737 First Officer’s Report ■ While on approach, we started out a little high due to thunderstorms that were on our arrival. The deviation was going to get us on the ground with about 6,400 pounds of fuel. Just north of the airport, we were turned onto a downwind and cleared to 4,000 feet MSL, and after that to 3,000 feet. Once we got close to leveling off at 3,000 feet, we were given a base turn…and cleared down to 2,600 feet. At that time we reported the airport in sight, and I noticed that we were still around 240 KIAS. I queried the Captain if he still wanted to go that fast. He said he had not realized we were still going that fast and started slowing. He dropped the gear and started slowing while also following the glide slope. I made the 1,000 foot call, but we both realized we only had flaps 15 selected up until that point. We missed that gate, but it looked like the aircraft was slowing enough to make the 500 foot gate. As we tried to get the aircraft slowed, I think we may have had only flaps 25 at the 500 foot gate. What Would You Have Done?The Rest of the Story
Situation #1  Beech 1900 Captain’s Report The Reporter's Action■ The pilot rejected the takeoff, as briefed, for a Master Warning prior to V1 speed. The pilot assumed a false annunciator warning because the LOW FUEL PRESS annunciator extinguished after power was reduced…and all other remaining instruments and annunciators were indicating normal. The pilot decided to attempt a normal takeoff after taxiing back to [the] runway and receiving takeoff clearance. All operations during the second takeoff were entirely normal and routine, with no abnormal annunciations or events. The flight continued through termination under normal operating circumstances.First Half of Situation #2
Situation #2  Air Carrier Flight Crew Report The First Officer's Action■ We had hit a hole in the clouds, and the runway was there. We were still configured and in position to make a safe landing.The Captain's Action■ A second or two after bringing up the power, we were in the clear with the runway in sight. Since the flaps and gear had not been moved yet, I chose to pitch over gently and continued visually to land in the touchdown zone with a normal rate of descent and normal landing. First Half of Situation #3
Situation #3  ERJ170/175 Captain’s Report The Reporter's Action■ I would have normally broken off the approach immediately, but we were high enough off the ground that I could get stable by 1,000 feet AGL, and I also expected the [air]speed increase to immediately subside. We were both caught completely off guard when the airspeed didn’t go back to normal, but actually kept increasing. At that point, I told ATC that we were going missed and going to ZZZ.… Even though there was a flap overspeed, I elected to retract the flaps due to our fuel status and not knowing if there would be a delay getting into ZZZ with other aircraft being diverted there. I felt it would be less risky to retract the flaps than to continue flying with the flaps at 2 and burn extra fuel. We landed at ZZZ uneventfully, and I left the flaps in the landing configuration until Maintenance could look at them. First Half of Situation #4
Situation #4  B737 First Officer’s Report The Reporter's Action■ I should have made the go-around call per Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). However, neither of us announced the go-around, and we continued to land.… Luckily, we landed uneventfully. As we taxied clear of the runway, we both agreed that we should have gone around and, after the fact, realized our non-compliance. I realized that I should have used my training and my assertiveness to announce the go-around per SOP. I still regret not speaking up as I should have. Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 447 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS View ASRS Report Sets ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more » February 2017 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 4,128 General Aviation Pilots 1,104 Controllers 545 Military/Other 307 Flight Attendants 296 Mechanics 182 Dispatchers 169 TOTAL 6,731 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 6 Hazard to Flight 1 TOTAL 7 NOTE TO READERS:  ■ or ■ Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 447

NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189
Categories: News

FAA Safety Briefing April 2017

FAA & FAASTeam News - Wed, 04/12/2017 - 09:34
Read the Latest Issue!

Want to learn more about ADS-B? Then don’t miss reading this!

Ins and Outs of ADS-B

This issue focuses on Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) technology, a foundational component of FAA's NextGen system for improving the safety and efficiency of the NAS. Articles cover the myriad safety and technology benefits ADS-B offers, as well as provide important details on the purchase, installation, and operation of ADS-B equipment.

    Download Magazine:

PDF  |  EPUB  (for e-readers) |  MOBI (for Kindle)

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

FAA Clarification of Overhaul Requirements Under Part 91

FAA & FAASTeam News - Wed, 04/05/2017 - 09:28

Notice N 8900.410

Purpose of This Notice. This notice clarifies the differences between overhaul processes and the inspections that make up required inspection programs under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 91.

Background. There have been several recent issues surrounding the interpretation of whether compliance with the manufacturer’s recommended time between overhaul (TBO) intervals are required under part 9.

The Notice is avialble here in PDF:  http://fsims.faa.gov/wdocs/notices/n8900_410.pdf

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

EASA: U.S. Operators Can’t Use MMEL in Europe

AskBob News - Tue, 03/28/2017 - 13:37

U.S. Part 91 twin turboprops and jets flown in Europe must now operate with a Minimum Equipment List (MEL) developed for that specific aircraft under Letter of Authorization (LOA) D195, rather than with a manufacturer’s aircraft model Master MEL (MMEL) approved by the FAA under LOA DO95. Laurent Chapeau, head of the ramp inspection office of the French Safety Oversight Authority, which administers SAFA ramp inspections for third-country operators in France, has affirmed EASA’s recent recognition of the ICAO standard.

“The regulation is now clearly written from last November,” Chapeau said, adding that his agency has noted a lack of compliance “during ramp inspections in the last few months.” In some cases, inspectors “did raise Category 2 findings,” which represent “significant impact on safety” and require operators to take follow-up preventive action.

Under ICAO guidelines, LOA DO95 doesn’t provide the oversight or approval process required for a valid MEL. FAA Flight Standards is reportedly developing compliance solutions for affected U.S. operators. The U.S. is the sole ICAO signatory country that allows operators to use an MMEL as an MEL.

Source: AINOnline

Categories: News, US

EASA Aims To Tighten MX Flight Check Rules

AskBob News - Tue, 03/21/2017 - 13:30

The European Aviation Safety Agency has issued an opinion that is the first step in creating a rule aimed at mitigating mishaps during maintenance check flights (MCFs). According to EASA, a number of accidents and incidents have occurred during MCFs, caused by incomplete or inadequate maintenance.

This opinion proposes safety requirements to adequately select pilots and apply procedures for MCFs, while distinguishing between complex aircraft and non-complex aircraft. Operators conducting the higher risk category of these MCFs in complex aircraft (including business jets) will have to develop EASA-approved procedures and ensure coordination among the new MCF regulations; the member state’s continuing airworthiness management program; and the maintenance provider, whether commercial or private.

Some 362 comments were submitted to the notice of proposed amendment on MCFs published in 2012. The agency says the opinion responds to these comments. A rule is expected to be adopted in the first quarter of 2019.

Categories: News, US

Augmented Reality Could Help Close Skill Gap In Maintenance

AskBob News - Wed, 03/15/2017 - 11:27

The demand for aircraft engineers and mechanics continues to increase rapidly, especially in parts of the world with the least training infrastructure. Kevin Deal, vice president of Aerospace & Defense at IFS, thinks virtual reality and augmented reality tools could help meet the demand.

Japan Airlines recently deployed a virtual reality headset for engine mechanics and flight-crew trainees,” Deal notes. And the overall market for virtual and augmented reality is expected to reach $120 billion by 2020.

These technologies have been used in commercial and military aviation for simulated training for several years. Now Deal sees them being used to address the skill gaps in aviation maintenance.

Read Full Article on Aviation Week

Categories: News, US

Like The Proposed Changes To FAA Airworthiness Approval Tags?

AskBob News - Wed, 03/15/2017 - 11:19

MRO-Network.com reports the FAA is seeking comments on an advisory circular about instructions for use of airworthiness approval tags. 

The FAA is requesting comment on draft Advisory Circular (AC) 43-ARTS, which provides instructions for use of the airworthiness approval tag.

If issued in its current form, the new AC would address requirements for a single and dual release, as well as recognize electronic generation and digital signatures. Initial industry feedback suggests that the draft document is a significant departure from current regulatory interpretation and policy.

The original deadline to provide comment was extended in response to an industry coalition request. Comment is due June 12.

Categories: News, US

Lycoming Rolls Back Prices On Engine Parts

AskBob News - Wed, 03/15/2017 - 10:33

With little fanfare, Lycoming has dramatically rolled back prices on major engine parts, including crankcases and crankshafts. The price reductions on some parts are as much as 70 percent, according to the company, and have reset overhaul decisions for many owners who may have unserviceable cranks or cases. Heretofore, those replacement parts would have been drawn from the overhaul or repair pool and owners would have been charged accordingly. Now owners can opt for new crankcases and crankshafts at prices comparable to what they might have expected to pay for repaired parts.

Lycoming’s Steve Palmatier told us that the company routinely reviews production costs and selling prices on all of its parts and determined that it could boost parts sales by drastically reducing prices. One way they did this was to unbundle crankcase sales. The company once sold crankcases only as kits, which included such accessories as through bolts and spacers.

Read the Full Avweb article

Categories: News, US

CALLBACK 446 - March 2017

ASRS Callback - Tue, 03/14/2017 - 11:31
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Issue 446 March 2017 “Defined as overconfidence from repeated experience on a specific activity, complacency has been implicated as a contributing factor in numerous aviation accidents and incidents. Like fatigue, complacency reduces the pilot’s effectiveness in the flight deck. However, complacency is harder to recognize than fatigue, since everything is perceived to be progressing smoothly.”1

Complacency plagues more aviation professionals than just pilots. It can occur to anyone while accomplishing the most routine function or the most complex task in any sector of aviation operations. Because immunity from complacency simply does not exist, proactive techniques and procedures are necessary to mitigate its detrimental effects.

ASRS receives numerous reports suggesting that complacency is a significant factor in reported incidents across various aviation professions. CALLBACK examines a cross section of those reports and shows how complacency can combine with other factors to create undesirable circumstances that would be better avoided. Fueling Complacency This C182 pilot experienced an embarrassing loss of engine power. The pilot attributed his loss of power and subsequent off-field landing to pilot complacency when he overlooked a portion of the checklist procedures.■ [I] began to experience engine roughness followed quickly by a complete loss of power.… I had already closed the IFR flight plan and was…inbound to land. The engine lost power at 1,500 feet AGL, about 4 miles from [the airport] with 18 knots of headwind. Given the proximity to the ground and distance to the runway, [I] reversed course…and began searching for a place to land. Seeing that there was no immediate traffic on the highway, I decided to land [there], and the landing proceeded without incident.

Upon inspection of the aircraft, the cause was discovered for my loss of power. It was…fuel starvation. The fuel selector switch had been set to the right tank, and the previous flight had been conducted while on only one tank. The chain of events…was set in motion by the complacency of the Pilot in Command (PIC) and failure to properly…abide by checklist procedures in the cockpit. Familiarity with the aircraft led to a level of complacency on my part…[with] the fuel selector switch and checklist flow during preflight. My belief that the selector switch was always on BOTH allowed the checklist item to go unnoticed. The…flight [was] conducted with the aid of the autopilot, which prevented me from noticing the aircraft flying more and more out of trim while one [fuel] tank was being exhausted. Approaching the airport and disconnecting the autopilot, [I] noticed the trim situation, which was promptly overshadowed as the engine lost power. Ground proximity, aircraft configuration, airspeed, and the urgency of the situation prevented me from attempting corrective measures that might have restored engine power. Dueling Complacency A Tower Controller’s complacency, compounded by a pilot’s perfectly timed mistake, resulted in a ground conflict that could have had more serious consequences. ■ The Ground Controller advised me that an aircraft had taxied out and taken a wrong turn and that an aircraft would be holding short of the runway, waiting to cross. At that time a Bonanza advised me that he was holding short of the runway, ready for departure. I advised Ground Control that the aircraft that taxied the wrong way could wait until the Bonanza departed. I had a Cessna that was on short final for a touch and go. Once I had sufficient spacing, [I issued], “Bonanza, Runway 3, cleared for takeoff.” The Bonanza read back the runway and “Cleared for takeoff.”

During this time of day, the sun was setting to the southwest, and we had the double shades pulled, making it difficult to see the approach end of the runway. My attention was focused to the approach end of the runway, looking for the Bonanza to depart, when I noticed an aircraft pass the tower departing the opposite direction runway [Runway 21].

I felt that complacency on my part was to blame. I should have observed the Bonanza at the approach end of the runway instead of taking his word for it. The pilot couldn’t read a compass, read a runway sign depicting which way the runway goes, or familiarize himself with an airfield layout. This is a situation that I will probably never see again. Automating ComplacencyA G-V pilot was surprised when his automation did not capture the altitude as it always had. Contemplating the incident, he discovered the underlying problem.■ I was given a clearance to cross an arrival intersection at 14,000 feet. I reset the altitude alerter to 14,000 feet and selected VPATH for the vertical mode of operation. The autopilot was [engaged in] the descent mode.… The Pilot Not Flying (PNF), was out of the seat to use the lavatory prior to landing. All was in order, so I looked at the FMS to review the ATIS information and to further review the arrival.… During this time my attention was diverted from the primary flight display. The automation did not…capture the assigned altitude. It kept descending until I looked and saw the altimeter at 13,300 feet. I immediately disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles and corrected the aircraft back to 14,000 feet as assigned. As I was leveling at 14,000 feet, the PNF returned to his station and asked me what had happened. A short exchange took place, and we pressed on with the flight. No instruction or challenge was made by ATC, and no conflict was indicated by the TCAS.

For a long…time after this flight concluded, I evaluated the performance of my duties.… I failed to adequately monitor the specific flight path of the aircraft during a critical time in the flight. I got complacent…, and I believe it was because for so many years of operating this equipment, never had the automation failed to perform as it had been set up. I believed that it would do as always.… I allowed myself to occupy my attention with other aspects of the flight. Worse, I allowed this to happen when the other pilot was away from his station. I did not discipline myself to avoid distraction from the primary duty.… Complacency contributed directly to this deviation and…has no place on the flight deck. Functional ComplacencyDuring the initial takeoff on what seemed to be a routine day, a B767-300 First Officer made a simple, but significant error. Making no excuses, he describes how complacency was the most probable culprit. ■ After becoming airborne on our initial takeoff, the Captain called, “Gear up.” Inexplicably, I raised the flap handle instead of the gear handle. Over the next several seconds, the flaps retracted while I confirmed lateral navigation (LNAV) at 400 feet AGL, selected vertical navigation (VNAV) at 1,000 feet AGL, and responded to Tower’s call to change to Departure Control. During this time, the flaps were retracting, and the minimum airspeed indicator “hook” increased until the stick shaker activated. When this happened, I looked at the flap indicator, realized my error, and extended the flaps to takeoff position (Flaps 5). Simultaneously, the Captain reduced the climb angle, I raised the gear handle, the aircraft accelerated, and the stick shaker stopped. The rest of the departure was normal.

I screwed up.… No excuses. I have no idea why I reached for the flaps instead of the gear. I have successfully raised the gear—without error—for decades and buckets of hours. Slow down. Don’t rush. Fight complacency. Don’t think it can’t happen to you! Procedural ComplacencyThis Mechanic erred while performing a procedure on a CRJ-700 engine. Only after extensive damage was done to the engine during run-up testing, did he realize the mistake and distinguish between the apparent and root causes. From the right seat Mechanic’s report:■ I had performed a Fan Blade Pin change on the Right Engine in accordance with the appropriate work card.… We taxied the aircraft to the testing ramp, and after the required time had elapsed, we began the test by increasing the engine speed to full power. All indications up to this time had been normal.… After several seconds at full power, the vibration began to very quickly increase to 1.1.… Upon arrival [back] at the hangar, it was discovered that extensive damage had occurred within the engine. I very quickly…discovered that a ratchet I had been using to perform the pin change was missing. I then went to the acting Supervisor's office and reported the damage and my missing tool.

Several factors may have contributed to this incident. It was very early in the morning on my first day back to work after three days off. This is a job I have performed often, and overconfidence or complacency may have figured in. From the left seat Mechanic’s report:■ The procedure was not followed. Combating Complacency This Flight Attendant, who recognized an ongoing situation where complacency could generate a real hazard, attempted to mitigate the threat by making the hazard known. We applaud both the Flight Attendant and the effort. ■ This report is to highlight my concern about personnel who are not active working crew members on a flight (jumpseaters), but take it upon themselves to arm and disarm aircraft doors. I have personally had this situation happen, and I have witnessed it happening to fellow working crew members.

My intent…is to bring to the attention of the company…an action that should be discouraged and discontinued due to its ability to impact the safety and security of an armed aircraft door.… I think a note or bulletin needs to be sent out to each and every flight attendant explaining proper procedures so that complacency does not breed an opportunity for a fatal outcome.1 Aviation Instructor's Handbook (FAA-H-8083-9A), 2008, p. 9-11. Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 446 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more »
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report » January 2017 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,043 General Aviation Pilots 1,102 Controllers 504 Flight Attendants 404 Military/Other 350 Dispatchers 229 Mechanics 181 TOTAL 7,813 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 1 Airport Facility or Procedure 3 Company Policy 1 TOTAL 5 NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 446




NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189
Categories: News

FAA Safety Team | Safer Skies Through Education

FAA & FAASTeam News - Wed, 03/08/2017 - 13:07

 

FAAST Blast – InFO on ACS Revision, SAIBs Issued for Piper/AmSafe, Personal Minimums, The Wild (Not So Blue) Yonder
Notice Number: NOTC7054

FAAST Blast — Week of Feb 20, 2017 – Feb 26, 2017
Biweekly FAA Safety Briefing News Update

 

FAA Issues Notice on Use of Electronic Nav Systems for Private Pilot Practical

The FAA issued an Information for Operators (InFO) bulletin last week that describes an upcoming revision to the Private Pilot-Airplane Airman Certification Standards (ACS) that will allow pilots to use aircraft with installed or onboard electrical navigation systems during their private pilot practical test. The revision will clear up an inadvertent change from the Practical Test Standards. For more, see InFO 17003 here.

 

SAIBs Cover Piper Landing Gear Concern; Restraint System Assembly Issue

            The FAA this week issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB CE-17-08) that pertains to certain Piper PA-23 models. The SAIB highlights a concern regarding a failure of the main landing gear drag link bolt, which can cause the main gear to collapse.

            The FAA also issued an SAIB (NM-17-07) to advise owners and operators, and original equipment manufacturers of Normal, Utility, Acrobatic and Commuter Category Aircraft, and Transport Category Airplanes of the potential for failure of the end release buckle on certain AmSafe, Inc., restraint system assemblies installed on the passenger seats. The FAA recommends accomplishing the procedures outlined in AmSafe Service Bulletin 504443-25-02 Issue 10, dated February 10, 2016, on airplanes having any affected part, at the earliest opportunity.

            Both SAIBs can be found here on the FAA’s Regulatory and Guidance Library.

 

#FlySafe Topic of the Month – Personal Minimums

            This month we’re focused on personal minimums and how to integrate these important safety measures into your flight planning. For details, see the FAA’s news release and FAA Safety Team flyer here.

 

The Wild (Not So Blue) Yonder

The Jan/Feb 2017 issue of FAA Safety Briefing focuses on risk management and follows the framework of the PAVE checklist: Pilot, Aircraft, enVironment, and External Pressures. Today we look at the “V” in PAVE to learn more about how to properly evaluate the flight operating environment before you launch into the wild blue yonder. The most obvious risk element is weather, a powerful and often fickle factor in the equation for assessing environmental risk for flight. Other environmental factors include terrain, obstacles, lighting, airspace, airports, traffic, and more. To learn more, see the article “The Wild (Not So Blue) Yonder” at https://adobe.ly/2hus9AX.

Produced by the FAA Safety Briefing editors, http://www.faa.gov/news/safety_briefing/
Address questions or comments to: SafetyBriefing@faa.gov.
Follow us on Twitter @FAASafetyBrief or https://twitter.com/FAASafetyBrief

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Invite a fellow pilot to the next WINGS Safety Seminar in your area.

 

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

March/April 2017 issue of FAA Safety Briefing

FAA & FAASTeam News - Wed, 03/08/2017 - 12:08

The March/April 2017 issue of FAA Safety Briefing focuses on Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) technology, a foundational component of FAA’s NextGen system for improving the safety and efficiency of the NAS. Articles cover the myriad safety and technology benefits ADS-B offers, as well as provide important details on the purchase, installation, and operation of ADS-B equipment.

 

Feature articles include:

  • ADS-B 101 – What It Is, and What It Means To You (p. 8)
  • Getting It Right – What You Need to Know About ADS-B Installation Errors (p. 11)
  • Everyone Loves a Rebate – The FAA’s General Aviation ADS-B Rebate Program Explained (p. 14)
  • What’s In a Name? – How to Avoid an ADS-B Call Sign Mismatch (p.18)
  • Top 10 Things You Need to Know About ADS-B – Quick Tips and Information for GA Aircraft (p.22)

 

In the March/April Jumpseat department, Flight Standards Service Director John Duncan highlights some important reasons to not procrastinate when it comes to meeting the Jan. 1, 2020 deadline for ADS-B Out, while the Angle of Attack department covers the important role ADS-B plays in helping mitigate mid-air collisions. In Nuts, Bolts, and Electrons, we look at three techniques that can help AMTs avoid errors during the set up and installation of an ADS-B Out system.

 

The Vertically Speaking department explains how the advent of ADS-B has helped keep helicopter operations safer and more efficient and outlines how the FAA is helping to streamline the ADS-B installation process for those in the rotorcraft community. And in our editor’s perspective department, Postflight, editor-in-chief Susan Parson provides an “ADS-B PIREP” on her DC-area flying club’s strategy for finding the optimal ADS-B solution for their Cessna 182.

 

Our ADS-B themed issue of FAA Safety Briefing wraps up with a profile of Aviation Safety Inspector Jim Marks, the ADS-B Focus Team lead in the FAA’s Aircraft Maintenance Division. Marks is also the driving force behind development of the ADS-B Performance Monitor, a tool that allows the agency’s Flight Standards Service to provide regulatory oversight of the rule and data to support equipage reporting and the general aviation ADS-B Out rebate program.

 

The link to the online edition is: http://www.faa.gov/news/safety_briefing/. Please see our new mobile-friendly links to each feature article. Be sure to follow us on Twitter - @FAASafetyBrief

 

FAA Safety Briefing is the safety policy voice for the non-commercial general aviation community.  The magazine's objective is to improve safety by:

  • making the community aware of FAA resources
  • helping readers understand safety and regulatory issues, and
  • encouraging continued training

 

 

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

FAA Safety Team | Safer Skies Through Education

FAA & FAASTeam News - Tue, 02/28/2017 - 13:12

FAAST Blast – InFO on ACS Revision, SAIBs Issued for Piper/AmSafe, Personal Minimums, The Wild (Not So Blue) Yonder
Notice Number: NOTC7054

FAAST Blast — Week of Feb 20, 2017 – Feb 26, 2017
Biweekly FAA Safety Briefing News Update

FAA Issues Notice on Use of Electronic Nav Systems for Private Pilot Practical

The FAA issued an Information for Operators (InFO) bulletin last week that describes an upcoming revision to the Private Pilot-Airplane Airman Certification Standards (ACS) that will allow pilots to use aircraft with installed or onboard electrical navigation systems during their private pilot practical test. The revision will clear up an inadvertent change from the Practical Test Standards. For more, see InFO 17003 here.

SAIBs Cover Piper Landing Gear Concern; Restraint System Assembly Issue

The FAA this week issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB CE-17-08) that pertains to certain Piper PA-23 models. The SAIB highlights a concern regarding a failure of the main landing gear drag link bolt, which can cause the main gear to collapse.

The FAA also issued an SAIB (NM-17-07) to advise owners and operators, and original equipment manufacturers of Normal, Utility, Acrobatic and Commuter Category Aircraft, and Transport Category Airplanes of the potential for failure of the end release buckle on certain AmSafe, Inc., restraint system assemblies installed on the passenger seats. The FAA recommends accomplishing the procedures outlined in AmSafe Service Bulletin 504443-25-02 Issue 10, dated February 10, 2016, on airplanes having any affected part, at the earliest opportunity.

Both SAIBs can be found here on the FAA’s Regulatory and Guidance Library.

#FlySafe Topic of the Month – Personal Minimums

This month we’re focused on personal minimums and how to integrate these important safety measures into your flight planning. For details, see the FAA’s news release and FAA Safety Team flyer here.

The Wild (Not So Blue) Yonder

The Jan/Feb 2017 issue of FAA Safety Briefing focuses on risk management and follows the framework of the PAVE checklist: Pilot, Aircraft, enVironment, and External Pressures. Today we look at the “V” in PAVE to learn more about how to properly evaluate the flight operating environment before you launch into the wild blue yonder. The most obvious risk element is weather, a powerful and often fickle factor in the equation for assessing environmental risk for flight. Other environmental factors include terrain, obstacles, lighting, airspace, airports, traffic, and more. To learn more, see the article “The Wild (Not So Blue) Yonder” at

https://adobe.ly/2hus9AX.

Produced by the FAA Safety Briefing editors, http://www.faa.gov/news/safety_briefing/
Address questions or comments to: SafetyBriefing@faa.gov.
Follow us on Twitter @FAASafetyBrief or https://twitter.com/FAASafetyBrief

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Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

CALLBACK 445 - February 2017

ASRS Callback - Thu, 02/16/2017 - 12:58
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Issue 445 February 2017 With the improvement of navigational capabilities, Area Navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigation Performance (RNP) operations have become routine procedures for performing many terminal instrument approaches. RNAV and RNP together compose Performance Based Navigation (PBN), which uses satellites and onboard equipment for navigation procedures that are more precise and accurate than standard avionics and ground-based navigation aids.1 PBN is so named because the types of routes and procedures an aircraft can fly are dependent upon the performance level of equipment and pilot training.1 RNAV permits aircraft to fly any desired flight path within the coverage of ground-based or space-based navigation aids, within the limits of aircraft avionics, or with a combination of these. RNP is a more advanced form of RNAV that includes an onboard performance monitoring and alerting capability.1

The use of RNAV and RNP terminal approach procedures has grown. As of Publication Cycle 01/05/2017, the FAA Instrument Flight Procedures (IFP) Inventory Summary lists a total of 6,837 RNAV charts comprising 14,932 unique sets of approach minimums.2 With expanded use of these procedures, new problems and concerns arise.

ASRS receives reports that indicate pilots experience common RNAV problems. While RNAV technology may be relatively new and still evolving, a large portion of reported problems appear to have roots in the basic knowledge and fundamentals of instrument flight. This month, CALLBACK examines reports depicting issues that crews encounter with RNAV operations in the terminal environment. The Unexpected RNAV Excursion – Back to Basics I This air carrier crew entered the RNAV approach that they intended to fly into their FMS. An unexpected turn during the approach started the next unwelcome turn of events.■ I was the pilot flying. The pilot monitoring had loaded the full RNAV (GPS) RWY 34R approach. After being cleared for the approach, we got established on the inbound course. Without notification the aircraft began a right turn. Realizing that the aircraft had begun to turn, we disconnected the autopilot and attempted hand flying the aircraft back onto course. Realizing that I was descending, I began to increase power and climb the aircraft. In the descent, a TERRAIN WARNING aural alert sounded, and a go-around and missed approach were initiated.

Storms in the area had created a very high workload. The turn was caused by a full procedure turn that had been included during the FMS setup for the approach that should not have been there. The excessive descent was caused by a work overload for myself as the pilot flying. The Unprotected RNAV Descent – Back to Basics II This aircrew experienced a late approach change that required them to program an RNAV approach. Manually reprogramming that approach resulted in an undesirable flight condition in weather and mountainous terrain. ■ We were filed to fly the MQU1A arrival into SKBO. Prior to MQU, the FO listened to ATIS and reported landings to Runways 13L and 13R. We briefed the ILS Runway 13L approach.… Approaching 14,000 feet,…the Approach Controller assigned 250 knots and the RNAV (GNSS) RWY 13R approach. We were also cleared direct to NEPOP. At this point I felt slightly rushed.

I loaded the RNAV (GNSS) RWY 13R approach, selected the NEPOP transition,…and briefed the approach. It was in the box as follows: Line 1 - NEPOP procedural hold at 13,000 feet; Line 2 - NEPOP at 12,000 feet; Line 3 - URULO (FAF) at 10,000 feet; Line 4 - RWY 13R.

Knowing that the Controller did not expect us to enter a procedural hold at NEPOP, I attempted to line select Line 2 (NEPOP at 12,000 feet) to Line 1. The box did not allow that action. At this time I elected to concentrate on slowing the airplane down for the approach. I directed the FO to…correct the sequence of waypoints for the intended approach. The FO thought he had solved the problem by line selecting Line 3 (URULO) to Line 2. This action displayed the proper sequence of NEPOP followed by URULO. By this time the aircraft was in the approach mode.… When VNAV was selected, VNAV PATH was displayed in the FMA. Thinking the approach was correctly sequenced, I directed the FO to set 9,100 in the MCP altitude window. The autopilot was on and soon…started a slow descent. Within a few hundred feet we broke out of the clouds.… We saw the airport and all surrounding terrain.… I suspected we were low…based on visual cues. The aircraft gave an ALTITUDE and PULL UP WARNING as we passed over a ridge. I elected to not respond to these warnings since I had visual contact on all terrain. We proceeded to Runway 13R and made a normal landing.… I now believe when URULO was line selected to Line 2, we lost the altitude protection of 12,000 feet at NEPOP.Common RNAV Automation SyndromeA change in runway and approach type required this B737 crew to program an RNAV approach and link it to the active arrival. It proved problematic, as did Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) currency, in executing the RNAV approach.■ The current ATIS information listed the ILS for Runways 16C and 16R in use.… The ILS for 16R had been set up and briefed. After checking in with Seattle Approach, we were instructed to fly the RNAV (RNP) Z RWY 16C approach, which joined with the…arrival.… The Captain attempted to re-program the FMS for the new approach.… I discovered that I did not have access to the approach since…I did not perform an update on my EFB on the layover. The Captain…had updated his EFB…and did have access to the approach, so we agreed that I would brief and fly from his approach plate. In the attempt to re-program the RNAV approach in the FMC and prepare to brief, the correct sequence of waypoints along the…arrival…dropped out of the LEGS page in the FMC, and a discontinuity was created after the waypoint…directly in front of us. I had requested that the Pilot Monitoring (PM) clean up the LEGS page prior to executing the change, however this did not happen due to the high workload…on the PM at that time. Consequently, when the aircraft traversed the next waypoint and reached a discontinuity on the LEGS page, it sequenced out of LNAV and into Control Wheel Steering (CWS). We immediately saw the change and attempted to turn toward the next waypoint, correct the discontinuity, and re-engage the correct lateral navigation. We reached a lateral excursion of 1.45 [NM] prior to correcting back to the published course. ATC queried us about our lateral excursion…, and we advised them of our correction.… We continued the arrival and were re-assigned the ILS 16C approach without further event. The Dubious RNAV Descent – Back to Basics IIIConfusion over RNAV Instrument Approach Procedures and RNAV FMS displays allowed this corporate crew to descend below published altitudes during their RNAV approach. The result was another close encounter with terra firma. ■ The airport reported 10 miles visibility and 900 feet scattered clouds, and the approach occurred during dusk while the sun was setting. We originally planned and briefed the visual approach with the LOC DME RWY 28L backup utilizing the FMS. The LOC DME RWY 28L was [reported out of service in the] NOTAMS. Approaching WIGGL, the IAF for both approaches, ATC informed us that we needed to choose an actual approach, as the airport weather had changed to 10 miles visibility in smoke and 900 feet overcast. We asked for…the RNAV (GPS) Y RWY 28L and decided to forgo a thorough briefing and fly it with the PM guiding the Pilot Flying (PF). Unfortunately, we missed the step down fixes between the FAF and the MAP that were not represented in the FMS. There was slight confusion in the application of the step down fixes, i.e. [whether they] apply to only the LP minimums, or also to the LNAV minimums.

I decided to descend to the MDA as early as possible to allow for more time to search for the runway in the haze. During the level off at the MDA,…about 6 nautical miles from the runway and descending through about 1,250 feet, we received an EGPWS TERRAIN CAUTION followed immediately by an EGPWS TERRAIN WARNING. We immediately initiated the escape maneuver. We were still in VMC conditions and some distance from the runway.… Still able to remain within the “stable criteria,” we elected to level off at about 1,500 to 1,600 feet. We were clear of the EGPWS CAUTION and WARNING areas, with no audio messages and no colors depicted on the terrain map, so we continued with the descent to level off at the MDA about 3 nautical miles from the runway. At that point we saw the runway and made an uneventful approach and landing. Degraded RNAV – Inspiration for VersatilityDuring an RNAV approach, this Mooney pilot experienced RNAV degradation that required a creative solution. It also spawned his new commitment to better preparedness. ■ On my first approach attempt, the reported weather indicated a 300 foot ceiling with 2.5 miles visibility. I was established on the RNAV (GPS) RWY 31 approach, and shortly after the FAF, the approach downgraded to LNAV. The weather was below [LNAV] minimums, so I declared a missed approach and requested the RNAV (GPS) RWY 31 approach into [a nearby airport]. After the IAF, approximately at the FAF, the approach downgraded to an LNAV approach. I was high on final and declared a missed approach. By this time, I was lower on fuel than I expected and advised ATC of the situation. ATC advised that they would provide the ILS RWY 13 approach to save time. The receiver did not provide accurate glide slope, but ATC advised altitudes at the fixes and a landing was made without incident.… I intend to practice more ILS approaches and also LNAV approaches. 1 https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/update/progress_and_plans/pbn/2 https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/procedures
   /ifp_inventory_summary/ Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 445 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more » December 2016 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,063 General Aviation Pilots 945 Controllers 538 Flight Attendants 463 Military/Other 306 Dispatchers 223 Mechanics 192 TOTAL 7,730 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 9 Airport Facility or Procedure 7 ATC Equipment or Procedure 10 Other 1 TOTAL 27 NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 445




NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189
Categories: News

Aviation MX Human Factors

FAA & FAASTeam News - Mon, 02/06/2017 - 13:30
Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

Hartzell Engine Technologies Announces the Availability of FAA Certified South Wind Replacement Cabin Heaters

AskBob News - Tue, 01/31/2017 - 09:18

Montgomery, AL, (January 31, 2017)  — Mike Disbrow, president of Hartzell Engine Technologies (HET), announced today that as a result of its asset purchase of C&D Associates in 2016,

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Categories: News, US

CALLBACK 444 - January 2017

ASRS Callback - Thu, 01/12/2017 - 10:18
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Issue 444 January 2017 Extensive and accurate communications are imperative in aviation operations. Whether conducting an airline operation or a general aviation equivalent, communications occur in various ways through many channels. Communications must be efficient and explicit between Pilots, Air Traffic Controllers, Dispatchers, Maintenance Technicians, Relay Services, Ramp Services, Flight Attendants, Passengers, Customer Services, and Command and Control Authorities.

An old aviator’s maxim wisely bids one to “aviate, navigate, and communicate.” Effective communications may preclude a multitude of aviation problems or even restore success from imminent failure, while poor or no communications can quickly steer a desirable outcome toward potential disaster. As Mark Twain once said, “The difference between the right word and the almost right word is the difference between lightning and the lightning bug.” We might all benefit if we strive to better our communications with the same commitment as the effort expended to resolve personal weight and balance issues that emerge each January.

In this issue, CALLBACK examines reports that reveal communication deficiencies during aviation operations. In these reported incidents, the resulting circumstances yield important lessons where ambiguity is unacceptable and may have serious consequences. An Air Carrier’s Premature Pushback“The single biggest problem in communication is the illusion that it has taken place.” - George Bernard Shaw.■ At the same time we were cleared to push, we received a [third] message for inaccurate weights. I told the push crew that we needed to get new weights before we pushed. We got new weights and loaded them into the FMC. When cleared to push, I released the brakes and said, “Brakes released, cleared to push, disconnect abeam gate XX.” We started moving, but no verbal response was heard from the push crew. After trying to contact [the push crew] on the headset, the aircraft stopped. I still thought we had a communication problem. One of the wing walkers got on the headset and told us there was no one in the tug. From Defect to Conflict and Complexity“The two words ‘information’ and ‘communication’ are often used interchangeably, but they signify quite different things. Information is giving out; communication is getting through.” - Sydney J. Harris. ■ [The airport] was running an east operation, and we were on approach for Runway XX. We were given vectors to turn north for the base leg and 3,000 feet. I had spotted the preceding aircraft, as well as the aircraft on approach for Runway YY. Approach called us and issued a right turn to a heading of 070. I sensed everything went quiet because usually there is a bit more with that clearance, so I looked at [the] radio and realized that Communication Radio 1 was transmitting. We had a stuck microphone, yet as I scanned all the switches, none were in the [Radio Transmit (R/T)] position. The First Officer (FO) and I both [realized the condition] at the same time, and [we] began checking our switches more thoroughly. The FO was the Pilot Flying (PF), and as we were converging with traffic from the adjacent runway, coupled with a small delay caused by our becoming aware of the malfunction, he elected to disengage the autopilot to expedite the turn back toward our localizer. Additionally, because we had strayed and it appeared that the adjacent aircraft had started a descent based on our TCAS, [the FO] started a shallow descent as well.

Once we established a heading back toward our approach course and were no longer in unsafe proximity of the Runway YY approach course, we leveled off. To make matters worse during this situation, we didn’t realize for a few moments that he and I couldn’t hear one another over the crew intercom, and the FO is hearing impaired. We were both talking, thinking the other person could hear, and at one point, he asked me to take the controls so he could investigate his headphone jacks, but I didn’t hear him. Nothing came of that because he was only a moment in doing so, but under a different set of circumstances there could have been very different results. I didn’t think there was a procedure in the QRH for our situation and felt that what little time I had to correct this problem without it escalating into an even bigger problem was best spent trying to [troubleshoot] a couple of things I knew of from basic system knowledge. I isolated the [communication radios] by selecting EMERG on both [audio control panels], and it solved the problem. Although the FO could not hear ATC or me, I was able reestablish communication with the Approach Controller and obtain proper clearances. As we crossed the outer marker, ATC issued a low altitude alert as a result of the descent maneuver we performed earlier. We had leveled off at 2,200 feet, and ATC advised us that the minimum altitude at the outer marker was 2,700 feet. We established the aircraft on the glideslope and continued to a normal landing. The FO’s [communication radios] came back somewhere along the approach but went back out during taxi in. We reported to ground control that we were having problems with the radios, and we were extra vigilant during taxi in.

The biggest threat was losing communication with ATC at a very critical phase of the approach, in very congested and busy airspace.… The nature of this malfunction didn’t allow a determination of the full scope of debilitation immediately; it became a huge distraction when coupled with the tight constraints of the operating environment. The idea of flying in such busy, complex airspace without [communication, and thereby] imperiling one’s own aircraft as well as others, caused extreme pressure to correct the issue. Impaired Crew Communications“Communication usually fails – except by chance. If communication can fail – it will. If communication cannot fail, it nevertheless, usually does fail.” – Osmo A. Wiio.■ The first attempt to land…was unsuccessful due to fog, and the flight returned to [the departure airport]. The flight then changed Captains and was re-dispatched…. The [second] Captain was on his second day of being [assigned involuntary flying] and [had been] pulled off his deadhead aircraft home to [fly this] turn…. He was understandably upset and was having problems hearing the First Officer (FO) through the [communications system], since there was no HOT MIC function on this [aircraft]. Unfortunately this was not identified until the return trip. The Captain missed several CRM calls from the FO on climbout, and the FO assumed it was due to his emotional state, but it was also due to the [communications system issue]. Upon approach to [the airport], Approach Control vectored the flight to a position north of [the airport] and asked if they had the field in sight. [The destination] recently had a snow and frost event, and the Crew was having problems identifying the field. Everything looked white. The Captain responded that they had it; the FO concurred and began to maneuver for landing. At approximately 1,300 feet AGL, both pilots noted that the runway did not line up with the navaids and verbalized, “This doesn’t look right.” At that time, [the] Tower informed the Crew that they were lined up on the wrong airfield. A go-around was conducted, the flight maneuvered for the proper airfield, and [we] landed uneventfully.

The HOT MIC function should be installed on all aircraft. A Numerical Near Miss“Precision of communication is important, more important than ever, in our era of hair trigger balances, when a false or misunderstood word may create as much disaster as a sudden thoughtless act.” - James Thurber. ■ Upon my landing flare on Runway 17 at CVO, I noticed a single engine, low wing plane off to the left side of the runway, heading toward me. The plane had moved off to the left of the runway and was flying above the taxiway at about 100 feet AGL.

It was my third landing at CVO on Runway 17 that day, and I had communicated with other planes on 123.075, all of which were using Runway 17. During my [last] left downwind, I did see a plane to the west of the airport above traffic pattern altitude, but I didn’t hear any calls on CTAF and thought [the plane] was transitioning through the airspace. So I was a little shocked to see it buzz past me as I landed. I was able to complete the landing without incident. I do know that the sectional shows CTAF at CVO as 123.0, but the frequency is 123.075, so maybe they were reporting on this frequency, but I don’t know. Dispatch Isolation“The more elaborate our means of communication, the less we communicate.” - Joseph Priestley. ■ As I was building the release for this flight, I was getting an error that [indicated] the drift-down alternates could not be calculated because of an error. [A fellow Dispatcher] told me to file it and make sure that the drift-down information was on the release. I filed it and checked the release, but the [drift-down] information was missing. After I corrected this issue, I called [the associated ARTCC] to pull the flight strip, sent the corrected [flight plan], sent an ACARS message to the crew, and then called Ops to pass the information to the crew to print the new [flight plan]. While the flight was enroute, I got a message from the crew that the route given to them by ATC was not matching what was on the release. I sent [the crew] the corrected flight summary, the drift-down information, and the weather for [their] escape airport. I then did a pen and ink for the new flight plan. The Captain said he was not notified by the gate agent and did not receive [my] ACARS [message].

There was a breakdown of communication. The gate agent did not notify the crew to print the new [flight plan], and the crew did not receive the ACARS message. The next time I [will] directly call the Captain and follow up to ensure that they have the correct [flight plan]. Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 444 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more » November 2016 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 4,154 General Aviation Pilots 1,191 Controllers 504 Flight Attendants 435 Military/Other 250 Dispatchers 236 Mechanics 138 TOTAL 6,908 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts ATC Equipment or Procedure 2 Hazard to Flight 1 TOTAL 3 NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 444


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