News

SAE International Launches New Maintenance, Repair & Overhaul Information Products, Addressing Rapid Growth of MRO Industry

AskBob News - Tue, 01/09/2018 - 10:05

SAE International has introduced new Maintenance, Repair & Overhaul (MRO) Information Products in response to dramatic changes affecting the MRO landscape, including the recent influx of available aircraft data, new manufacturing methods and business models. Featuring technical insights and detailed guides to repairing advanced materials and detecting predictive data patterns, the MRO Information Products were created in support of independent MRO’s, mainline carriers and OEM’s to help them capitalize on new developments in data management and advanced materials to deliver cost-effective maintenance faster.

“The MRO industry is experiencing a fascinating period of rapid growth across the globe, especially in the Asia-Pacific region,” says Frank Menchaca, Chief Product Officer for SAE International. “In fact, according to Oliver Wyman’s 10-year outlook for the commercial airline transport fleet and the associated MRO market, Asia is forecasted to host almost 40% of the global aircraft fleet by 2027, making it the central location of global fleet activity. SAE International saw a need for dependable resources that can help MRO professionals not only keep up with their competition, but with the speed at which their industry is developing, and that’s exactly what our MRO Information Products aim to provide.”

The MRO Information Products will be available for instant access through SAE MOBILUS, the technical resource platform created by the international automotive and aerospace mobility community to provide a critical advantage to develop the future of aerospace engineering. Along with standards, technical papers, books and case studies, the MRO Information Products will also include complimentary white papers and graphical information pieces.

The MRO Information Products, published by SAE International, can be accessed through an annual standards subscription, an annual non-standards subscription or a custom subscription that can be tailored to meet individual organization needs.

CustomerSales(at)sae(dot)org
1.888.875.3976 (U.S. and Canada) | 1.724.772.4086 (Outside North America)

SAE International is a global association committed to being the ultimate knowledge source for the engineering profession. By uniting over 127,000 engineers and technical experts, we drive knowledge and expertise across a broad spectrum of industries. We act on two priorities: encouraging a lifetime of learning for mobility engineering professionals and setting the standards for industry engineering. We strive for a better world through the work of our charitable arm, the SAE Foundation, which helps fund programs like A World in Motion® and the Collegiate Design Series™.

-http://www.sae.org-

Categories: News, US

FAAST Blast — Week of Dec. 25, 2017

FAA & FAASTeam News - Fri, 12/29/2017 - 09:31

FAAST Blast – SAFO Issued for Rockwell Collins FMS, SAIB Calls for V-Band Coupling Inspections, Virtual Plan for the Real World
Notice Number: NOTC7539

FAAST Blast — Week of Dec. 25, 2017 – Dec. 31, 2017
Biweekly FAA Safety Briefing News Update

SAFO Issued for Rockwell Collins Pro Line FMS

On December 14, 2017, the FAA issued SAFO 17013 which informs the operators of Rockwell Collins Flight Management Systems (FMS) Pro Line 4 and Pro Line 21 FMS of the reinstatement of approximately 10,000 approach procedures and provides awareness to flight crews of the new Rockwell Collins Temperature Compensation Limitations. Operators should familiarize themselves with the information in this SAFO (https://go.usa.gov/xnEeb), as well as OPSB 0166-17R4 (bit.ly/RC17r4), which provides guidance for flight crews to operate Rockwell Collins systems or products.

SAIB Calls for V-Band Exhaust Coupling Inspections

A recent FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) highlights an airworthiness concern with v-band coupling failures on all turbocharged, reciprocating engine powered aircraft, including rotorcraft. Cracks originating out of a spot weld, on multi-segment, spot welded, v-band couplings have led to separation of the outer band and failure of the v-band coupling to retain the tailpipe or exhaust inlet pipe. SAIB CE-18-07 recommends affected owners perform a detailed inspection of the couplings and replace the part as needed. For more details, including inspection criteria and photos, go to https://go.usa.gov/xnEtW.

A Virtual Plan for the Real World

Simulators allow pilots to practice dealing with dangerous or difficult situations without exposure to the risk that would normally accompany them. Learn how you can mitigate risk through simulation by reading the article, “A Virtual Plan for the Real World,” in the Nov/Dec 2017 issue of FAA Safety Briefing. Download your copy or read online at: 1.usa.gov/FAA_ASB. You can view a mobile-friendly version of this article at https://adobe.ly/2z7ci3k.

From all of us here at the FAA Safety Briefing team, we wish you a happy and safe 2018!

Produced by the FAA Safety Briefing editors, http://www.faa.gov/news/safety_briefing/
Address questions or comments to: SafetyBriefing@faa.gov.
Follow us on Twitter @FAASafetyBrief or https://twitter.com/FAASafetyBrief

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

CALLBACK 455 - December 2017

ASRS Callback - Wed, 12/20/2017 - 12:31
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Issue 455 December 2017 NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is a voluntary, confidential, and non-punitive reporting system for aviation safety that has served the aviation community since 1976. It is a successful and trusted program, forged from a cooperative effort between the FAA, NASA, and the aviation community. ASRS receives, processes, and analyzes voluntarily submitted reports from pilots, air traffic controllers, flight attendants, maintenance personnel, dispatchers, ground personnel, and others regarding actual or potential hazards to safe aviation operations. The program’s output currently includes aviation safety alert messages issued to appropriate agencies, research studies and special papers on various subjects, a searchable database with direct access to de-identified reports, and CALLBACK. The latter four are publicly available on the ASRS website.1

Value added to aviation safety stems from two important protections that the ASRS program offers to reporters. Confidentiality and limited immunity from FAA enforcement actions are afforded. Naturally, participation has consistently grown, and the result is the richness found in greater breadth and depth of reported incidents, lessons learned, and aviation wisdom. ASRS’s intake is robust, currently averaging 261 reports per calendar day and projected to exceed 95,000 in 2017.

With intake of that magnitude, ASRS receives reports on every conceivable topic related to aviation operations. This month we have reserved a few of the more unusual and light-hearted, but still important, incidents to share. Enjoy these “Odds and Ends” as we conclude another successful year. Now You See it, Now You Don’t A Bonanza Pilot became distracted and confused when he perceived the runway edge and centerline lights cycling on and off while ATC assured him that they were on steady.■ I was transiting the final approach path of…Runway 16R and observed the runway edge and center line lights cycle on and off…at a rate of approximately 1 per second. It was very similar to the rate of a blinking traffic light at a 4-way vehicle stop. The [3-blade] propeller speed was 2,400 RPM. This was observed through the entire front windscreen and at least part of the pilot side window. I queried ATC about the reason for the runway lights blinking and was told that they were not blinking. It was not immediately obvious what was causing this, but I did later speculate that it may have been caused by looking through the propeller arc.

The next day [during] IFR training while on the VOR DME Rwy 16R approach, we observed the runway edge and center line lights cycle on and off…at a rate slightly faster than 1 per second. The propeller speed was 2,500 RPM. I then varied the propeller speed and found that at 2,700 RPM, the lights were observed strobing at a fairly high rate, and at 2,000 RPM the blinking rate slowed to less than once per second. This was observed through the entire approach that terminated at the Missed Approach Point (MAP). The flight instructor was also surprised and mentioned that he had not seen this before, but he also doesn’t spend much time behind a 3-blade propeller arc.

I would speculate that the Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) dimming system of the LED runway lights was phasing with my propeller, causing the observed effect. I would also speculate that the effect would…significantly differ at other LED dimming settings…and behind a 2-blade propeller.

I found the effect to be entirely confusing and distracting, and would not want to make a landing in such conditions. Snakes on a Plane A Large Transport Captain receiving a line check experienced a peculiar problem during the pre-departure phase of flight. He may have speculated whether the rest of the flight would be as “snake bitten” as the idiom implies.
■ Well within hearing distance of the passengers, the Gate Agent said, “Captain, I am required to inform you that while cleaning the cockpit, the cleaning crew saw a snake under the Captain’s pedals. The snake got away and they have not been able to find it. I am required to tell you this.”

At this time the [international pre-departure] inspection was complete, and I was allowed on the aircraft. I found two mechanics in the flight deck. I was informed that they had not been able to find the snake and they were not able to say with certainty what species of snake it was. The logbook had not been annotated with a write up, so I placed a write up in the logbook. I was also getting a line check on this flight. The Check Airman told me that his father was deathly afraid of snakes and suggested that some passengers on the flight may suffer with the same condition.

I contacted Dispatch and discussed with them that I was uncomfortable taking the aircraft with an unknown reptile condition.… The possibility [existed] that a snake could expose itself in flight, or worse on the approach, come out from under the rudder pedals. Dispatch agreed with my position. The Gate Agent then asked to board the aircraft. I said, “No,” as we might be changing aircraft. I then contacted the Chief Pilot. I explained the situation and told him I was uncomfortable flying the aircraft without determining what the condition of the snake was. I had specifically asked if the cleaning crew had really seen a snake. I was informed yes, that they had tried to vacuum it up, and it had slithered away. The Chief Pilot agreed with me and told me he would have a new aircraft for us in five minutes. We were assigned the aircraft at the gate next door.

…When I returned [to the airport], I asked a Gate Agent what had happened to the “snake airplane.” I was told that the aircraft was left in service, and the next Captain had been asked to sign some type of form stating he was informed that the snake had not been found.
Up, Close, and Personal While attempting to mitigate a known, visible hazard, an Air Taxi Captain took special care to clear his wingtips while taxiing for takeoff. A surprise loomed ahead just as he thought that the threat had subsided.
■ Taxiing out for the first flight out of ZZZ, weed whacking was taking place on the south side of the taxiway. Watching to make sure my wing cleared two men mowing [around] a taxi light, I looked forward to continue the taxi. An instant later I heard a “thump.” I then pulled off the taxiway onto the inner ramp area and shut down, assuming I’d hit one of the dogs that run around the airport grounds on a regular basis. I was shocked to find a man, face down, on the side of the taxiway. His coworkers surrounded him and helped him to his feet. He was standing erect and steady. He knew his name and the date. Apparently [he was] not injured badly. I attended to my two revenue passengers and returned the aircraft to the main ramp. I secured the aircraft and called [the Operations Center]. An ambulance was summoned for the injured worker. Our ramp agent was a non-revenue passenger on the flight and took pictures of the scene. He stated that none of the workers was wearing a high visibility vest, which I also observed. They seldom have in the past.

This has been a recurring problem at ZZZ since I first came here. The operation is never [published in the] NOTAMs [for] an uncontrolled airfield. The pilots just have to see and avoid people and animals at all times. I don’t think the person that collided with my wingtip was one of the men I was watching. I think he must have been stooped down in the grass. The only option to [improve the] safety of the situation would be to stop completely until, hopefully, the workers moved well clear of the taxiway. This is one of…many operational deficiencies that we, the pilots, have to deal with at ZZZ on a daily basis. Corrigan Conquers AgainAn RV-7 Pilot was planning ahead for the weather he observed prior to departure. The weather, distractions, and personal stress influenced his situational awareness and decision-making during the takeoff. ■ I was cleared to depart on Runway 27L from [midfield at] intersection C. However, I lined up and departed from Runway 9R.… No traffic control conflict occurred. I turned on course and coordinated with ATC immediately while airborne.

I had delayed my departure due to weather [that was] 5 miles east…and just north of the airport on my route.… Information Juliet was: “340/04 10SM 9,500 OVC 23/22 29.99, Departing Runway 27L, Runways 9L/27R closed, Runways 5/23 closed.” My mind clued in on [Runway] 09 for departure. In fact I even set my heading bug to 090. Somehow while worried mostly about the weather, I mentally pictured departing Runway 9R at [taxiway] C. I am not sure how I made that mistake, as the only 9 listed was the closed runway.… My focus was not on the runway as it should have been, but mostly on the weather.

Contributing factors were: 1.Weather.2. No other airport traffic before my departure. (I was looking as I arrived at the airport and completed my preflight and final weather checks).3. Airport construction. For a Runway 27 departure, typical taxi routing would alleviate any confusion.4. ATIS listing the closed runway with 9 listed first.5. Quicker than expected takeoff clearance. I do fly for a living.… I will be incorporating the runway verification procedure we use on the jet aircraft at my company into my GA flying from now on. Sadly, I didn’t make that procedural change in my GA flying. 1. https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov
Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 455 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more »
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report » October 2017 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 4,897 General Aviation Pilots 1,407 Controllers 544 Flight Attendants 411 Military/Other 320 Dispatchers 233 Mechanics 200 TOTAL 8,012 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 4 Airport Facility or Procedure 4 ATC Equipment or Procedure 6 Other 1 TOTAL 15 NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 455


NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189
Categories: News

CALLBACK 454 - November 2017

ASRS Callback - Wed, 12/20/2017 - 12:27
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Issue 454 November 2017 The arrival of winter weather brings an assortment of phenomena which manifest themselves in many predictable aviation hazards. Commercial and General Aviation are similarly affected. Winter storms, turbulence, low ceilings and visibilities, fog, freezing rain, ice, snow, and slippery surfaces all demand special attention. With increased workload, concentration becomes more fragmented, and situational awareness can suffer. Crews may exhibit more susceptibility to common or uncommon winter threats.

The FAA is attempting to reduce the risk of runway overrun accidents and incidents due to runway contamination caused by weather.1 In October 2016, the FAA implemented Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) procedures that include new tools such as the Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM). After just one season, TALPA has produced significant improvements to operational safety. A TALPA Stakeholders Feedback Review2 was held in July 2017, and recommendations from this review are targeted to become procedural changes.

This month CALLBACK shares reported incidents spawned by typical winter weather. Even if you are not familiar with TALPA procedures, we encourage you to learn more, connect your dots, and glean the lessons in these reports. The Winter Wing DingA Learjet Captain anticipated and experienced icing conditions during his descent. As a precaution, he turned on the nacelle heat, but he had not bargained for the surprise he received during the landing.■ Descending through FL180, I turned on the nacelle heaters, but did not turn on the wing and stab heat, as I anticipated a short descent through a shallow cloud layer to temperatures above freezing. The approach proceeded normally.… The aircraft entered the cloud tops at approximately 1,500 feet MSL and exited the bases at approximately 900 feet MSL. There were no indications of ice accumulation on the normal reference area during descent. During the landing flare (less than 10 feet AGL), as the flying pilot applied right aileron to counteract the right crosswind, the left wing abruptly dropped. I immediately took the controls, applying full right aileron as the left main landing gear contacted the runway, followed closely by deployment of spoilers, thrust reversers, and brakes to return the aircraft to the runway centerline.

Upon exiting the aircraft, I observed a small amount (less than 1/4 inch) of rough, rapidly melting ice on the leading edges of the wings. Inspection revealed that the trailing edge of the left wingtip had contacted the runway surface, causing abrasion to the contact area. I believe the combination of the small amount of ice, aileron deflection, and mechanical turbulence from buildings on the upwind side of the runway caused the left wing to stall at a higher than normal airspeed, resulting in the uncommanded left roll. Contributing factors include my failure to turn on the wing and stab heat prior to entering the cloud layer. Ever Present Proverbial Pitot Heat This SR22 pilot experienced aircraft icing while IFR in IMC. He kept the wings, propeller, and windshield clear of ice, but the routine associated with his VMC habits caused another problem.
■ I was on an IFR flight plan.… We had been in and out of the clouds picking up light rime ice.… Occasional use of the aircraft’s ice protection system was easily keeping the wings, propeller, and windshield clear of ice buildups.… We were initially above the clouds at 10,000 feet, but soon realized we would again be in the clouds. Center gave us a climb to 11,000 feet MSL where we remained in IMC. The Controller reported another aircraft ahead of us was in VMC at 13,000 feet MSL and offered a climb to 13,000 feet MSL.

As I considered the options of climbing to 13,000 feet (we had supplemental oxygen on board), I first noted significant ice accumulating on the windshield and wings, and then the airspeed began to fluctuate and suddenly dropped to 60 knots on the Primary Flight Display (PFD). I immediately recognized a Pitot-Static System failure, disconnected the autopilot, and began hand flying using the attitude indicator and standby instruments as primary references. I also immediately noted that, although the Ice-Protection Switch was on, the Pitot Heat Switch was in the OFF position. I turned on the pitot heat, selected alternate static air, and advised Center. The Center Controller cleared me for a descent to 8,000 feet, which I initiated slowly using only the attitude indicator as a reference. Within 2 minutes the airspeed indicator and altimeter began indicating normally.… We broke out into VMC at approximately 8,000 feet MSL.… The rest of the trip was uneventful, and a safe landing was completed.

In hindsight I realized that I traditionally do not turn on the pitot heat because most of my personal flying is VFR.… I will now…always turn on the pitot heat before takeoff, regardless of the flight conditions.
Clear and Present Danger This BAe125 crew encountered widespread winter weather and elected to divert. Weather and aircraft consumables reduced their number of options and influenced decisions which could have had a much worse outcome.
■ The entire New York City area was forecast for moderate to severe icing conditions, snow, and low visibility. Numerous PIREPs reported the presence of such icing conditions, which were further confirmed by an amber ICE DETECT light indication. We elected to divert to Morristown, NJ, which was reporting 2 miles visibility, adequate ceilings, and moderate snow.… At the time we began receiving vectors, the amber ANTI-ICE LOW QUANTITY annunciator illuminated, indicating that we had approximately 30 minutes of ice protection remaining.

We were cleared for the approach and configured normally.… Upon reaching the MDA, I continued searching for the runway. The runway came into view, and I called, “Runway in sight, 12 o’clock.”… It became clear to me that we did not have the required visibility for the approach and that we did not have the ability to achieve a normal rate of descent to a normal landing.… I called for a go-around, and the pilot flying responded something like, “I think I’ve got it, yeah, I’ve got it,” and continued the approach. He immediately retarded the thrust levers to idle and called for full flaps. We immediately began an excessive descent rate and received ground proximity warnings that said, “SINK RATE, SINK RATE, PULL UP,” and continued…until just before touchdown. We landed just about halfway down a snow covered runway that was 5,998 feet in length. The braking action was good and we stopped…on the runway. The next several aircraft behind us were not able to land…and diverted to an alternate. Low Visibility White Out TaxiAfter a successful approach and landing in traditional winter weather, this Large Transport Captain was surprised by an unexpected stop while taxiing to the gate. ■ After landing, on the taxi-in, we turned westbound on the taxiway. Since it was snowing fairly hard and the wind was blowing, we made sure to identify the yellow centerline and confirmed it by noting the blue taxi lights to our right. Almost abeam [the turn point] to the gate, the right engine shut down. We stopped and requested a tug. When the snow let up, we determined that we were stuck on a snowdrift that had blown onto the taxiway.Icing the PuckThis Large Transport crew planned extensively for their approach and landing. The approach and touchdown were executed well, but procedures they used during the landing rollout were not as successful.
■ Weather at our arrival time was forecast to have blowing snow, 2 SM visibility, winds gusting up to 24 knots out of the northwest, and ceilings between 800 and 1,500 feet. ATIS advertised arrivals to Runways 28C, 28R, and 4R at various times enroute.… We planned a primary approach to Runway 4R and pulled landing data for Runways 28C and 28R in case of further changes. ATIS advertised braking action of 5-5-5 for Runway 4R. The landing data calculation produced a 7,000 foot stopping distance for good braking action with Autobrakes 3 and flaps 30. Stopping distance declined to 6,500 feet for Autobrakes 4. We discussed both braking options. The Captain initially chose Autobrakes 4 while I favored Autobrakes 3. He ultimately chose Autobrakes 3.

ATIS called the winds 340/23G29, which drove a target speed of 151 knots. Tower verified the same winds at initial check-in.… The landing was smooth and uneventful.

The Captain used full reverse thrust and stowed the reversers passing 80 knots. He called 3,000 feet runway remaining at the appropriate location and seemed to have complete control of the aircraft. At that point, he asked me to disengage the autobrakes. I noted the airspeed decelerating through 70 knots and stowed the speed brakes in order to disengage the autobrakes. I expected the Captain to use manual braking at that point to ensure control of the aircraft as we decelerated to taxi speed. The aircraft did not decelerate like I expected between 3,000 and 1,000 feet remaining. At that point, I could see the end of the runway approaching rapidly and told the Captain that he needed to come left to exit the runway. That was when I realized that he was trying to stop the aircraft and bring it left without success.

The runway end identifier and taxiway lights came up quickly, and we slid right as the right main gear departed the prepared surface. It took me a brief period of time to realize that the main gear had departed the prepared surface. I called…Tower to tell them that we had departed the runway and would not be able to clear Runway 4R. After our situation was clarified with Tower, I started the APU and shut down Number 2 Engine.
1. https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=88369 2. https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/talpa/update_meeting_July_2017/
    media/TALPA-Update-Meeting-2017-Stakeholder-Feedback-w-Notes.pdf
Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 454 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more » September 2017 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 4,157 General Aviation Pilots 1,256 Controllers 515 Flight Attendants 335 Military/Other 302 Mechanics 188 Dispatchers 129 TOTAL 6,882 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 1 ATC Equipment or Procedure 1 TOTAL 2 NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 454


NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189
Categories: News

NOTICE to Operators of Rockwell Collins Flight Management Systems Pro Line 4 and Pro Line 21

FAA & FAASTeam News - Mon, 12/11/2017 - 09:47

NOTICE to Operators of Rockwell Collins Flight Management Systems Pro Line 4 and Pro Line 21 FMS 3.3.x through FMS 4.x
Notice Number: NOTC7524

Notice to Operators of Rockwell Collins Flight Management Systems Pro Line 4 and Pro Line 21 FMS 3.3.x through FMS 4.x

From Rockwell Collins, Commercial Systems Customer Support

Subject: The FMS may turn in the wrong direction after sequencing a "Climb to" altitude that was manually edited or Temperature Compensated

Overview: 

If the crew manually edits or temperature compensates a "Climb to" altitude, the FMS will remove the database turn direction (if any) on the immediately following leg. The FMS will turn in the wrong direction after sequencing the "Climb to" leg if the shortest turn direction is different than the required turn direction onto the next leg.

For more information please see the attached PDF from Rockwell Collins of click here (https://www.faasafety.gov/files/notices/2017/Dec/OPSB_0166-17R2.pdf)

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

FAAST Blast — Week of Nov. 27, 2017

FAA & FAASTeam News - Wed, 11/29/2017 - 09:45

FAAST Blast – Kidde Fire Extinguisher SAIB, NTSB Seminar on Transition Training, Engine Maint. & Performance Monitoring, A-Z of
Notice Number: NOTC7507

FAAST Blast — Week of Nov. 27, 2017 – Dec. 03, 2017
Biweekly FAA Safety Briefing News Update

SAIB Issued for Kidde Fire Extinguishers

Last week the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB CE-18-05) for certain recalled Kidde fire extinguishers with plastic handles. These extinguishers, which may be found in GA aircraft, can become clogged or require excessive force to operate and can fail to operate during an emergency. The plastic handle fire extinguishers involve 134 models manufactured between January 1, 1973, and August 15, 2017. The FAA recommends you check your aircraft for any of the recalled Kidde extinguishers and replace it with one that is airworthy and not affected by the recall. For more details and a list of all Kidde models that are affected, go to https://go.usa.gov/xn8ZK.

NTSB Seminar on Transition Training

The lack of transition training has been a factor in many GA accidents. If you are in the Washington, D.C. area, there is a free seminar on Saturday, Dec. 2, at the NTSB Training Center in Ashburn, Va. Attendees will hear presentations from AOPA, NAFI, Cirrus Aircraft, and NTSB Member Earl Weener. This four-hour program is also FAA WINGS credit eligible. For more details and to register for the event, go to www.faasafety.gov/SPANS/event_details.aspx?eid=79494.

Engine Maintenance and Performance Monitoring

Don’t let your engine contribute to a loss-of-control accident. Proper engine maintenance, advanced pre-flight, and performance monitoring can go a long way to eliminating this type of mishap. Get the facts at: https://t.co/OivH7lAyZL

The A-Z of ATDs

Do you know the difference between a BATD and an AATD? Or how much credit allowance you can earn with each device towards flight training and/or experience requirements? The answers to these and other questions about Aviation Training Devices can be found in the Nov/Dec FAA Safety Briefing article, “The A-Z of ATDs — Sorting the Lot of Flight Simulation Devices.” Download your copy or read online at: 1.usa.gov/FAA_ASB. You can view a mobile-friendly version of this article at https://adobe.ly/2imT5QT.

 

Produced by the FAA Safety Briefing editors, http://www.faa.gov/news/safety_briefing/
Address questions or comments to: SafetyBriefing@faa.gov.
Follow us on Twitter @FAASafetyBrief or https://twitter.com/FAASafetyBrief

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

SAIB Issued for Kidde Fire Extinguishers

FAA & FAASTeam News - Wed, 11/29/2017 - 09:38

FAAST Blast — Week of Nov. 27, 2017 – Dec. 03, 2017
Biweekly FAA Safety Briefing News Update

SAIB Issued for Kidde Fire Extinguishers

Last week the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB CE-18-05) for certain recalled Kidde fire extinguishers with plastic handles. These extinguishers, which may be found in GA aircraft, can become clogged or require excessive force to operate and can fail to operate during an emergency. The plastic handle fire extinguishers involve 134 models manufactured between January 1, 1973, and August 15, 2017. The FAA recommends you check your aircraft for any of the recalled Kidde extinguishers and replace it with one that is airworthy and not affected by the recall. For more details and a list of all Kidde models that are affected, go to https://go.usa.gov/xn8ZK.

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

FAAST Blast: Week of Nov 13, 2017 Proposed ADs for Piper/Textron Aviation

FAA & FAASTeam News - Fri, 11/17/2017 - 13:35

Biweekly FAA Safety Briefing News Update

Proposed ADs for Piper/Textron Aviation

The FAA last week issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that addresses reports of main wing spar corrosion found in certain Piper PA-28 and PA-32 Cherokee series airplanes. This proposed AD would require installing an inspection access panel in the lower wing skin near the left and the right main wing spars if not already there, inspecting the left and the right main wing spars for corrosion, and taking all necessary corrective actions. The FAA estimates the AD would affect 11,476 airplanes of U.S. Registry. For more details and for instructions on how to submit comments before the December 22 deadline, go to

www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-11-07/pdf/2017-24083.pdf.

            The FAA also revised an NPRM originally designed for Textron Aviation A36TC and B36TC Bonanza models to include all Textron Aviation Models S35, V35, V35A, and V35B airplanes that have the optional turbocharger engine installed. The proposed AD aims to prevent

failure of the exhaust tailpipe v-band coupling (clamp) that may lead to detachment of the exhaust tailpipe from the turbocharger and allow high-temperature exhaust gases to enter the engine compartment. The comment period for the NPRM has been reopened until December 26, 2017. For more, go to www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-11-08/pdf/2017-24065.pdf.

 

Aeronautical Chart Users Guide Revamped

Last month, the FAA’s Aeronautical Information Services (formerly, “AeroNav Products”) released a revamped Chart Users Guide (CUG). The CUG website offers improved navigation, updated information and expanded content, ranging from a more robust IFR Enroute & Terminal Terms section, to the addition of a “References & Abbreviations” and “What’s New” sections. The CUG is an unparalleled training and study aid for student pilots, Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operators, flight instructors, and anyone wanting to familiarize themselves with FAA charts and publications. It serves as a reference for both novice and experienced pilots alike, decoding the legends and information found on VFR charts, Helicopter Route charts, Flyway Planning charts, Terminal Procedure Publications and IFR Enroute charts. 

Download the new CUG at: faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/digital_products/aero_guide

Runway Length Matters

            See the NTSB’s Safety Alert (SA-071) on Understanding the Potential Hazards on Intersection Takeoffs at www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-alerts/Documents/SA-071.pdf.

 

Chart A Course for “Sim City”

Explore the exciting world of flight simulation technology and its evolving impact on aviation safety in our new issue of FAA Safety Briefing. Download your copy or read online at: 1.usa.gov/FAA_ASB. For a good primer on how flight simulators have evolved, check out author William Dubois’ article, “Link Trainer, to Desktop, to Redbird.” You can view a mobile-friendly version of this article at http://adobe.ly/2xLo5jO.

 

Produced by the FAA Safety Briefing editors, http://www.faa.gov/news/safety_briefing/
Address questions or comments to: SafetyBriefing@faa.gov.
Follow us on Twitter @FAASafetyBrief or https://twitter.com/FAASafetyBrief

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

Engine Maintenance and Performance Monitoring

FAA & FAASTeam News - Thu, 11/16/2017 - 08:06

Did you know that most general aviation fatal accidents are caused by in-flight loss of control? Many of these loss of control accidents are due to engine failure-related factors. Between 2001-2010, 35 of 70 randomly selected accidents had engine maintenance errors identified as a contributing factor. Proper engine maintenance, post maintenance, advanced pre-flight, and performance monitoring can go a long way to eliminating this type of mishap.

FAA Sound Maintenance Practices PDF

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

Flight Standards Service Terminology

FAA & FAASTeam News - Fri, 11/03/2017 - 11:09

Hi, folks -

We’ve received quite a few questions about the nomenclature everyone should be using to talk about our new structure. I addressed some of these issues in the October Monthly Message, but below is an expanded guide to Flight Standards Service terminology.

Thanks for the great work -

Best,
John Duncan

 

Proposed Summary of Intent:

Words are the tools we use to think, and how we think drives how we act. Using the right nomenclature for our new functional structure and its constituent parts reinforces and supports the critical cultural changes we continue to make in order to function as an interdependent team.

Flight Standards Service

  • The nomenclature for the overarching organization is “Flight Standards Service.”
    • The acceptable short forms are “Flight Standards” or “the Service.”
    • The acceptable abbreviation is “FS.”

 

Flight Standards Functional Offices

  • Use the name of the functional office(s) in policy, correspondence, training, and any other formal documents, as well as in verbal communication.
    • Acceptable short forms include Standards, General Aviation, Air Carrier, and Business.
    • Acceptable abbreviations include SS, GA, AC, and FB.

 

Constituent Organizations (e.g., Divisions, Frontline Offices)

  • Use the name of the division(s) and/or office(s) in policy, correspondence, training, and any other formal documents, as well as in verbal communication.
  • Frontline offices (e.g., Flight Standards District Offices, Certificate Management Offices, Aircraft Evaluation Groups, and International Field Offices) retain their legacy names.
    • Legacy abbreviations (e.g., “FSDO,” CMO,” “AEG,” “IFO”) are acceptable.
  • Aircraft Evaluation Groups have been renamed based on their area of specialty. Short forms are:
    • Small Aircraft AEG
    • Propulsion and APU AEG
    • Transport Aircraft Seattle AEG
    • Transport Aircraft Long Beach AEG
    • Rotorcraft & Powered Lift AEG

 

Universal Norms for Nomenclature

  • Use the actual name of the organization in policy, correspondence, training, and any other formal documents, as well as in verbal communication.
    • As necessary, use "the appropriate Flight Standards Office." This practice is not intended to create generic offices; rather, it is to prevent having to make another rule change if we were to develop another kind of office.  
  • Limit use of organizational routing codes to coordination grids. Internal routing codes should never be used in written or verbal external communications, including e-mail.
  • Location-reference terms such as “headquarters,” “field,” and “remotely sited inspector” are inaccurate. As appropriate, use “standards” or, for the Air Carrier and/or GA functional offices, “safety assurance.” Regardless of physical proximity to their assigned units, all inspectors are “Aviation Safety Inspectors” or ASIs.

 

 

 

Legacy

New

Term

Flight Standards Service

Flight Standards Service

Short Form

AFS

Flight Standards

The Service

Abbreviation

AFS

FS

 

 

Legacy

New (Functional Offices)

Term

NA

Safety Standards

Air Carrier Safety Assurance

General Aviation Safety Assurance

Foundational Business

Short Form

NA

Standards, Air Carrier, General Aviation, Business

Abbreviation

NA

SS, AC, GA, FB

 

 

 

Legacy

New (Functional Offices)

Term

e.g., AFS-200

Air Transportation

Short Form

e.g., AFS-200

NA

Abbreviation

e.g., AFS-200

NA

 

 

 

Legacy

New (Functional Offices)

Term

Flight Standards District Office

 

Certificate Management Office

 

Aircraft Evaluation Group

 

International Field Office

No change

Short Form

FSDO, CMO, AEG, IFO

No change

Abbreviation

FSDO, CMO, AEG, IFO

No change

 

 

Legacy

New (Functional Offices)

Headquarters

NA

Policy Divisions

Safety Standards

Field

Safety Assurance

(AC and/or GA)

Remotely-Sited Inspector (RSI)

Aviation Safety Inspector (ASI)

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

FAA National Policy - Clarification of Inspection and Overhaul Requirements Under Part 91

AskBob News - Tue, 10/24/2017 - 12:50

Hello Avmgr and Maint subscribers,

 

The purpose of this email is to ascertain what your interpretations as aviation department managers and maintenance personnel are concerning the FAA’s National Policy Notice N 8900.410 Effective Date: 3/31/17, regarding SUBJ:

Clarification of Inspection and Overhaul Requirements Under Part 91, which will be incorporated into FAA Order 8900.1 before this notice expires 3/31/18.

 

Please refer to the following link: https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Notice/N_8900.410.pdf for the complete text.

 

Specifically,

Paragraph 4. Background. There have been several recent issues surrounding the interpretation of whether compliance with the manufacturer’s recommended time between overhaul (TBO) intervals are required under Part 91.

 

Paragraph 5. Discussion. a.(1)(b)  Overhauls are Maintenance. By definition, overhauls are a form of maintenance, not inspection, and are not included in an inspection program. Overhauls are part of the maintenance program. Part 91 operators are not required to comply with a manufacturer’s entire maintenance program; as such, overhauls are not mandatory for part 91 operators.

 

As a purely Part 91 operator with an aircraft whose engines have exceeded the manufacturer’s recommended calendar TBO interval; however, may still have hundreds or potentially thousands of operating hours remaining until the manufacturer’s recommended hourly TBO interval is reached, does the statement above “…Part 91 operators are not required to comply with a manufacturer’s entire maintenance program; as such, overhauls are not mandatory for part 91 operators.” from your perspective give credence that a Part 91 operator may continue to operate the aircraft and its engines practically and legally?

 

This interpretation by a Part 91 operator has the potential to save that operator hundreds of thousands to well over one million dollars in engine overhaul costs, or be able to have that operator defer those overhaul costs to a future time.

 

If a Part 91 operator using the above interpretation uses its own internal maintenance personnel, and the decision is made by that owner to continue to operate its aircraft’s engines per the above FAA National Policy beyond the manufacturer’s recommended TBO interval, then this is straightforward; however, if that same Part 91 operator has its aircraft maintenance performed by a Part 145 repair station, could that operator be at risk by having that repair station contradict the position of the Part 91 operator, mandating overhauls are due citing only the manufacturer’s recommended engine TBO interval, and potentially not issue return to service logbook entry sign offs.

 

I’ve spoken with several sources including aircraft manufacturers, engine manufacturers, Part 145 repair stations, Part 91 operators and FAA FSDO personnel, and have received a broad spectrum of interpretations on this topic.  I’d be interested in learning your perspective on this issue, especially from Part 91 operators and Part 145 repair stations.

 

Thank you,

 

Verlyn Wolfe

Wolfe Aviation

(209) 983-0117 ext. 233 = Office

(209) 607-9804 = Cellular

verlyn@wolfeaviation.com

Categories: News, US

Airtext brings cell phone convenience and other data collection to GA

AskBob News - Thu, 10/19/2017 - 10:22

FLYING Magazine
There are people who claim their cell phone works everywhere, even while cruising along at 10,000 feet in their Baron, or PC-12. Experts will tell you of course that while there's always the chance an airborne phone might grab a scrap or two of cell service in flight, it's never reliable enough to regularly send a text or complete a voice conversation.  READ MORE 

Categories: News, US

FAAST Blast — Week of Oct 16, 2017

FAA & FAASTeam News - Wed, 10/18/2017 - 15:38

FAA Safety Team | Safer Skies Through Education

FAAST Blast – SAIBs Address Helicopter Safety, Pilot and Flight/Ground Instructor AC Revised, Flight Instructor Renewal Methods
Notice Number: NOTC7438

FAAST Blast — Week of Oct 16, 2017 – Oct 22, 2017
Biweekly FAA Safety Briefing News Update

New SAIBs Address Helicopter Safety Issues

On October 13, the FAA issued Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) SW-17-31 that urges operators to be aware of the crash resistant fuel system (CRFS) capabilities of helicopters they operate. Operating a CRFS compliant helicopter may reduce the risk of post-crash fires and improve occupant survivability in an accident. CRFS standards help accomplish this by minimizing crash-induced fuel leaks and their contact with potential fuel ignition sources both during and after the crash, and increasing the time occupants have available to egress before a post-crash fire could become critical. To read the SAIB, go to go.usa.gov/xnr3y

The FAA issued an additional SAIB for helicopter operators and maintenance technicians that addresses a concern with the use of engine inlet barrier filters. SAIB SW-17-30 was prompted by reports of helicopters with inlet barrier filters experiencing abnormal engine operation when exposed to persistent or high precipitation rates.

For more details and recommended actions that can help prevent engine issues when using inlet barriers, go to go.usa.gov/xnr3Q.

 

AC for Pilot and Flight/Ground Instructors Updated

Advisory Circular (AC) 61-65G, Certification: Pilots and Flight and Ground Instructors, provides guidance for pilot applicants, pilots, flight instructors, ground instructors, and evaluators on the certification standards, knowledge test procedures, and other requirements in 14 CFR part 61.

A recent revision to the AC provides guidance for those persons seeking to conduct enhanced flight vision system (EFVS) operations as well as guidance for airmen seeking an endorsement for helicopter touchdown autorotations. Download AC 61-65G at 1.usa.gov/2vQgQKz.

 

How Do You Renew?

Flight instructors: What’s your renewal method of choice? Unlike a private pilot certificate, a flight instructor certificate is valid for only 24 calendar months after an initial certification ride or renewal. For a refresher on the several different ways you can renew your certification, check out the article, “Renewing Your Lease: Options for Flight Instructor Certification Renewal” in the Sep/Oct 2017 issue of FAA Safety Briefing at faa.gov/news/safety_briefing. To read this article on a mobile device, go to adobe.ly/2xjBJL6.

 

Produced by the FAA Safety Briefing editors, http://www.faa.gov/news/safety_briefing/
Address questions or comments to: SafetyBriefing@faa.gov.
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Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

CALLBACK 453 - October 2017

ASRS Callback - Tue, 10/17/2017 - 10:28
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Issue 453 October 2017 The application of team management concepts in the flight deck environment was initially known as cockpit resource management. As techniques and training evolved to include Flight Attendants, maintenance personnel, and others, the new phrase “Crew Resource Management” (CRM) was adopted. CRM, simply put, is “the ability for the crew…to manage all available resources effectively to ensure that the outcome of the flight is successful.”1 Those resources are numerous. Their management involves employing and honing those processes that consistently produce the best possible decisions. Advisory Circular 120-51E, CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TRAINING, suggests that CRM training focus on “situation awareness, communication skills, teamwork, task allocation, and decisionmaking within a comprehensive framework of standard operating procedures (SOP).”2

Aircrews frequently experience circumstances that require expert CRM skills to manage situations and ensure their successful outcomes. Effective CRM has proved to be a valuable tool to mitigate risk and should be practiced on every flight. This month CALLBACK shares ASRS reported incidents that exemplify both effective CRM and CRM that appears to be absent or ineffective. Who Has the Aircraft? A B737 Captain had briefed and instituted his non-standard method to transfer aircraft control when the FO performed takeoffs. When he did not employ his own technique, confusion was evident and aircraft control was questionable.■ [As we were] pushing back in Albuquerque, ATC switched the airport around from Runway 26 to Runway 8. The Captain and I ran the appropriate checklist and proceeded to taxi…. I was the Pilot Flying (PF) [for this leg]. The Captain stated previously that he likes to spool the engines up and transfer controls while the aircraft is moving.

Once cleared for takeoff, the Captain spooled the [engines]. I was expecting him to transfer controls. I monitored him spool them up to takeoff power. While he was accelerating, my comment was, “I’m not flying the aircraft. You have the controls.” He seemed confused briefly, and we took off with the Captain in full control without incident. The Captain needs to [abandon] the habit of transferring thrust levers to the First Officer while moving. It’s a bad habit. It can be confusing if one of the crew members is saturated.… Under no circumstance should transfer of thrust levers and aircraft happen while saturated in the takeoff phase while moving. Freedom of Speech This Captain received uncommon, simultaneous inputs from two unexpected sources. An accident may have been averted when the Heavy Transport crew exercised simple, effective CRM in a critical situation and high workload environment.
■ This was a night takeoff,…and it was the FO’s first flying leg of Initial Operating Experience (IOE). Two Relief Pilots were assigned for the flight. We were cleared onto the runway…after a B737 [had landed]. The FO taxied onto the runway for takeoff. Once aligned for takeoff, I took control of the throttles. At this point I thought we were cleared for takeoff, but apparently we were not. I advanced the power to 70% and pressed TOGA. At about that same time, a Relief Pilot alerted the flying pilots that the other plane that had just landed was cleared to [back-taxi]…on the runway, and the Tower alerted us to hold our position. I disconnected the autothrottles and immediately brought them to idle. [Our speed was] approximately 30 knots, and we had used up approximately 200 to 400 feet of runway. The back-taxiing B737 exited the runway.

Looking back, somehow the clearance to take off or the non-clearance was lost in the translation. The Controllers in ZZZZ most often use non-standard phraseology with an accent not easily understood.… Higher than normal workloads [existed] due to a new hire first leg, and the flight was late and had been delayed from the previous day. I had assumed situational awareness with the airport and runway environment. Generally in past practice, ZZZZ holds the landing traffic in the holding bay after landing and does not have two airplanes on the runway at the same time. What “saved” the situation was good CRM and situational awareness by the Relief Pilots.
Finishing Strong This MD80 crew finished the last leg of their trip, but distractions degraded the performance of their duties. Unmanaged threats had contributed to the misperception that the job was done when it was clearly incomplete.From the Captain's report:
■ The landing was uneventful, and we were given an expedited crossing of the departure runway. We accomplished the after landing checklist, but due to the expedited crossing, I wasn’t sure if the First Officer started the APU (which had been consistent/standard practice so far in the trip). We were cleared to enter the ramp, and I consciously elected to leave both engines running (which was contrary to my standard practice during the trip). As we turned to pull into the gate,…an unmarked van cut across our path. We saw him coming, so no immediate stop was necessary.… At the gate,…we pulled to a stop normally, parked the brakes, and I believe I commanded, “Shut down engines.” The FO believes he heard, “Shut down the left engine” (which had been the standard command throughout the trip). He shut down the left engine. The right engine continued to run and we finished the Parking Checklist and departed the cockpit.

Minutes later…I received a page…requesting that I return to the gate. I returned to find the right engine running. I immediately shut off the fuel lever. No damage or injuries occurred. The aircraft was chocked and the brakes parked. In my estimation, there are three distinct contributing factors in this event. 1. Complacency when reading the checklist. I assumed items had been accomplished and felt no need to follow up the response with a tactile and visual check. 2. Complacency when relying on past actions as a predictor of future actions. We had done things the same way each leg, therefore we would continue to do them the same way on every leg. 3. Distractions. The expedited crossing to the ramp side of the runway, compressed time frame for completing the after landing checklists, and vehicular traffic all led to this event.… These issues…still keep happening. Strict, unyielding adherence to policy and procedures is a must. No one is perfect, and that is why policies and procedures exist. An event like this WILL happen if you allow yourself to become too comfortable.
From the First Officer's report:
■ We arrived at the gate, and the parking brake was parked. The Captain remarked, “Shut down the Number 1 Engine, Parking Checklist.” I read the checklist as the Captain responded. At the end of the checklist, I exited the aircraft.… I had walked about 10 gates down from the aircraft…when I heard an announcement asking the flight crew inbound from our flight to please return to the gate.… No one was there when I returned.… About 5 minutes later the agent walked up…and told me that one of the engines had been left running. She let me on the jet bridge and the Captain was walking off the aircraft.…

I believe this problem came about because of a pattern we developed during all our flights.… I started the APU…after landing, and…about two to three minutes [later], would shut down the Number 2 Engine at the Captain’s request. We did this every flight. After landing on this flight, it got very busy.… When…at the gate, the Captain called for me to shut down the Number 1 Engine, I didn’t think about the Number 2 Engine still running.… I read the checklist and listened to the Captain’s responses. I should have been double checking him, but I didn’t.… This has never happened to me.…I’m just grateful that no one was hurt…. Here, Here! and Hear, Hear!This Dash 8 crew experienced a flight control problem that required extensive coordination. Thorough, effective CRM contributed to the orderly sequencing of their decisions and to the successful completion of their flight.
■ We had to deice prior to takeoff, and we checked all flight control movements twice before we took off. At the beginning of the cruise portion of the flight, the…Master Caution Annunciators…and two amber Caution [lights] illuminated: ROLL SPLR INBD HYD (Spoiler Inboard Hydraulics) and ROLL SPLR OUTBD HYD (Spoiler Outboard Hydraulics). We completed the associated Spoiler Failure Checklist, including confirming that all spoilers [indicated] retracted at the PFCS (Primary Flight Control System) indicator. The Pilot Flying, the Captain, continued to hand fly the aircraft (as our autopilot was [inoperative] for all legs). We evaluated all facts, discussed all of our options, and [advised Center of our flight control situation]. We informed them that we were not requiring any assistance (upon landing or elsewhere).

The Captain talked to Dispatch and Maintenance, while I hand flew the aircraft. The Captain, Dispatch, and I all agreed that ZZZ, with its long runways, was the best place to land. I informed our Flight Attendant that we were planning on a normal, uneventful landing with no delays. ATC issued [our runway], and we executed a visual approach. [We accomplished] a normal landing and taxi. We thanked ATC for all of their help. At the gate, the maintenance write up was completed. The smooth outcome can be attributed to very good CRM exhibited today.
1. https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/
    airplane_handbook/media/airplane_flying_handbook.pdf
2. https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/
    AC120-51e.pdf
Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 453 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more » August 2017 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,349 General Aviation Pilots 1,391 Controllers 598 Flight Attendants 516 Military/Other 321 Mechanics 203 Dispatchers 196 TOTAL 8,574 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 2 ATC Equipment or Procedure 1 TOTAL 3
NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 453
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Categories: News

CALLBACK 452 - September 2017

ASRS Callback - Tue, 10/17/2017 - 10:28
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Issue 452 September 2017 This month, CALLBACK again offers the reader a chance to “interact” with the information given in a selection of ASRS reports. In “The First Half of the Story,” you will find report excerpts describing an event up to a point where a decision must be made or some direction must be given. You may then exercise your own judgment to make a decision or determine a possible course of action that would best resolve the situation.

The selected ASRS reports may not give all the information you want, and you may not be experienced in the type of aircraft involved, but each incident should give you a chance to refine your aviation decision-making skills. In “The Rest of the Story…” you will find the actions that were taken by reporters in response to each situation. Bear in mind that their decisions may not necessarily represent the best course of action. Our intent is to stimulate thought, training, and discussion related to the type of incidents that were reported. The First Half of the StoryWhat’s All the Flap?  B737 First Officer’s Report■ As the Pilot Flying while maneuvering in the busy terminal area, I didn’t notice that the flap indicator did not match the [flap] handle (2 indicated, 30 selected) until the Captain identified it with the…Before Landing Checklist. We checked the Leading Edge Device [LED] indicator on the overhead panel; the LED’s [indicated] FULL EXTEND. We discussed how the aircraft felt as it was being hand flown. The feel was normal.… The airspeed indicator was normal. The aircraft flew normally in all aspects except for the flap indication. All this occurred approaching the final approach fix.. What Would You Have Done?
Takeoff Face-Off  C182 Pilot’s Report ■ [The] airport (with a single runway) was undergoing major construction and had no parallel taxiway.… The only exit from the runway was a single narrow taxiway at the [approach] end of Runway 02 leading between some hangars to and from the FBO. [There was] no operating Control Tower, only UNICOM. Before departure I asked…the FBO what the active runway was, and the reply was, “People are taking off on Runway 02 and landing on Runway 20 to avoid a back taxi on a long runway.” Taxiing out to Runway 02 for departure I encountered another…single engine airplane near the runway end taxiing in on a narrow taxiway…, so we talked ourselves past each other on UNICOM. I had apparently not heard the radio call…of a small jet landing on Runway 20, so I started my takeoff roll on Runway 02.… The aircraft that had [just] landed…was at taxi speed. During my takeoff roll, I only saw that aircraft when I was near rotation speed.
What Would You Have Done?
The Weak Side  B767 Captain’s Report ■ While on climb out, [we] noticed the aircraft was having difficulty climbing through 30,000 feet. We checked the engine instruments and noticed that the right engine fuel flow was indicating 700 pounds per hour. We checked the other engine indications and noticed that they were significantly below the left engine indications.
What Would You Have Done?
Keep the M in MDA  CRJ Captain’s Report ■ We were flying the localizer approach to [Runway] 24L. As we started down to the MDA, we broke out and I started looking for the airport. I was making the callouts to MDA and thought the First Officer was stopping the descent at the MDA. I looked out and back;… he was still descending.…
What Would You Have Done?
An Approach to Remember  B737 Captain’s Report ■ The First Officer (FO) was flying his first arrival to Corpus Christi, and I believe the last time I was there was more than a decade ago, so needless to say, we were not familiar with the Corpus Christi environment. We had been kept high on the arrival by ATC and were hurrying to descend to be stabilized for the approach. We realized that we would be too high for the approach.…
What Would You Have Done?The Rest of the Story
What’s All the Flap?  B737 First Officer’s Report The Reporter's Action■ The Captain elected to continue to land. We used flaps 15 Vref [speed for the approach] and added 10 knots. Landing was uneventful. The flap indicator moved to match the [flap] handle shortly after clearing the runway during taxi. We notified maintenance on gate arrival.
First Half of "Takeoff Face-Off"
Takeoff Face-Off  C182 Pilot’s Report The Reporter's Action■ I thought the best option was to immediately lift off with a slight turn to the right to laterally clear the runway in any case, and that worked. I missed him vertically by 50 feet and laterally by more than 150 feet. Was that the best split-second decision? I thought so - I am an [experienced] pilot. In my opinion, the airport management had made some bad decisions concerning their improvement construction (reconstructing the parallel taxiway), and the airport was dangerous considering their heavy corporate jet traffic. I had not heard the small jet on UNICOM - possibly due to my conversation on UNICOM with the…plane taxiing in (opposite direction) just prior to takeoff. The wind was…light, and Runway 20 was apparently chosen by the jet traffic to, likewise, avoid a back taxi since the only runway exit was at the [departure] end of Runway 20.
First Half of "The Weak Side"
The Weak Side  B767 Captain’s Report The Reporter's Action■ I [requested] to level off at FL350, then to descend to FL320. I was the pilot monitoring. I did not [request priority handling] at this time because we received no EICAS messages or alerts telling us of this situation.

After rechecking the engine instruments and conferring with the pilot flying, I made the decision to shut down the engine inflight via the QRH Engine Failure/Shutdown Checklist.… I also made the decision that we would attempt to restart the engine because no limitations or engine parameters or engine vibrations were present or were exceeded. At this time we were about 20 minutes into the flight.… The inflight shutdown checklist was completed, and the engine inflight start checklist was completed. The engine started and accelerated normally,…and all parameters [remained within] limitations.… I contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control…. After speaking with them and informing them of our situation and what transpired, I made the decision to continue to destination.

First Half of "Keep the M in MDA"
Keep the M in MDA  CRJ Captain’s Report The Reporter's Action■ [I] told him to stop the descent. We stopped 150 feet below the MDA, continued the approach, and landed. Looking back at the approach, I should have called for a missed approach and received vectors for another approach. The only reason for continuing was…poor judgment or just a bad decision at the time.
First Half of "An Approach to Remember"
An Approach to Remember  B737 Captain’s Report The Reporter's Action■ [We] requested a 360 degree turn for our descent from the Tower. They approved us to maneuver either left or right as requested, and we initiated a go-around and a 360 degree left turn in VMC conditions. We initiated the go-around above 1,000 feet but descended slightly during the first part of the turn. I directed the FO to climb to 1,000 feet, which he slowly did. I had referenced the approach plate and noticed that the obstacles on the plate in our quadrant were at 487 feet and our climb ensured clearance from them. During the 360 [degree] maneuver, the FO lost sight of the airport, but I had it in sight and talked him through the turn back to the landing runway.

The FO completed the maneuver, but we were, again, not in a position to make a safe landing, as we were not well aligned with the landing runway.… We initiated another go-around, again getting approval to stay with Tower, but we maneuvered in a right hand pattern so the FO could see the runway in the turn. I directed a climb to 1,500 feet for the 579 foot towers west of the field. The FO…had lost sight of the field and wasn’t sure what maneuver we were doing while on downwind.… I had not adequately communicated my intentions for the pattern we were flying. We were maneuvering visually, so I took control of the aircraft and directed the FO to re-sequence the FMC…and extend the centerline. I completed the base and final turns and landed uneventfully on Runway 18.










The ASRS Database is a rich source of information for policy development, research, training, and more. Search ASRS Database »CALLBACK Issue 452 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS View ASRS Report Sets ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more » July 2017 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,224 General Aviation Pilots 1,261 Controllers 622 Flight Attendants 451 Military/Other 345 Mechanics 204 Dispatchers 179 TOTAL 8,286 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 1 ATC Equipment or Procedure 1 TOTAL 2 NOTE TO READERS:  ■ or ■ Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 452

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Categories: News

CALLBACK 451 - August 2017

ASRS Callback - Tue, 10/17/2017 - 10:27
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Issue 451 August 2017 In June 2016 the NTSB conducted a forum on Pilot Weather Reports (PIREPs) with the goal of “improving pilot weather report submission and dissemination to benefit safety in the National Airspace System” (NAS).1 To that end, pilots and dispatchers, ATC personnel, atmospheric scientists, and NWS meteorologists use PIREPs extensively in real time. All require good fidelity weather feedback to validate and optimize their products so that pilots have accurate foreknowledge of current weather conditions.

The NTSB’s Special Investigative Report1 (SIR) that documents the forum’s proceedings is comprehensive and makes for excellent reading. Many PIREP behind-the-scene needs are identified. Problem areas are diagnosed. Weaknesses in the PIREP system are pinpointed in categories of solicitation, submission, dissemination, and accuracy. Conclusions are drawn from top level philosophical thinking through component level hardware to enhance the PIREP system, and recommendations for improvement are prescribed.

ASRS presented data at this forum about reported incidents revealing complications with PIREPs that affected flight operations. ASRS reported incidents are offered this month to illustrate issues that were addressed by the NTSB’s recent PIREP forum and recorded in the associated SIR. What Did these Captains Really Mean? This air carrier Captain landed in actual conditions that did not mirror the Field Conditions Report (FICON). He made required PIREP reports, but challenged the aviation community to become better, more accurate reporters using standardized tools and appropriate descriptors.■ The Providence Field Condition (FICON) was 5/5/5 with thin snow, and ATIS was [reporting] 1/2 mile visibility with snow. The braking report from [the] previous B757 was good. Upon breaking out of the clouds, we saw an all-white runway with areas that looked as if they had previously been plowed in the center, but were now covered with snow. Landing occurred with autobrakes 3, but during rollout I overrode the brakes by gently pressing harder. However, no matter how hard I pressed on the brakes, the aircraft only gradually slowed down. Tower asked me if I could expedite to the end.… I said, “NO,” as the runway felt pretty slick to me. I reported medium braking both to the Tower and via ACARS to Dispatch. A follow-on light corporate commuter aircraft reported good braking.

I was a member of the Takeoff And Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) advisory group…and am intimately familiar with braking action physics as well as the Runway Condition Assessment Matrix (RCAM). There was no way the braking was good or the snow was 1/8th inch or less in depth.

I would [suggest that] data…be collected from the aircraft…to analyze the aircraft braking coefficient.… It would also be of value to ascertain the delivered brake pressure versus the commanded pressure for this event, as there can sometimes be a large disparity in friction-limited landings. I think that pilots do not really know how to give braking action reports, and I don’t think the airport wanted to take my report of medium braking seriously. I also think pilots need to know how to use the RCAM to evaluate probable runway conditions that may differ from the FICON. Additionally, there is no such description as “thin” in the RCAM. None of the FAA Advisory Circulars that include the RCAM have thin snow as part of depth description. Don’t Wait to Disseminate; Automate A Phoenix Tower Controller experienced and identified a common problem while disseminating an URGENT PIREP. He offers a potential solution, technique, and rationale.
■ While working Clearance Delivery, I received an URGENT PIREP via Flight Data Input/Output General Information (FDIO GI) message stating, “URGENT PIREP...DRO [location] XA30Z [time] 140 [altitude] BE40 [type] SEV RIME ICING….” This was especially important to me to have this information since we have several flights daily going to Durango, Colorado. My technique would be to not only make a blanket transmission about the PIREP, but also specifically address flights going to that location to advise them and make sure they received the information. The issue is that…I did not receive this URGENT PIREP until [1:20 after it had been reported]. Severe icing can cause an aircraft incident or accident in a matter of moments. It is unacceptable that it takes one hour and twenty minutes to disseminate this information.

[A] better PIREP sharing system [is needed.] PIREPs should be entered in AISR [Aeronautical Information System Replacement] immediately after receiving the report and should automatically be disseminated to facilities within a specified radius without having to be manually entered again by a Traffic Management Unit or Weather Contractor, etc.
Informing the Intelligent Decision This C402 Pilot encountered icing conditions in conjunction with a system failure. Teamwork and accurate PIREPs allowed him to formulate a plan, make an informed decision, and successfully complete his flight.
■ During my descent I was assigned 6,000 feet by Approach.… I entered a layer of clouds about 8,000 feet. I turned on the aircraft’s anti-icing equipment. I leveled at 6,000 feet and noticed the propeller anti-ice [ammeter] was indicating that the equipment was not operational. I looked at the circuit breaker and saw that the right one was popped.

I informed ATC of my equipment failure. Approach requested and received a PIREP from traffic ahead of me indicating that there was ice in the clouds, but the bases were about 5,500 to 5,000 feet. Some light mixed ice was developing on my airframe. My experience [with] the ice that day was mostly light [with] some pockets of moderate around 5,000 to 6,000 feet. I informed [Dispatch] of my situation and elected to continue to [my destination] as I was close to the bottom of the icing layer, and a climb through it to divert would have prolonged exposure to the ice.
If the Controller’s Away, the Pilots Can Stray This Tower Controller experienced a situation that resulted in a hazard. He identified a potential risk associated with a Controller entering a new PIREP into AISR.
■ I was working alone in the tower cab, all combined Tower and Approach positions, at the beginning of a midshift. Weather had been moving through the area with gusty winds and precipitation in the area.… Aircraft X checked [in while] descending via the SADYL [arrival] and immediately reported moderate turbulence.

I issued a clearance to…JIMMI as a vector for sequencing with a descent to 9,000 feet. The instruction was read back correctly, and I observed Aircraft X turn left toward the fix and continue descending. I obtained some additional information from Aircraft X concerning the turbulence. At that point I went to the computer in the back of the room and logged on to the AISR website to enter a PIREP for the moderate turbulence. After successfully [completing that task,] …I walked back to the radar scope and observed Aircraft X descending through 8,000 feet. I instructed them to climb to 9,000 feet. The Pilot replied that they were descending to 6,000 feet. I again instructed them to climb to 9,000 feet and informed them that they were in a 9,000 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) area. They began climbing and reached approximately 8,400 feet before they crossed into a 7,000 foot MVA [area.] The 6,000 foot altitude is the final altitude on the arrival, and I suspect they missed entering the new altitude into the FMS.

The responsibility to enter the PIREP into AISR instead of transmitting it verbally to FSS resulted in my being away from the radar scope as the aircraft descended through their assigned altitude.… [We should] return the responsibility of computer based PIREP entry to FSS to allow Controllers to focus on the operation.
The Effective Party-Line PIREP A B787 Crew experienced a severe, unexpected weather phenomenon that had not been forecast. Their situation and immediate actions illustrate the importance of both the PIREP process and the pilot response that it demands.
■ The [aural] warning…sounded like the autopilot disconnect button. We immediately looked at the instruments and noticed that the airspeed was in the red zone and our altitude was off by -500 feet. The Captain reduced the throttles, but airspeed continued to increase, so [he] opened the speed brakes slightly. I noticed that yellow slash bars were indicated on both LNAV and VNAV. I told the Captain, “No LNAV or VNAV, engines look fine.” The Captain disconnected the autopilot while continuing to get the airspeed under control and regain our altitude back to FL380. I reset the flight directors, selected Heading Select, and set V/S to +300. I reengaged LNAV/VNAV and informed the Captain that these systems were available.…

…We were both stunned as to what had happened because the ride was smooth and had no bumps or chop at all. I immediately got on the radio and told another aircraft behind us (one that we had been communicating with and passing PIREP information) that we had just experienced something very erratic and strange. As I was making this call, a printer message came across the printer about a B777 that had experienced severe wave turbulence at FL350 in the same vicinity as [our encounter.] I relayed this information to the aircraft behind us. They informed us that, yes, they had just encountered the same and gained 1,000 feet and 50 knots. There were other aircraft in the area who later confirmed that they experienced the same wave, however were better prepared to handle it due to our detailed PIREPs, and [those crews] were very appreciative.

We sent a message to Dispatch. Dispatch did not show any unusual activity such as horizontal windshear or unusual jet streams in the area and was…surprised to get our [PIREP].
1. https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/SIR1702.pdf
Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 451 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more » June 2017 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,194 General Aviation Pilots 1,246 Controllers 593 Flight Attendants 429 Military/Other 405 Mechanics 223 Dispatchers 154 TOTAL 8,244 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 1 Airport Facility or Procedure 1 Company Policy 1 TOTAL 3 NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 451
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Categories: News

AEPC™ and PAMA announce the creation of a scholarship program for aircraft maintenance technicians

AskBob News - Mon, 10/16/2017 - 11:31

Today, AeroEngine Protection Corp (AEPC™) and the Professional Aviation Maintenance Association (PAMA) announced the formation of a scholarship program for individuals interested in a career as an aircraft maintenance technician. Aircraft maintenance technicians are the lifeline of the aviation industry as they are responsible for keeping aircraft flying by maintaining the aircraft to the safety standards mandated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). As more aircraft are produced over the next several years, the need for qualified aircraft maintenance technicians will continue to grow exponentially.  READ MORE 

Categories: News, US

Aviation MX Human Factors Sept 2017

FAA & FAASTeam News - Mon, 10/16/2017 - 11:15

The September 2017 issue of Aviation MX Human Factors is now available here

Inside this issue

     COMPARING AIRCRAFT MX FOR PATIENT SAFETY DURING MAJOR REPAIR & REPLACEMENT
by Dr. Bill Johnson & Marc Szepan

     MAINTENANCE HUMAN FACTORS RECENT AND UPCOMING EVENTS

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

FAA Realigns Flight Standards

FAA & FAASTeam News - Fri, 10/06/2017 - 11:46

On August 20, Flight Standards transitioned its management structure from the traditional geography-based regional structure to a functional structure. The new functional structure aligns our leadership in four areas: Air Carrier Safety Assurance, General Aviation Safety Assurance, Safety Standards, and Foundational Business.

This structural realignment should be completely transparent to you. We have “erased” the geographic boundaries and aligned our reporting and management practices according to function, but you will not see any structural change to the local FAA offices who serve you today.

What you should see, though, is continuing improvement in how those offices operate. As I have said many times to our employees, our structural changes are important, and they are the most visible part of our Future of Flight Standards transition. But structural change won’t do much for us without the essential cultural changes at both the individual and organizational levels. For several years now, we have been stressing the importance of interdependence, critical thinking, and consistency in our workforce, and these behavioral attributes and competencies are now embedded in each Flight Standards Service employee’s work requirements. At the organizational level, the ongoing culture change includes training managers in the competencies of change management, and the "coach approach" to leadership, which is about helping employees by expanding awareness and sharing experience.

With our less-tangible but absolutely critical culture changes well underway, we were finally in a position to benefit from the structural realignment. The organizational intent of the shift to functional organization is to increase efficiency, eliminate multiple interfaces, and integrate surveillance activities, and to improve our performance in several areas:

Accountability to Flying Public, Stakeholders

  • Meet the needs of a constantly and rapidly changing industry
  • Fix/prevent issues with consistency and standardization in regulatory interpretation

Budget Constraints

  • Balance allocation of resources
  • Increase efficient use of personnel and travel funds
  • Reduce redundancy in regions

Change Readiness to Meet Constant Stream of New Challenges

  • Operational agility, efficiency, and effectiveness
  • Consistent service and performance

Decision-Making – e.g., Risk-Based Decision-Making Strategic Initiative

  • Culture and structure that facilitate effective implementation of risk-based decision-making, including Compliance Philosophy

You can probably see how our cultural and structural changes are mutually reinforcing, and how both aspects of the transition contribute to a Flight Standards Service with greater accountability, better use of resources, and change readiness. So the change we do want you to notice is what we have already been hearing from some of our industry stakeholders. From my vantage point, the conversation with industry has changed for the better. Our stakeholders are noticing that we are responding in a different way, with a greater amount of service, and with better care and quality. I hope and expect that your experiences with Flight Standards will be similar.

I also hope and expect that you will also see us continue to improve. You’ve probably heard it said that “the future is now.” What that means to me – and for the FAA Flight Standards Service as a healthy organization – is that the future is the result of what we do right now. So I want to see us get better still at practicing our new cultural norms, and creating a Flight Standards Service that is truly agile, efficient, and consistent in our service to you. We owe you that, we are ready to deliver.

John Duncan is the Executive Director of the FAA Flight Standards Service.

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

Air France explores blockchain potential for aircraft maintenance processes

AskBob News - Fri, 10/06/2017 - 10:39

Air France is exploring blockchain potential for the management of replacement parts on in-service airplanes, Aviation Today reported.

Air France KLM’s engineering and maintenance division is using its MRO Lab to experiment with the technology. The airlines uses MRO Lab to collaborate with universities, manufacturers and software developers to work on innovative ideas for the aviation industry.

James Kornberg, director of innovation of the Air France KLM business unit, said that his team is seeking to establish a clear blockchain business case for improving maintenance processes and work flows.

Read More

Categories: News, US