FAA evolution of Flight Standards: selection of Directors and Deputy Directors

FAA & FAASTeam News - Fri, 07/14/2017 - 09:58

Hi, folks –


John Barbagallo, Mike Zenkovich, and I are very happy to announce a major milestone in the evolution of Flight Standards: the selection of the Directors and Deputy Directors. 


As you know, the organizational intent of our restructuring is to facilitate and accelerate the evolution of Flight Standards as an agile, efficient, and consistent organization. Leadership is one of the keys to successful change, so we invested a great deal of time and effort in making these selections. Just to recap, we used a three-level interview process to help us identify leaders who have the right mindset, which includes awareness of, and commitment to, our new direction. The interviews were also intended to help us determine where these leaders best fit in the new organization. 


We used this process to interview and place all current executives. For the remaining positions, we used a bid process that attracted 640 applicants.  After several stages of evaluation, we interviewed 8 candidates.  We focused on selecting those who demonstrated that they have the right mindset and that they are prepared to lead at the executive level in the new Flight Standards Service.


Mindset and leadership maturity are very important. For that reason, we chose not to fill two of the deputy positions at this time. We will address this issue through a future bid.

With that background in mind, we are proud to announce that we have selected the following leaders to serve in the Director and Deputy Director positions in the new Flight Standards Service structure:


Air Carrier Safety Assurance

            Tim D. Miller, Director

            Jim Gardner, Deputy Director

            Wes Mooty, Deputy Director


General Aviation Safety Assurance

            Larry Fields, Director

            Jim Viola, Deputy Director

            Thomas Winston, Deputy Director


Safety Standards

            Rick Domingo, Director

            Tim Shaver, Deputy Director

            Deputy Director (Not currently filled.)


Foundational Business

            Bruce DeCleene, Director

            Nick Reyes, Deputy Director

            Deputy Director (Not currently filled.)


Again, we chose these leaders for their mindset, their awareness of our new direction, and their commitment to leading this crucial change. We will introduce this team more fully in a future Monthly Message video. In the meantime, please join us in supporting them, and in holding them accountable to being the kind of leaders we need.



John Duncan

John Barbagallo

Mike Zenkovich

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

CALLBACK 450 - July 2017

ASRS Callback - Fri, 07/14/2017 - 09:35
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Issue 450 July 2017 The windshear saga in American aviation history reveals a complex and costly past. Windshear has existed for as long as aviators have taken to the skies and is largely responsible for several classic aviation losses. Notable U.S. aviation accidents include Eastern Flight 66 (1975), Pan American Flight 759 (1982), and Delta Flight 191 (1985).

Windshear remained unrecognized for years. It was not clearly understood until swept wing, jet aircraft encountered the phenomenon. Since 1975, windshear has been researched and studied, measured, defined, catalogued, and rightly vilified. Technology has been developed to identify and minimize the threats that it poses. Procedures have been implemented to aid pilots who experience windshear in flight and flight crews invest hours of simulator training practicing windshear escape maneuvers.

Even with progress to date, windshear continues to be a worthy adversary to aviation professionals. It requires respect and wisdom to defeat. Pilots often must make decisions regarding known or anticipated windshear, and the best practice is always avoidance.

This month, CALLBACK shares reported incidents that reveal some means and extremes of windshear experienced in modern aviation. Lessons to be gleaned are ripe, rich, and many. Teasing a Toronto Tailwind After encountering windshear that resulted in an unstabilized approach, this A319 Captain elected to continue to a landing. He noted his awareness of the current winds and trends as well as his personal preparedness to go around as reasons for continuing the approach.■ After being delayed due to low ceilings in Toronto, we were finally descending…in heavy rain and moderate turbulence with clearance to 7,000 feet MSL. After a third 360 degree turn, we were…transferred to the Final Controller and proceeded inbound for the ILS RWY 05. The last several ATIS [reports] showed winds at approximately 090 to 100 [degrees] at 5 to 10 knots, and the Final Controller mentioned the same with an RVR of 6,000 plus feet for Runway 05. When cleared for the approach, we were at 3,000 feet MSL to intercept the glideslope, and I noticed the winds had picked up to a 50 knot direct tailwind. The First Officer was flying. We were assigned 160 knots and began to configure at approximately 2,000 feet AGL. At 1,500 feet the wind was a 30 knot direct tailwind and we had flaps 3. Indicated airspeed (IAS) had increased at this point [with] thrust at idle to 170-175 knots, prohibiting final flaps just yet. The First Officer did a great job aggressively trying to slow the aircraft, as we were concerned about getting a flaps 3 overspeed. As I knew from the ATIS and the Controllers (Tower now), the winds were to die off very soon to less than 10 knots. [Below] 1,000 feet we were just getting the airspeed to put in final flaps (full) and were finally stabilized and on speed between 500 to 800 feet. The winds were now at the reported 090 [degrees] at 8 knots or so [below] 500 feet. The total wind shift was approximately 90 degrees from direct tailwind to a right crosswind - losing 40 knots [of tailwind] in the space of 1,500 feet or so. The reasons I elected to continue the approach were: 1. [I knew] about the wind shift and decrease [in tailwind] as reported on the ATIS and from ATC. 2. [I saw] a positive trend in the wind. 3. [I was] prepared for the missed approach (at 500 feet) IF the winds and IAS stayed as they were earlier in the approach. We landed uneventfully in the touchdown zone and on speed…after breaking out before minimums.
Up and Down into Salt Lake City While being vectored for an approach, this light twin transport Pilot encountered a vertical windshear that dramatically demonstrated the intensity, danger, and potential traffic conflict that a challenging vertical shear can present.
■ We had lined up for the ILS RWY 3 at Ogden, but at glideslope intercept, the weather had [deteriorated] to ¼ mile visibility and a 400 foot ceiling. We broke off the approach,…requested an approach to land at Salt Lake City, and were vectored to the ILS RWY 34L. Approximately 10 miles downwind in solid IMC [with the] autopilot and altitude hold on and about to turn base, we hit a downdraft that dropped us approximately 2,000 feet. The horizon ball was all brown, the autopilot and altitude [hold function] were ineffective, the loss of control set off the master warning system due to lack of fuel (at the time we had 750 pounds per side), and the terrain warning went off. Recovery was accomplished, but with a 2,000 foot gain (assigned altitude [had been] 10,000 feet; at the floor of the incident [the altitude was] approximately 8,000 feet; at the ceiling of incident [the altitude was] approximately 12,000 feet). I was then routed back to the west and north on vectors for sequencing back to the ILS RWY 34L at Salt Lake City that was shot with a side-step on final in VFR conditions to RWY 34R.
Shearing Situational Awareness This Air Carrier Captain accomplished a successful windshear recovery while on final approach. He was surprised by the quickly changing environment and challenged by his diminished awareness as a result.
■ We were on final for Runway 8R in Houston and encountered windshear.… Tower started calling an approach wind loss of 20 knots that increased to 25 knots at a 3 mile final. The Copilot and I were discussing what constituted a microburst alert, which was 30 knots, so we elected to continue the approach. We were in moderate turbulence and the wind was currently a right quartering tailwind which would switch to a left crosswind on the runway. I asked the Copilot to increase our target speed to plus 20, which he did, and as we approached the outer marker, we were fully configured and on speed. At approximately 1,400 feet AGL, we received a “MONITOR RADAR DISPLAY.” I saw that the indication was ahead of us to the right of our course. Since we were still stable and fully configured [with the] autopilot and autothrottles on, we elected to continue.

Shortly we received the call, “GO AROUND, WINDSHEAR AHEAD.” I initiated the go-around and asked for flaps 15 and gear up. Very shortly after this, we received the call, “WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR.” At that point I pushed the throttles to the stops, verified the spoilers were stowed, and selected Takeoff Go-Around (TOGA) again. The First Officer called ATC and said we were going around. I was so focused on flying the plane with regards to Radio Altimeter (RA) and trend, and verifying I was doing everything correctly, I did not hear what ATC replied back to us. Adding to the workload and task saturation was the plane on Runway 8L, which also went around, and then the two planes behind us on Runways 8L and 8R also went around.

The Copilot advised that ATC said to level off at 2,000 feet as we were passing through 2,000 feet with a high climb rate. I still had “WINDSHEAR” displayed on my ADI, and I told him I was not going to level off. He then had to try to talk to ATC again to get a new altitude. They gave us 3,000 feet. We were climbing rapidly, and I brought the throttles back to level off at 3,000 feet, but overshot it to approximately 3,200 feet and descended back to 3,000 feet. The landing gear horn immediately began to sound when I pulled the power back since we still had flaps 15. I made sure we were above flaps 15 retraction speed, and we completed a normal go-around at that point to clean maneuvering speed.

Everything happened so fast. ATC should not give a level off altitude of 2,000 feet since I now know it is possible to still be in windshear…at that altitude. If I were to fly this approach again, I would elect to abort the approach and wait for tower to stop calling a 20-25 knot loss at a 3 mile final.… We thought that since the planes ahead of us were landing, we would be able to [as well]. Obviously there is always a first flight that cannot land, and on this day, that was us.
The Final Authority — 14 CFR 91.3 This heavy transport Captain perceived a subtle suggestion to take off when weather that may have presented a windshear hazard was nearby. He exercised his authority with seasoned wisdom and sound judgment when he opted not to leverage the safety of his aircraft or crew.
■ As we were taxiing west on Runway 27, we could see a radar return of a strong storm which was depicted red on our screen. The storm was directly west of the…airport and appeared to be moving east toward us. As we turned south on Taxiway N, we could only see part of the storm to our right on the radar display. When we switched frequencies to Tower, we heard that there was windshear on a two mile final for our runway. As we approached the runway, we advised Tower that we would not take off. Tower reminded us that the windshear was two miles in the opposite direction from where we would be heading. It seemed like the cell was directly over the field at that time, possibly centered a little north.… The FOM guides us not to get within 5 miles of a cell below FL200. Tower instructed us to taxi out of the way so that several other aircraft could take off while we waited a few minutes for the storm to pass.

I feel that Tower was more concerned about getting airplanes on their way than waiting a few minutes until it was safe. I also think [there is an] air carrier culture pressure to get the job done even if there is an increased risk.

When one aircraft decides it is not safe to take off, perhaps Tower should inform the following aircraft that might not have been on frequency to get the same information. Although several aircraft took off away from the storm, they faced the possibility of getting a decreasing performance windshear on takeoff.
Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 450 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more » May 2017 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,625 General Aviation Pilots 1,388 Controllers 682 Flight Attendants 428 Military/Other 396 Mechanics 220 Dispatchers 174 TOTAL 8,913 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 2 Airport Facility or Procedure 1 ATC Equipment or Procedure 6 TOTAL 9 NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 450

NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189
Categories: News

CALLBACK 449 - June 2017

ASRS Callback - Fri, 07/14/2017 - 09:32
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Issue 449 June 2017 The FAA is striving to improve efficiency in the National Airspace System (NAS) by increasing capabilities in 12 active or completed Metroplexes. A Metroplex is a metropolitan area that includes one or more commercial airports with complex, shared airspace and serves at least one major city. Potential benefits include reduced fuel burns, fewer aircraft exhaust emissions, and improved on-time performance.1

The Optimized Profile Descent (OPD), the Optimization of Airspace and Procedures in the Metroplex (OAPM), and Time Based Flow Management (TBFM) are important pieces of the Metroplex concept. Operational problems that occur in Metroplex areas are not unique to Metroplex environments nor attributable to Metroplex mystique. Threats experienced in Metroplex areas result from complex interactions and forces at play when optimizing airspace, time, and aircraft operations. Some threats are exclusive to the Metroplex environment and relate directly to a piece of the Metroplex concept. Most threats are not limited strictly to the Metroplex environment, but they are intensified by the higher traffic density. ASRS reported incidents citing Metroplex issues reveal that the usual suspects are involved when considering related factors such as degraded communication, misunderstanding, lack of procedural knowledge, and poor execution.

This month CALLBACK offers a sample of reported Metroplex incidents from Pilot and Controller points of view. Resulting complications include traffic compression, aircraft separation, vectors for spacing, airspace violations, potential airborne conflicts, and airspeed reassignments that result in unachievable altitude restrictions. Sweet Separation After receiving clearance for a visual approach, a Challenger Jet Captain was drawn into a compromising position. The incident illustrates a looming concern as Airport Acceptance Rates (AAR’s) and Airport Departure Rates (ADR’s) are increased within a Metroplex.■ South of Avenal, ATC [vectored] a heavy B747 1,000 feet above us, sequencing us behind them for Runway 24L with repeated cautions for wake turbulence. Both aircraft were instructed to fly heading 065 after Santa Monica, which puts them on a downwind for Runway 24L. The B747 had made the turn to final when ATC asked us if we had a visual on the B747. We acknowledged that we did and were cleared for the visual. At that point, separation from terrain and other aircraft is now my responsibility. We set up for a squared off base to final turn to maximize wake turbulence separation from the heavy B747. Before we intercepted the final approach course, the Final Controller issued us a heading of 230 degrees. This shortened our turn to final and reduced our separation from the B747. After the B747 touched down, Tower cleared a Super A380 into position on Runway 24L and then subsequently cleared him for takeoff. We had minimum traffic separation from that aircraft and zero wake turbulence separation. A follow-up call to the Tower revealed that although ATC has guidelines of 5 miles minimum separation between departing aircraft and the same standard for arriving aircraft, there is no standard separation between a departing aircraft and an arriving aircraft.
Waking Up During the Descent This C560XL Captain was a bit upset when he encountered the wake of another aircraft. The two aircraft were descending within a Metroplex on different STARs that serve different airports, share common waypoints, and provide guidance to aircraft whose weights could differ by two orders of magnitude.
■ While flying the FERN5 arrival into Santa Monica, descending thru FL370, we experienced severe wake turbulence from another aircraft in front of us. I believe [the aircraft was] a Super A380, on the SADDE6 arrival to Los Angeles. The event took place between REBRG and DERBB intersections with ATC reporting that the Super A380 was 15 nautical miles ahead of us and descending. The aircraft upset was an abrupt negative g’s, followed immediately by a right roll to 90+ degrees.… I quickly brought the plane back to a level attitude, assessed passenger injuries, aircraft control in approach/landing configurations, and whether any structural damage [had occurred]. [There were] no serious injuries, and aircraft integrity was verified. We continued to our destination due to close proximity of all diverts (Van Nuys, Burbank, and Los Angeles). We [advised ATC of a medical issue with a passenger], and as a precaution, to have the passenger checked out by medical personnel upon arrival.… The FERN5 and SADDE6 [arrivals] converge and share fixes DERBB, REYES and FILLMORE. No altitude restrictions exist [at these three fixes] on either arrival. The FERN5 is tailored for smaller General Aviation (GA) aircraft and the SADDE6 tends to be for larger commercial aircraft. These two arrivals should not converge or share fixes, and [they should] have altitude crossing restrictions. ATC should also be aware of these conflicts and not allow Heavies [and] Supers to be descending thru this airspace [without] much, much greater lateral and vertical separation.
“Control the Ball” – V. LombardiAn Approach Controller experienced unpredictable compression and inadequate spacing that resulted from new procedures and an OPD serving the Atlanta Metroplex. He offers his analysis, rationale, and solution.
■ While assisting another Controller on the combined TAR-D/L position, four arrivals were inbound from the northeast, two on the WINNG arrival and two on the PECHY arrival. All aircraft needed to be blended in order to fit on the base leg for Runway 26R. Aircraft X, the lead aircraft on the PECHY arrival, was followed by Aircraft Y, also on the PECHY arrival. The spacing provided by Center was more than the required 5 miles, but due to the overtake created by the fact that arrivals cross the airspace boundary at 280 knots “descending via” the arrival procedure, this spacing rapidly collapsed to less than 5 miles. To mitigate the situation, the Controller issued Aircraft Y 210 knots to increase spacing enough to give the Final Controller something to work with. Aircraft Y immediately responded that they would no longer be able to meet their altitude restrictions if they slowed, which would, in turn, result in an airspace violation of satellite and departure airspace.

It is unacceptable to get aircraft at 280 knots on the base leg, with unpredictable compression (there is a 15 mile window in which the Pilot can slow to 250 knots), especially when two base leg feeds are routinely fed to the same runway. Many times it is inappropriate to feed the Final Controller at a speed greater than 210 knots (our facility standard operating procedures specifically state that the final should not normally be fed at speeds greater than 210 knots), and aircraft “descending via” are unable to make altitude restrictions if slowed beyond the 280/250 knot restrictions on the Optimum Profile Descent arrival procedures.

[We should] terminate the OPD procedures at [our airspace] boundary and have all aircraft level at hard altitudes and in trail at 250 knots, especially when feeding dual base legs. The OPD is manageable in a single stream scenario, but we are being fed dual stream OPD arrivals from the northeast and the northwest. This complexity…creates a huge safety risk. Simply slowing an aircraft to 210 knots to comply with our SOP results in the aircraft not being able to meet crossing restrictions, [which then] results in multiple airspace violations.… The dual arrivals are routinely blended into a single base leg feed, requiring additional speed control and vectors. This procedure is not acceptable.
Old Habits Die HardAn unexpected pilot route deviation prompted this Controller to issue a new “direct to” and “descend via” clearance. All seemed in order until the Controller remembered that the new OPD STAR is not what it used to be.
■ Center cleared this aircraft direct SMOOV and failed to enter it into Enroute Automation Modernization (ERAM) (ERAM showed the aircraft routed over the HOWRR transition for the SMOOV arrival). I eventually noticed that the aircraft was not flying the route I expected it to fly, and that’s when I had to figure out how to clear him back onto the route and issue a “descend via” clearance. So I [cleared] him direct SMOOV and issued the “descend via” clearance, but I had forgotten that the crossing restriction for SMOOV is at or above 10,000 feet. It had been 12,000 feet for ages before these new Optimal Profile Descent arrivals. The aircraft descended early down to 10,000 feet into A80 (Atlanta) Macon sector’s airspace before crossing the boundary for the new shelf which has been set aside for this descent. There was no loss of separation or conflict.

[At or above] 10,000 feet at Transfer of Control Point (TCP) SMOOV is a terrible design. It dramatically increases complexity and Controller phraseology in any situation where an aircraft isn’t flying the entire arrival as published. Today, it was because a prior Controller in Jacksonville ARTCC cleared the aircraft direct SMOOV even though they’re not supposed to. During thunderstorm season, there will be many times when aircraft will be deviating off of the published route for the STAR. The TCP, SMOOV, should be changed to at or above 11,000 feet, at the very least, thus totally eliminating any risk of an aircraft descending too soon into approach airspace without excessive verbiage from the Controller. 1.
Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 449 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report »
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more » April 2017 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 4,703 General Aviation Pilots 1,156 Controllers 566 Flight Attendants 365 Military/Other 335 Mechanics 179 Dispatchers 151 TOTAL 7,455 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Airport Facility or Procedure 1 ATC Equipment or Procedure 1 Company Policy 1 TOTAL 3 NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 449

NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System | P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field | CA | 94035-0189
Categories: News

It’s not too late to apply for your ADS-B rebate!

FAA & FAASTeam News - Thu, 07/13/2017 - 09:58

Act Now to Reserve your ADS-B Rebate!
Notice Number: NOTC7263

Attention pilots and aircraft owners:  It’s not too late to apply for your ADS-B rebate! 

For a limited time, the FAA is offering a $500 rebate for new ADS-B installations in fixed-wing, single-engine piston aircraft. The FAA is implementing this program to emphasize the urgent need for pilots to equip for the ADS-B Out rule ahead of the January 1, 2020 deadline.

The last day to make a rebate reservation is September 18, 2017, if reservations are still available. Once the reservation is established, you will still have up to 150 days to complete the remaining steps in the process.

Are you eligible for a rebate? Please visit for details.

Questions?  For questions about the ADS-B rebate program, please contact

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

FAAST Blast - Piper AD Superseded, ADS-B Twitter Chat, Pilots and Meds, The Basics on BasicMed

FAA & FAASTeam News - Tue, 07/11/2017 - 15:01


FAAST Blast — Week of July 10, 2017 – July 16, 2017
Biweekly FAA Safety Briefing News Update

Amended AD Issued for Piper Oil Cooler Hose Assemblies

The FAA this week has superseded airworthiness directive (AD) 95-26-13 for certain Piper PA-28 and PA-32 models equipped with oil cooler hose assemblies that do not meet certain technical standard order (TSO) requirements and which could rupture or fail. The superseded AD retains all of the requirements of the original AD and adds language to clarify its applicability and compliance requirements. The FAA estimates that this AD affects 23,643 airplanes of U.S. registry but that the revision will not increase the economic burden or the scope of the AD for any operator. 

For more details, click here.

ADS-B Twitter Chat July 19

Do you have ADS-B questions? Then join us next week as the FAA will be hosting a live Twitter #ADSBchat to directly answer and address your general aviation questions and concerns. The FAA #ADSBchat will take place on Wednesday, July 19, 2017 from 2 p.m. to 3 p.m. ET (1400-1500 EDT). In addition to several FAA experts, representatives from the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Experimental Aircraft Association, and Aircraft Electronics Association will also help co-host the live question and answer session. For more details, go to

Pilots and Medications

Impairment from medication, particularly over the counter (OTC) medication, has been cited in a number of GA accidents. Learn more about how drugs can compromise a pilot’s ability to control an aircraft in this month’s #FlySafe topic of the month flyer, “Pilots and Medication” available at

Get the Basics on BasicMed

            The July/August 2017 issue of FAA Safety Briefing explores several key facets of the new BasicMed rule, which offers pilots an alternative to the FAA's medical qualification process for third class medical certificates. Our lead feature for the issue, “Bring on BasicMed,” will help you understand what the FAA’s new regulatory relief rule means for you. Author and aviation safety analyst Brad Zeigler takes you step-by-step on what you’ll need to know and do to fly under BasicMed. To view the article, go to You can download the entire issue here at

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Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

FAAST Blast – Lycoming Engine AD, ADS-B Rebate Program, NTSB Alert on PIREPs

FAA & FAASTeam News - Fri, 06/30/2017 - 08:51

FAA Safety Team | Safer Skies Through Education

FAAST Blast – Lycoming Engine AD, ADS-B Rebate Program, NTSB Alert on PIREPs, Ready for AirVenture?
Notice Number: NOTC7238

FAAST Blast — Week of June 26, 2017 – July 02, 2017
Biweekly FAA Safety Briefing News Update

New AD Issued for Lycoming Engines

The FAA has issued a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Lycoming TIO-540-AJ1A reciprocating engines that went into effect June 28, 2017. The AD, which was prompted by several reports of engine exhaust leaks, requires initial and repetitive inspections of engine exhaust system weld joints and torque checking the exhaust pipe flange mounting nuts. The FAA estimates the AD will affect 758 engines installed on airplanes of U.S. registry. For more details, click here.

Act Now for ADS-B Rebates

For a limited time, the FAA is offering a $500 rebate for completed ADS-B installations in fixed-wing, single-engine piston aircraft. The FAA is implementing this program to emphasize the urgent need for pilots to equip for the ADS-B Out rule ahead of the January 1, 2020 deadline. Are you eligible for a rebate? Please visit for details. But act now! The last day to apply for your rebate is September 18, 2017.

NTSB Issues Safety Alert on PIREPs

            The NTSB has issued a new Safety Alert this week entitled: Pilot Weather Reports (PIREPs): Pay it Forward. The Alert reviews the importance of PIREPs to flight safety and provides tips and resources for pilots to enhance the quality and frequency of their PIREPs. One such resource you can use to improve your PIREPs is the online course, “SkySpotter: PIREPs Made Easy (ALC-96),” available on, as well as a PIREP Notice that went out May 10, 2017, at

Are you Ready for AirVenture?
            The “World’s Greatest Aviation Celebration” — EAA’s AirVenture — will kick off on Monday, July 24. The weeklong event is scheduled to attract more than 500,000 visitors and more than 10,000 aircraft which will arrive at Wittman Regional Airport in Oshkosh, Wisc., as well as other surrounding airports. If you’re headed that way, be sure to carefully read and adhere to the procedures in the special event Notice to Airmen (NOTAM). Flight planning for AirVenture should include thorough familiarity with NOTAM procedures, as well as knowledge of primary and alternate airports. Carry a copy of the NOTAM for in-flight reference, which can be downloaded at (see Section 5). EAA’s Airventure website also contains a handy pilot resource page for all those flying in at

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Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

FAA: Outdated Data bases are not to be used in the MEL

FAA & FAASTeam News - Thu, 06/29/2017 - 07:00

The FAA has just released Policy Letter 98 Rev 1


This letter removes out dated data bases and now only deals with Data Base Inoperative


The FAA now states that Outdated Data bases are not to be used in the MEL

 The Policy Letter is dated June 1, 2017



MMEL Code:       34 (NAVIGATION)

Reference:             Policy Letter 98, Revision Original, dated January 20, 1999

                                              14 CFR §§ 91.213, 91.503, 91.1115, 121.628, 125.201, 129.14, 135.179

AC 20-138, AC 20-153, AC 90-100, AC 90-101, AC 90-105

Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM); MMEL PL-25

PURPOSE: Establish MMEL Relief for Inoperable Navigation Databases



Revision 1: corrects the regulatory non-compliance found in revision 0 for an out of currency navigation database; aligns allowable MMEL relief in accordance with the definition of “inoperative” found in MMEL PL-25; updates the repair category from repair category C to repair category A, ten (10) flight days; changes “Remarks or Exceptions” in accordance with repair category A and flight operations with an inoperative navigation database.

Revision 0: The original PL-98 established MMEL relief of an “out of currency” navigation database with repair category C.

A navigation database is any navigation data stored electronically in a system supporting navigation applications. Navigation data is information intended to be used to assist the pilot to identify the aircraft’s position with respect to flight plans, ground reference points and navaid fixes (such as VHF omni-directional radio ranges (VOR), nondirectional radio beacon (NDB), etc.) as well as some points on the airport surface. A navigation database may include an airport database but does not include other aeronautical databases such as an obstacle or terrain database.

Although a navigation database is software, it is considered an item within the aircraft that may be considered for MMEL relief per 14 CFR. However, for any item to be considered for MMEL relief it must be inoperative by regulation, and must meet the definition of inoperative in MMEL PL-25:

Inoperative: A system and/or component malfunction to the extent that it does not accomplish its intended purpose and/or is not consistently functioning normally within its approved operating limit(s) and/or tolerance(s).

An out-of-currency (aka: out-of-date or expired) navigation database does not meet the definition of inoperative and is not authorized MMEL relief per 14 CFR. A navigation database that is malfunctioning may be considered for MMEL relief with the appropriate provisos in the “Remarks or Exceptions” column that prohibit the use of the navigation database until repairs are made.



  1.   An inoperative navigation database may be authorized MMEL relief per 14 CFR.
  2.   An out-of-currency or out-of-date navigation database is not authorized MMEL relief per 14 CFR.



Repair Interval

Number Installed

Number Required for Dispatch

Remarks or Exceptions



Navigation Database




May be inoperative provided:

a)        Operations do not require its use,

b)      It is not used in a primary navigation system required by 14 CFR,

c)        Alternate procedures are developed and used,

d)      The ICAO Flight Plan is updated (as required) to notify ATC of the navigation equipment status of the aircraft, and

e)        Is repaired within ten (10) flight days.

Note: An out-of-currency or out-of-date navigation database is not authorized MMEL relief per 14 CFR.




Each Flight Operations Evaluation Board (FOEB) Chair should apply this Policy to affected MMELs through the normal FOEB process.

 Jodi Baker


Winsor P. Brown 

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

Legal Interpretation of 135.421(b), in particular the term "maintenance instructions."

FAA & FAASTeam News - Thu, 06/15/2017 - 11:37

The FAA has published a  Legal Interpretation Memorandum as a response for a request defining the interpretation of 14 C.F.R. § 135.421(b), in particular the construction of the term "maintenance instructions."  The full Memoransum is attached below but here is the text from the document

This responds to your January 6, 2017 request for an interpretation of 14 C.F.R. § 135.421(b), in
particular the construction of the term "maintenance instructions." First, you asked what
constitutes "maintenance instructions" as the term is used in the regulation. Second, you asked
whether "manufacturer's (engine, propeller, rotor, and each item of emergency equipment)
service bulletins, service letters, service instructions, etc., that specifically address a maintenance
procedure [are] considered to be part of the 'manufacturer's maintenance programs' and thus
mandatory under this rule?"

As to your first question, i.e., what would constitute maintenance instructions, we believe that, in
the absence of a regulatory definition, the term should be given its plain meaning-something
that would instruct (teach) how to perform a maintenance task or procedure. To borrow from
your second question, these could include any or all of your examples. This could encompass
various documents issued by a manufacturer, such as a maintenance manual, service bulletins,
service letters, service instructions, etc.

Your second question asks whether, in the context of § 13 5 .4 21 (b ), those foregoing documents
that specifically address a maintenance procedure are considered to be part of the manufacturer's
maintenance programs [referenced in paragraph (a) of the regulation] and thus mandatory for the
part 135 operator that chose the "manufacturer's recommended maintenance programs" in lieu of
the alternative option of a program approved by the administrator. The answer is yes, because
paragraph (b) provides that a manufacturer's maintenance program [which is made mandatory by
paragraph (a) for operators who choose that option] 1 "is one contained in the maintenance manual
or maintenance instructions set forth by the manufacturer ... for the aircraft, aircraft
engine, propeller, rotor, or item of emergency equipment."

You provided two factual scenarios for our office to consider in answering the questions.

Scenario #1: The Part 135 certificate holder adopts the manufacturer's
maintenance program/instructions on a specific date and will maintain their
aircraft to that program up to that date only. In this scenario, would the
certificate holder only be required to accomplish the maintenance related
service bulletins (SB), service letters (SL), or service information (SI) that
is included in the manufacturer's maintenance program up to the date they
adopted this maintenance program? Or would the certificate holder have
to continue to adopt future SB, SL, or Sis?

Answer: The certificate holder would be required to follow the maintenance procedures
contained in those manufacturer's documents that were in effect on the date the certificate holder
adopted the maintenance program. Our reasoning is explained in previous legal interpretations
issued by this office. 2 While those interpretations addressed different regulations, the same
reasoning applies. Under§ 135.42l(a), the certificate holder has the option of selecting either a
manufacturer's recommended maintenance program for the aircraft's engine, propeller, rotor,
and each required item of emergency equipment, or a program for those items approved by the
FAA. If the certificate holder chooses the first option, he or she is adopting a known
maintenance program then in existence, with knowledge of what it entails. With that adoption,
the certificate holder agrees to be bound by that existing program, in lieu of developing a
different program and seeking FAA approval.

Whereas the two referenced legal interpretations dealt in part with the application of the word
"current" in the respective regulations, the same legal principles apply here even though
§ 135.421(a) does not use that term. It is implicit that if a certificate holder adopts a
manufacturer's maintenance program, it is the one in effect (hence current) at the time of
adoption. Manufacturer's often make revisions to their recommended maintenance programs,
including issuing future SBs, SLs, and Sls, but under the circumstances set forth in Scenario # 1,
a certificate holder is not obligated to follow these later-issued procedures. As we observed in
our December 5, 2008 legal interpretation, if certificate holders were required to follow newlyissued
changes to their maintenance programs, these new requirements could impose financial
and other burdens on them for which they did not bargain. The exception would be if the
maintenance program selected by the certificate holder included a clause stating that the
program, if selected, necessarily includes all future-issued SBs, SLs, and Sis, etc.
2 See, e.g., Legal Interpretation of 14 C.

Moreover, if such compliance were required, this would be tantamount to private entities
issuing "rules" of general applicability without meeting the notice and comment
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. § 553), and the
public would not have had an opportunity to comment on these future requirements.
An interpretation of the regulation that would allow manufacturers unilaterally to issue
changes to their recommended maintenance programs that would have future effect on
owners of their products would not be legally correct. This would run afoul of the AP A.
It would mean that our regulations effectively authorize manufacturers to issue
"substantive rules," as that term is used in the AP A, i.e., it would enable them to impose
legal requirements on the public. This would be objectionable for at least two reasons.
First, and most significantly, the FAA does not have authority to delegate its rulemaking
authority to manufacturers. Second, "substantive rules" can be adopted only in
accordance with the notice-and-comment procedures of the APA, which does not apply
to manufacturers. This reasoning is discussed in greater detail in our December 5, 2008
legal interpretation.

Scenario #2: The Part 135 certificate holder adopts the manufacturer's
maintenance program/instructions and state[ s] that they [sic] will maintain
their [sic] aircraft to the current manufacturer's program/instructions, without
a set date. In this scenario, would the certificate holder be required to accomplish
all maintenance related SB, SL, and Sis past, present, and future?

Answer: The certificate holder would be required to follow the maintenance procedures
contained in those manufacturer's documents that were in effect on the date the certificate holder
adopted the maintenance program, plus all the above-referenced later-issued maintenance-related
documents. That would be the maintenance program selected by the certificate holder, and
therefore it would be mandatory until such time that the certificate holder rejects that program by
(1) either electing to adopt the program in effect on that date of decision, or (2) by selecting the
second option provided by paragraph (a) of the regulation, i.e., developing its own program and
obtaining FAA approval of it.

You also attached five examples of Service Bulletins and Service Instructions that contain
maintenance procedures that are part of Lycoming's maintenance program/instructions, and ask
whether they are required to be accomplished by the certificate holder under§ 135.421(b). In
that regard, all three attached Service Bulletins are labeled MANDATORY by Lycoming.
Consistent with our answers above, if these documents are applicable and included in
Lycoming's maintenance program at the time a certificate holder adopts Lycoming's program
for its engine, the certificate holder would be obliged to follow them. A certificate holder would
not be required to follow any of them that are issued after the date of adoption of the program,
except as noted above. The fact that Lycoming has labeled the Service Bulletins as mandatory
has no regulatory effect unless they are already included in the engine maintenance program as
adopted by the certificate holder, or the FAA has issued an Airworthiness Directive or other rule
incorporating the service bulletin by reference.

Nevertheless, because Lycoming is probably in the best position to provide maintenance advice
on its products, a certificate holder would be well-served to follow the procedures in these
recommended documents even if they are not part of the adopted maintenance program. For
example, we note that Lycoming's Mandatory Service Bulletin No. 533C addresses actions that
should be taken in the event of a sudden engine stoppage. The Service Bulletin's Subject is:
"Recommended Action for Sudden Engine Stoppage, Propeller/Rotor Strike or Loss of
Propeller/Rotor Blade or Tip." We note that, although the procedures in the bulletin may not be
mandatory from an FAA regulatory perspective, following them would be an acceptable means
of addressing the damage at issue. Doing nothing after one of the listed damage events would
not be acceptable to the FAA, and doing something else would run the risk that the FAA would
find the attempted maintenance unacceptable.

This response was prepared by Edmund Averman, an attorney in the Regulations Division of the
FAA's office of the Chief Counsel, and coordinated with the Aircraft Maintenance Division
(AFS-300). If you have further questions concerning this response, please contact Mr. Averman
at 202-267-3073.

AttachmentSize Duncan-AFS-1 - 2017 Legal Interpretation.pdf291.9 KB
Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

FAAST Blast — Week of June 12, 2017

FAA & FAASTeam News - Tue, 06/13/2017 - 15:47

FAAST Blast – Cessna SAIB, Airman Testing Updates, ADS-B Rebate, Startle Response, Flying a Global Hawk
Notice Number: NOTC7212

FAAST Blast — Week of June 12, 2017 – June 18, 2017
Biweekly FAA Safety Briefing News Update


SAIB Stresses Inspection of Cessna Main Landing Gear Actuator Assembly

On June 9, 2017, the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) for Cessna Models 172RG, R182, TR182, FR182, and all variants of 210/T210/P210-series airplanes with the exception of the Models 210 and 210A airplanes. The SAIB emphasizes the importance of inspecting main landing gear actuator assemblies for cracks following Textron Aviation Inc. supplemental inspection documents (SIDs) applicable to each model to prevent gear extension and retraction malfunctions. To view the SAIB and all related SIDs, go to


Airman Testing Updates

The FAA recently updated its Airman Testing page, to include revisions to the Airman Certification Standards for the private pilot airplane certificate and the instrument rating along with the first version of the commercial pilot airplane ACS. Be sure to visit, or better yet, subscribe to this page ( for all the latest updates.


Act Now for ADS-B Rebates

For a limited time, the FAA is offering a $500 rebate for completed ADS-B installations in fixed-wing, single-engine piston aircraft. The FAA is implementing this program to emphasize the urgent need for pilots to equip for the ADS-B Out rule ahead of the January 1, 2020 deadline. Are you eligible for a rebate? Please visit for details. But act now! The last day to apply for your rebate is September 18, 2017.

FlySafe – Startle Response

Fatal general aviation accidents often result from inappropriate responses to unexpected events. Don’t get caught by surprise on your next flight — check out this month’s #FlySafe fact sheet on how to manage the “startle response” at


What’s it Like to Fly a Global Hawk?

You might be familiar with what it takes to fly a small quadcopter around, but have you ever wondered what it takes to fly “big” drones? FAA Aviation Safety Inspector Chris Huebner recalls his military experience to give us an inside look at large drone operations in his article, “What’s It Like to Fly a Global Hawk?” In the article, Huebner makes note of the widely distributed nature of UAS personnel and equipment which sometimes can require 25 people or more to fly an aircraft with no one onboard. You can find the article in the May/June 2017 issue of FAA Safety Briefing, or go to for a mobile friendly version.

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Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

AEA recognizes members for training commitment

AskBob News - Fri, 06/09/2017 - 13:32

LEE'S SUMMIT, MISSOURI, June 9, 2017 -- The Aircraft Electronics Association announced the recipients of the annual Avionics Training Excellence Award, which recognizes AEA member companies for their total commitment to training as evidenced by participation in AEA-approved training. Fifty member companies received the 2016 AEA Avionics Training Excellence Award. 

Mike Adamson, AEA vice president of member programs and education, said AEA-certified repair station members are trained far beyond the Federal Aviation Administration requirements and demonstrate a commitment to training few other industries match. 

"The AEA develops high-quality, cost-effective regulatory and technical training for technicians to meet their employer's training program requirements and their own professional development goals," Adamson said. "Interest in AEA training expands beyond our membership and our borders as our reputation for excellence becomes more widely known."  


For a member company to be eligible for the AEA Avionics Training Excellence Award, all of its technicians must have completed at least one AEA-approved training event in the previous year, which includes the courses conducted at AEA headquarters; the AEA International Convention & Trade Show; AEA Connect Conferences; the Avionics News Technical Training Exam; AEA computer-based training; original equipment manufacturer training from AEA associate member companies; and AEA partner training. 

The following companies completed the training requirements and received the 2016 AEA Avionics Training Excellence Award: 

  • Absolute Aviation LLC, Edgewater, Florida
  • Aerotronics Inc., Billings, Montana
  • Airborne Avionics, Winnsboro, South Carolina 
  • Arapahoe Aero Avionics, Englewood, Colorado
  • Atlas Aircraft Center, Portsmouth, New Hampshire
  • BlackRock Aircraft Maintenance & Avionics, Hazle Township, Pennsylvania
  • Capital Avionics Inc., Tallahassee, Florida
  • CE Avionics Inc., Sanford, Florida
  • Century Flight Systems Inc., Mineral Wells, Texas
  • Dakota Avionics, Bismarck, North Dakota
  • Dyersburg Avionics of Caruthersville Inc., Caruthersville, Missouri
  • Executive Autopilots Inc., Sacramento, California
  • Flight-Deck Avionics, Salt Lake City, Utah
  • Flightpath Aviation Services, Brooksville, Florida
  • Flightstar Corp., Savoy, Illinois
  • Freedom Air Avionics, Broomfield, Colorado
  • Gibbs Service Center Inc., San Diego, California
  • Georgia Avionics Inc., Winder, Georgia
  • Gulf Coast Avionics Corp., Lakeland, Florida
  • Gulfstream Aerospace, Appleton, Wisconsin
  • Gulfstream Aerospace, Dallas, Texas
  • Islip Avionics Inc., Ronkonkoma, New York
  • JP Avionics, Hoedekenskerke, The Netherlands
  • Kent Career Technical Center, Grand Rapids, Michigan
  • Kitchener Aero Avionics Ltd., Breslau, Ontario, Canada
  • L3 Vertex Aerospace, Madison, Mississippi
  • Maine Aviation Aircraft Maintenance LLC, Portland, Maine
  • Mayday Avionics Inc., Grand Rapids, Michigan
  • National Jets Inc., Fort Lauderdale, Florida
  • Nolan Avionics, Durant, Oklahoma
  • Northeast Air Inc., Portland, Maine
  • Northern Lights Avionics, Anchorage, Alaska
  • Park Rapids Avionics, Park Rapids, Minnesota
  • Pegasus Technologies Inc., Green Cove Springs, Florida
  • Pfizer Inc., West Trenton, New Jersey
  • Preferred Avionics & Instruments, Howell, Michigan
  • PrivateSky Aviation Services, Fort Myers, Florida
  • Prodigious Jet Services LLC, Lake Worth, Florida
  • Q.F. Avionics Center Ltd., Red Deer, Alberta, Canada
  • Quest Avionics Inc., Ocala, Florida
  • R & Z Avionics Ltd., Delta, British Columbia, Canada
  • Signature TechnicAir, Frederick, Maryland
  • Southeast Aerospace Inc., Melbourne, Florida
  • Spirit Aeronautics, Columbus, Ohio
  • Sun Aviation Avionics, Vero Beach, Florida
  • Textron Aviation-Tampa, Tampa, Florida
  • Tomlinson Avionics of Florida, Fort Myers, Florida
  • Top Flight Avionics, Belleville, Michigan
  • Vortek Aviation, Tomball, Texas'
  • Wilmington Avionics, New Castle, Delaware 


Applications for the 2017 

Categories: News, US

FAAST Blast — Week of May 29, 2017

FAA & FAASTeam News - Fri, 06/02/2017 - 10:52

FAAST Blast – SAFOs Cover Attitude Indicators and ACS Changes, Int’l Flight Plan Update, Dawn of Drones
Notice Number: NOTC7195

FAAST Blast — Week of May 29, 2017 – June 04, 2017
Biweekly FAA Safety Briefing News Update


New SAFOs Cover Attitude Indicator Limitation; ACS Changes

            The FAA recently published a Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO 17008) that notifies aircraft operators of the potential operational limitations of some attitude indicators in the event of unusual attitude recovery. The SAFO states that operators should be aware of design limitations of the make and model of the attitude indicator installed in their aircraft. The design of the instrument, if displaying only a minimum pitch indication of ± 25 degrees vertically, could “peg” at this maximum or minimum pitch indication or “tumble” and provide erroneous pitch and bank indications when the aircraft exceeds these limits. This guidance was recommended by National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendation A-14-108.

            SAFO 17009, issued May 30, advises the general aviation community of changes to the evaluation standards for the slow flight task and certain stall tasks in the Private Pilot – Airplane Airman Certification Standards (ACS) and the Commercial Pilot – Airplane ACS, which will be effective June 12, 2017. It replaces a previous SAFO (16010) and provides a more comprehensive discussion of the Slow Flight and Stalls Area of Operation in the ACS.

To access these and other SAFOs, visit


International Flight Plan Update

The FAA recently met with Nav Canada and vendors (Harris Corporation, CSRA and Leidos) to review testing results between all operating systems for implementation of the new FAA requirement for International Flight Plan (ICAO) format for all civil flights filed with Flight Service.

To ensure a safe and seamless transition with full interoperability, the FAA has decided to delay implementation until the Fall of 2017. The additional time will allow all service providers to address required changes identified in testing and integrate enhancements to the international format, while avoiding system changes during the busy summer flying season. The FAA will provide a 30-day advance notice to the public when a final date is selected later this year. Learn more about the FAA International Flight Plan format by visiting our website.


The Dawn of Drones

Pilots: Are you the Doomsayer, the Dozer, or the Dazzled when it comes to drones? Traditional pilots generally fall into one of these three groups when it comes to opinions on drones. Figure out which group you belong to here:


Produced by the FAA Safety Briefing editors,
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Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

FAA Proposes $435,000 Civil Penalty Against United Airlines

FAA & FAASTeam News - Tue, 05/30/2017 - 13:10

The U.S. Department of Transportation's Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes a $435,000 civil penalty against United Airlines for allegedly operating an aircraft that was not in an airworthy condition. 

 The FAA alleges that on June 9, 2014, United mechanics replaced a fuel pump pressure switch on a Boeing 787 in response to a problem that a flight crew had documented two days before. However, the airline failed to perform a required inspection of the work before returning the aircraft to service, the agency alleges.

 United operated the aircraft on 23 domestic and international passenger flights before performing the required inspection on June 28, 2014, the FAA alleges. Two of those flights allegedly occurred after the FAA had notified United that it had not performed the inspection.

The FAA alleges the aircraft was not airworthy during all 23 of the flights.

 "Maintaining the highest levels of safety depends on operators closely following all applicable rules and regulations," said FAA Administrator Michael Huerta. "Failing to do so can create unsafe conditions."

 United has asked to meet with the FAA to discuss the case.

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

FAAST Blast — Week of May 15, 2017

FAA & FAASTeam News - Thu, 05/25/2017 - 10:07

FAA Safety Team | Safer Skies Through Education

FAAST Blast – ACS Updates, SAIBs for Cessna Elevator and CMI engines, Vmc Training, You and UAS
Notice Number: NOTC7170

FAAST Blast — Week of May 15, 2017 – May 21, 2017
Biweekly FAA Safety Briefing News Update

ACS Updates

Updates to the Airman Certification Standards (ACS) for the Private Pilot Airplane certificate and the Instrument-Airplane rating are coming in June 2017, along with the first ACS for the Commercial Pilot Airplane certificate. The FAA intends to publish these documents on the Airman Testing web page ( later this month. We will also offer a series of webinars to explain the revisions in the near future. Stay tuned for more details. 

SAIBs Issued for C-150/152 Elevator; Continental 550/520 Series Engines

On May 11, 2017, the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) that highlights the potential for loose elevator attach bolts on certain Cessna 150/152 models. The SAIB was issued based on a service difficulty report of an elevator hinge bolt backing out on a C-150. The FAA recommends performing the inspections detailed in the Cessna supplemental inspection document (SID) 55-10-01. Both the SAIB and the SID(s) can be found here.

The FAA also issued an SAIB on May 10 which outlines available service instructions for identifying causes of engine kickback and recommended engine inspections following a kickback event on certain Continental Motors, Inc., 550 and 520 series reciprocating engines. See the full bulletin here.

FlySafe Topic of the Month – Vmc Training and AOA

Learn more about how Vmc training and Angle of Attack can help prevent loss of control accidents in the event of a power loss in this month’s #FlySafe topic. For details, see the FAA Safety Team (FAASTeam) flyer here.

You and UAS

Did you know that any operation that changes the purpose of your drone flight from fun/hobby to “a job” could put you under part 107, even if there is no direct compensation? Get the facts by reading, “When Do I Need a Certificate: A Look at Hobbyist vs. Commercial Requirements for Small UAS” in the May/June 2017 issue of FAA Safety Briefing at:


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Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

CALLBACK 448 - May 2017

ASRS Callback - Wed, 05/17/2017 - 11:25
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Issue 448 May 2017 Charles Edward “Charlie” Taylor is not a household name. He is, in many respects, a typical “Forgotten Man,” whose contributions have been all but forgotten throughout aviation history. Charlie Taylor, born May 24, 1868 in Cerro Gordo, Illinois, quit school at age 12, was essentially self-educated, and had a brilliant, mechanically inclined mind. He settled in Dayton, Ohio where, through serendipitous circumstances, he met Orville and Wilbur of Wright brothers’ fame.

Fast forward…and Charlie began working for the Wright Brothers on June 15, 1901 repairing bicycles and keeping shop, allowing Orville and Wilbur freedom to pursue their work with flying machines. Charlie accomplished many tasks for the Wrights while they pursued their dream of powered flight, allowing Charlie to demonstrate his genius. When the Wrights could not interest nearly a dozen automobile manufacturers to build a powerful, lightweight engine needed for their purpose, Charlie took on the task. Without instruction books, formal drawings, manuals, handbooks, or tooling, Charlie completed the task in just six weeks. The rest is history.

Charlie worked for the Wrights for over a decade, and logged many “firsts” as a pioneering icon in aviation maintenance. In addition to building the first aircraft engine, he became the first Airport Manager. He participated in building the first military airplane, and he engineered the first transcontinental flight. He was the first person to investigate a fatal powered flight accident, and Charles E. Taylor was inducted into the USAF Museum as the very first airplane mechanic.

This month, CALLBACK pays tribute to Charles E. Taylor and is dedicated to the thousands of Aviation Maintenance Technicians, men and women, who keep America’s aircraft airworthy and return them to service when they require servicing, repair, or periodic maintenance.

The Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs) who submitted the following reports have contributed to improved maintenance practices. Their contributions to aviation safety exemplify commitment and dedication in the tradition of Charles E. Taylor.Right Seal, Wrong Place; Return to Base This aircraft maintenance team thought that they had correctly replaced a seal on a CRJ200. A successful leak check added confidence, but a procedural error would soon come to light…along with a lamentable loss of lubrication.■ [Another] Aircraft Maintenance Technician and I were installing a new carbon seal on the Integrated Drive Generator (IDG) on Engine #1. During that process, we put a seal in the wrong location. We misinterpreted the diagram depicting where the seal went. Throughout this process we had to keep going back to the [Maintenance] Manual to print out sub-tasks using computers that were exceptionally slow, as well as endure many interruptions…which added to our distraction.

After installation, we performed the leak check in accordance with the Maintenance Manual, and there were no leaks, so we did not realize our error at the time. During discussion about the project, Supervisors found that we had incorrectly installed the seal. By the time we discovered this fact, it was the following day.… The aircraft [had] lost the oil on the left engine IDG, most likely due to our mistake. The aircraft subsequently had to return to base. It was easy to misinterpret the diagram in the Maintenance Manual. The interruptions due to slow network access to the online Maintenance Manual and [other] interruptions added to the situation. When You’re out of O2, N2 Won’t Do The importance of proper color-coding and distinct labeling of gas bottles was highlighted in this Technician’s report on an incident that could have had “noxious” consequences.■ [I] received a call…to service oxygen on an [Air Carrier] aircraft. [I] arrived at the scene and opened up the rear tail gate [of the line truck.] I saw one bottle secured to the bed. It was green in color, with no visible warning sign that I can recall. I noticed a steel braided line that was attached to the regulator and wrapped [around] the tail gate, but I did not see the service end. I looked around and found the service kit.… Enclosed was a regulator with a braided line attached. Instead of [switching] regulators, I swapped [the braided] lines and serviced the aircraft with 120 psi of gas.

On my first day back to work [after scheduled days off], I installed what I thought was a missing bottle of nitrogen [in the line truck]. After further inspection, I found that the bottle that was already installed in the truck was nitrogen and not oxygen. I immediately notified my manager of the issue.

I believe that when I looked in the tailgate, I saw a green bottle and didn’t see any obvious abnormalities. I assumed the steel braided line was the same type we used in the hangar on the oxygen servicing bottle. The bottle didn’t have a…regulator like we had on the high pressure bottle, but [it was] the same color and a similar design.

[I recommend] better placards and warning signs around all gas bottles, more color distinctive regulators used for each [gas] type, and servicing stations at [each] gate. An Abundance of AssumptionsThis incident started out with a wrong assumption, which was compounded when the paperwork associated with the job was overlooked. The Inspectors should have caught the error, however they assumed that the initial assumption was correct.■ I started my service on a B737 aircraft while another Technician…was to start the fuel nozzle replacements. After I completed my initial service, I noticed that the Number 2 Engine Cowlings were opened up, so I figured that must be the engine getting the fuel nozzles. I found one new nozzle at the In-Station for our plane, so I took it into the Lead’s office and told the other Technicians that three were missing, as we were to replace four nozzles altogether. Our Lead was notified and more nozzles were ordered. When they arrived, one Technician took the left side of the engine and another took the right side and began removing the fuel nozzles to replace them. I was the third person, so I was handing tools to them and getting whatever they needed. After the nozzles were replaced, I helped to safety all the bolts that had been removed [and reinstalled]. After Inspectors had looked the engine over for safety and security, I closed Number 2 Engine Cowlings.…

The next day I was informed that the nozzles were the wrong part numbers and that they were supposed to be installed on the Number 1 Engine. I had never looked at any of the paperwork to verify with the other mechanics what part numbers [we were to use] or which engine we were to work on. Off with Their Heads!This Technician found that a less than professional maintenance person had used rather drastic and careless means to cover up a mistake in a maintenance procedure. ■ The Maintenance Technician noticed the Nose Gear Steering Cover was loose and seemed to be drooping. He checked the cover and found it to be loose. When attempting to tighten it, he discovered that forward attach bracket screws had been deliberately cutoff and a sealant fabricated screw head was used in its place. At the time the loose steering cover was noticed, the bolts had failed.

The event was started by a routine check for a loose steering cover. This is rather common and is simply a hardware tightening process to repair. In this case it turned out to be worse.

The person who installed the steering metering valve missed the step that required the Technician to install the forward attach bracket hardware through the upper steering plate. Apparently after the steering metering valve was installed, the Technician discovered his/her error. Rather than remove the metering valve to correct the error, the Technician opted to cut the screw heads off and use sealant to hold the forward bracket. Note the screw must be installed prior to the steering metering valve installation because there is insufficient clearance with the valve installed.

The aircraft was removed from service. The steering cover was removed and the proper hardware installed. The aircraft was then returned to service.

I suspect that schedule pressure played a role in this event. The Technician, realizing his error, likely feared calling the Inspector to inspect the metering valve reinstallation. The time required to remove and reinstall the valve also would likely need to be explained. Who’s on First?Perhaps the involvement of too many Technicians led to this propeller mix-up worthy of Abbott and Costello.… If 1 and 3 are on First and 2’s on Second,…■ I was the Lead Mechanic for a propeller build-up during which #2 and #4 Blades were swapped. When the prop was finally put on a plane a month later, the airplane experienced excessive vibration. This is when the prop was inspected and found [to have] blades…installed in the wrong locations. I think the blades were installed improperly because too many people were involved in the build-up. Blades #1 and #3 were installed first, so I think we just got confused as to which side #2 went on. Inevitably after installing #2 incorrectly, then #4 would also be incorrect. I think we also failed to double-check our work like we did when installing #1 Blade. Check Out
ASRS Safety Topics!ASRS Database Report Sets each consist of 50 de-identified ASRS Database records relevant to topics of interest to the aviation community. View/Download Report Sets »CALLBACK Issue 448 Download PDF & Print View HTML ASRS Online Resources CALLBACK Previous Issues Report to ASRS Search ASRS Database ASRS Homepage Special Studies
In cooperation with the FAA, ASRS is conducting an ongoing study on wake vortex incidents, enroute and terminal, that occurred within the United States. Learn more »
ASRS, in cooperation with the FAA, is gathering reports of incidents that occurred while pilots were utilizing weather or AIS information in the cockpit obtained via data link on the ground or in the air. Learn more » Read the Interim Report » March 2017 Report Intake: Air Carrier/Air Taxi Pilots 5,240 General Aviation Pilots 1,216 Flight Attendants 775 Controllers 660 Military/Other 339 Dispatchers 202 Mechanics 173 TOTAL 8,605 ASRS Alerts Issued: Subject No. of Alerts Aircraft or Aircraft Equipment 2 Other 1 TOTAL 3 NOTE TO READERS:   ■  Indicates an ASRS report narrative    [   ]  Indicates clarification made by ASRS A Monthly Safety Newsletter from The Office of the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
Issue 448

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Categories: News

Associations praise update to Product Certification Guide

AskBob News - Tue, 05/16/2017 - 09:41

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 16, 2017 -- The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), Aircraft Electronics Association (AEA) and the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) today announced the approval of an updated United States Federal Aviation Administration / Industry Guide to Product Certification. The last version of the guide was published in 2004. 

The updated guide will help institutionalize best practices and a new operating norm for the FAA, companies and applicants that will prove to be foundational in reaching the next level of safety and certification process effectiveness and efficiency. It incorporates changes based on lessons learned and the most recently published FAA policy guidance. The guide also establishes principles and guidance for how an applicant and the FAA can transition to a state where there is progressively less direct involvement of the FAA in detailed compliance activities, increasing the efficiency of the process while maintaining the same high level of safety. 

"Since the FAA and Industry Guide to Avionics Approvals was first published April 13, 2001, much has changed in the agency, the industry and the products," said AEA President Paula Derks. "Now on its third revision, this update leverages risk-based decision-making and organizational maturity as it modernizes the processes to better facilitate the needs of aviation. This Product Certification Improvement Guide is an excellent example of industry and the FAA working together to streamline processes and maximize efficiencies in certification." 

There have been significant changes in the certification processes over the last 10-to-15 years that improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the certification and design approval processes and enhance product safety. The revised guide addresses the impact of those changes and assists the stakeholders in taking full advantage of the benefits they offer. 

"Clarifying the roles and responsibilities of industry and FAA oversight offices and facilitating a shift to a systems approach to product certification and safety oversight was a recommendation of the FAA Aircraft Certification Process Review and Reform report to Congress and the Part 21 / Safety Management Systems Aviation Rulemaking Committee," said GAMA President and CEO Pete Bunce. "We're proud to work with the FAA to update this guide, and help implement these improvements to ensure the certification process becomes more efficient and consistent, while keeping safety as the number one priority." 

The revised guide introduces some significant changes to the Partnership For Safety Plan, a written agreement to define a working relationship between an applicant for a product certification or approval and the applicable organizations of the FAA. The PSP will now provide high-level guidance when the FAA and applicant have reached agreement on how they will conduct business, instead of providing specific details on how the parties will work together on specific issues, creating a more efficient, more consistent process. 

"This is an outstanding example of how government and industry can work together to reach a win-win outcome," said AIA President and CEO David F. Melcher. "The joint team of experts has outlined what it would take to conduct a timely and successful certification project, and we are committed to work with the FAA and industry partners during the implementation phase." 

A group comprised of representatives from nearly 15 organizations worked over 18 months to improve the guide and produce the third edition of it. The organizations are: AEA, AIA, ALOFT AeroArchitects, Bell Helicopter, FAA, GAMA, Garmin, GE Aviation, Gulfstream, Honeywell Aerospace, ICX Consulting, Textron Aviation and The Boeing Company. AEA, AIA, GAMA and FAA sponsored the guide. 


Click here to view the updated guide.


For more information, contact:

Geoff Hill, AEA director of communications

Phone: 816-347-8400



Dan Stohr, AIA director of communications

Phone: 703-358-1078



Sarah McCann, GAMA director of communications

Phone: 202-637-1375


Categories: News, US

May/June 2017 Issue of FAA Safety Briefing

FAA & FAASTeam News - Mon, 05/15/2017 - 10:40

The May/June 2017 issue of FAA Safety Briefing focuses on the exciting and ever-expanding world of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). Feature articles answer the Who, What, Where, When, Why, and How of UAS operations, including the regulatory and technical challenges they present.


Feature articles include:


  • The Dawn of Drones – Why We All Need to Care About UAS (p. 7)
  • When Do I Need a Certificate? A Look at Hobbyist vs. Commercial Requirements for UAS (p. 9)
  • Who’s Behind UAS? – A Look at Drone Support, Programs, and Initiatives in the FAA (p. 12)
  • How Do We All Get Along? – A Look at the FAA’s Strategy for UAS Integration into the NAS (p.16)
  • Where Do I Find the Drone Zone? – Navigating Cyberspace for Official UAS Resources (p. 20)
  • What’s It Like to Fly a Global Hawk? – A First Person Account of Large UAS Operations (p.24)
  • Drone Dragnet – UAS Guide for Law Enforcement Officials (p. 27)


In the May/June Jumpseat department (p. 1), Flight Standards Service Director John Duncan discusses the FAA’s overarching strategy for supporting and integrating UAS operations into the NAS, while the Checklist department (p. 23) reviews the steps required to become a remote pilot. In Nuts, Bolts, and Electrons (p.31), we explore the role of drone maintenance and the future job potential in this area.


In Aeromedical Advisory (p. 5), Federal Air Surgeon Dr. Michael Berry discusses some medical fitness tips for remote pilots, while Angle of Attack (p. 33), breaks down some of the key features of the FAA’s free B4UFLY app.


Our UAS-themed issue of FAA Safety Briefing wraps up with a profile of Part 107 Policy and Implementation Lead Everette Rochon, who discusses some of the challenges going forward with integrating UAS into the National Airspace System..


The link to the online edition is: Please see our new mobile-friendly links to each feature article. Be sure to follow us on Twitter - @FAASafetyBrief


FAA Safety Briefing is the safety policy voice for the non-commercial general aviation community.  The magazine's objective is to improve safety by:

  • making the community aware of FAA resources
  • helping readers understand safety and regulatory issues, and
  • encouraging continued training
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Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

Update on this years Mx Competition

AskBob News - Fri, 04/28/2017 - 15:54

We’re searching for the words to sum up this year’s competition and all we can come up with is “WOW!”

 We wish that every single aircraft maintenance professional could be so fortunate to be able to attend and compete in the Aerospace Maintenance Competition. For those of you who were able to be there in person or view the live stream delivered by AireXpert, you saw and felt the camaraderie and professionalism of these teams. There’s simply nothing like it, and all of those teams (both pros and students) set a great example for the next generation of mechanics.

 All eyes were on Orlando and we’re not joking. We were absolutely blown away not only by the number of viewers who signed up to view the broadcast, but from their locations. By the end of the ceremonies yesterday, over 8000 viewers in 39 countries tuned in to the competition. From St. Lucia to Australia and Ukraine to Zimbabwe, the AMC was on display for the entire world to see.

 We’ll be returning to Orlando to broadcast the 2018 AMC and we’ll be making some changes to improve the production and make it more interactive. We’re so inspired to shine a light on the incredible work that happens within the global aircraft maintenance community and we want to share it with the world.

 A sincere thank you to all of the men and women who work behind the scenes and who are responsible for every flight.

 From the entire AireXpert Team


Categories: News, US

FAA Cautions on off-the-shelf Checklists

FAA & FAASTeam News - Thu, 04/27/2017 - 13:58


Subject: Safety Concerns with Using Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) or Personally Developed Checklists

Purpose: This SAFO warns pilots and operators of the risks of purchasing a commercially available checklist, obtaining a free download, or developing their own aircraft checklist in lieu of using the checklist contained in the manufacturer’s Pilot Operating Handbook (POH)/Airplane Flight Manual (AFM).

Background: Recently, a pilot was unable to lower the aircraft’s landing gear and referred to a COTS checklist for the specific type of aircraft. The aircraft landed with the landing gear partially extended. On contact with the runway, the landing gear collapsed, and the aircraft sustained substantial damage.

Discussion: The post-accident investigation compared the POH/AFM and the COTS checklist used. The investigation found that the COTS checklist did not match the manufacturer’s checklist relating to the landing gear failure and manual gear extension. The omission of steps within the COTS checklist significantly contributed to the pilot’s inability to fully extend the aircraft’s landing gear. Further, the CAUTION statement in the POH/AFM was not present on the COTS checklist. The CAUTION states: "Do not re-engage landing gear operating motor in flight. To reduce landing gear side loads to a minimum, avoid crosswind landing and high speed turns while taxiing."

Recommended Action: Pilots and operators, other than those operating an aircraft under 14 CFR Part 121 or 135 that choose to use COTS or personally developed checklists should meticulously compare them to the manufacturer’s checklist and placards contained in the POH/AFM to confirm they are consistent. This action will ensure the pilot has all pertinent manufacturer’s information during aircraft flight operations.

Contact: Questions or comments regarding this SAFO should be directed to the General Aviation’s Commercial Operations Branch (AFS-820) at (202) 267-1100.

Link to SAFO 17006

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

Basic Medical Begins

FAA & FAASTeam News - Mon, 04/24/2017 - 10:11

April 24- General aviation pilots can now prepare to fly under BasicMed without holding a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) medical certificate as long as they meet certain requirements. They can fly under BasicMed beginning on May 1, the effective date of the January 10 final rule. It offers pilots an alternative to the FAA's medical qualification process for third class medical certificates, while keeping general aviation pilots safe and flying affordable.

General aviation pilots may take advantage of the regulatory relief in the BasicMed rule or opt to continue to use their FAA medical certificate. Under BasicMed, a pilot will be required to complete a medical education course every two years, undergo a medical examination every four years, and comply with aircraft and operating restrictions. For example, pilots using BasicMed cannot operate an aircraft with more than six people onboard and the aircraft must not weigh more than 6,000 pounds.

A pilot flying under the BasicMed rule must:·     

  • possess a valid driver's license;
  • consent to a National Driver Register check;
  • have held a medical certificate that was valid at any time after July 15, 2006;
  • have not had the most recently held medical certificate revoked, suspended, or withdrawn;
  • have not had the most recent application for airman medical certification completed and denied;
  • have taken a BasicMed online medical education course within the past 24 calendar months;
  • have completed a comprehensive medical examination with any state-licensed physician within the past 48 months;
  • have been found eligible for special issuance of a medical certificate for certain specified mental health, neurological, or cardiovascular conditions, when applicable; and
  • not fly for compensation or hire.

Pilots can read and print the Comprehensive Medical Examination Checklist and learn about online BasicMed online medical courses at

Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US

Got Safety Culture?

FAA & FAASTeam News - Mon, 04/17/2017 - 11:00

By Bill Johnson, PhD Chief Scientific and Technical Advisor for Human Factors in

Aircraft Maintenance Systems, FAA.

Capitalizing on selected questions, used for discussion in an FAA Airworthiness

Inspector’s Human Factors Workshop, Johnson

helps you to be introspective as you reconsider

your corporate safety culture.

The mere thought of another Ph.D. writing about

“Safety Culture” could cause you to flip to the next

article in this AMT magazine. Don’t do that! Try a

couple more paragraphs.Look for definitions of

safety culture. There are many. The good news is

that the definitions are redundant, containing the

same words and concepts.

Safety culture, like organizational culture, is founded on an organization’s shared

beliefs, attitudes, values, and commitment regarding the importance of safety at

every level of the organization. A strong safety culture requires unilateral knowledge

and commitment. Every person in the organization should be able to express, with

varying levels of detail, their personal commitment and job/task related contribution

to worker safety and safe flight.

While definitions of safety culture are abundant safety culture is intangible. It is not

an object or a written policy. An organization cannot “hold up and show” their safety

culture. While intangible, an organization’s safety culture is manifested by employee

attitude and behavior. It is visible based on how corporate leaders from every level

of management demonstrate their understanding of culture and their commitment to

safety. Demonstrated commitment can include training programs, voluntary

reporting with a just culture, establishment of formal measures to identify and

manage hazards, and sufficient equipment and procedures to enhance continuing

worker and flight safety.

Aviation Safety Inspectors Consider Safety Culture During Human

Factors Training

Regulatory compliance is one of many ways to ensure safety. A primary role of the

FAA Airworthiness Aviation Inspector is to ensure that the regulated entity, any

certificate holder, follows the rules. FAA’s Compliance Philosophy helps the ASI to

work with you to ensure compliance. Of course, mere compliance does not

guarantee a quality safety culture. Your FAA Inspector is not a safety culture

assessor. However, an insightful ASI can work with you to help identify challenges

and solutions before they evolve to a noncompliance or an undesirable event.

All FAA Airworthiness ASIs take a three-day maintenance human factors course.

FAA is one of the few regulators that offer such a course for their workforce. This

author sees the course as one of many demonstrated FAA Flight Standards

management commitments to organizational safety culture. The mere existence and

support of the three-day class shows that FAA management sees the importance of

the maintenance human factors topics. The class is a tangible demonstration of

safety culture.

The course covers the usual maintenance human factors fundamentals, like human

error, communication, fitness for duty, failure to use technical procedures, event

investigation, voluntary reporting, and more.

The course is structured around the PEAR Model, standing for People, the

Environment on which they work, the Actions that they perform, and the Resources

necessary to complete the work. Yes, the Dirty Dozen is included.

There is considerable discussion throughout the course proceedings. Average

aviation years of experience for this class are always greater than 25. Thus,

experience and aviation wisdom ensures powerful story telling. One unit of the

course considers safety culture by looking at demonstrated ways to consider an

organization's commitment to safety (aka, safety culture). Here are a few sample

ASI questions and expected company answers.

Voluntary Reporting Question

ASI Question: Show me the published written “Just Culture” policy and

steps for voluntary reporting

Sample Excellent Corporate Answer: Here is the policy. It is part of our Aviation

Safety Action Program, or a similar reporting method. It clearly explains the

voluntary reporting process and how such reports are processed. It delineates a

timely just culture decision-making process that protects workers who make

mistakes. It makes it clear that blatant procedural noncompliance, reckless behavior,

unfitness for duty, or falsification of records, and other actions are not protected by

the policy and not immune from regulatory or corporate punitive action. This

program has been instrumental in identification and management of hazards and

risk before it becomes an undesirable event. To maximize the value of this

voluntarily reported information we publish a quarterly newsletter of significant

reports. In addition we use voluntary reports as discussion items for shift change

and other safety meetings. We are working on a program to push this information to

worker mobile phones.

Human Factors Training Question

ASI Question: Show me the course outlines for your maintenance

human factors training

Sample Excellent Corporate Answer: We have three courses for maintenance

human factors. One is a two-hour introduction for new hires. The second is an eighthour

course for all employees. That course includes about two to four hours of

computer-based training of fundamentals.

It is followed by a four-hour event investigation and discussion class, with an

instructor. Our third class is the two-hour recurrent training which includes

information from our voluntary reporting, other event-based reports, and any

description of new practices/procedures. It is aligned with the EASA recurrent

training requirements and takes place on a 24-month recurring basis.

All employees, managers, and executives must take the human factors training. Our

instructors are usually promoted from the maintenance or maintenance training

ranks. Usually they have a college degree and an Airframe and Powerplant

Certificate but neither are firm requirements. All HF instructors must have taken a

train-the-trainer class and some human factors training outside of our organization.

We encourage our HF trainers to attend at least one human factors related meeting

at least annually.

Shift Turnover Question

ASI Question: Show me your shift turnover practices/process

Sample Excellent Corporate Answer: Of course, the shift turnover question is

somewhat dependent on the size and complexity of the shop/location. Our various

departments match the turnover to meet their specific requirements. There is no one

size fits all. In most cases we have designated lead mechanics who have the

responsibility to document the status of jobs from one shift to another. They have the

responsibility and are given sufficient shift overlap time to convey the status of all

tasks that transfer from one shift to the next. If there are complex procedures in

progress, the lead mechanic can ask personnel from the outgoing shift to stay on to

ensure proper handover. There is a shift turnover office at the worksite where the

meetings take place for every turnover. Job cards are used as the primary

documentation for job status. We have documentation to ensure that all appropriate

handover communications are clearly discussed and documented accordingly.

Incoming workers are required to check the last task performed prior to the shift

change. In our company the management and the workers recognize that shift

change, or within shift task turnover, presents a hazard. We treat shift and task

turnover very seriously.

Safety Culture Question

ASI Question: What evidence do you have to indicate that your company

has a positive safety culture?

Sample Excellent Corporate Answer: You can ask any worker on this floor and you

will get an answer to this question. We have had a lot of training about risk

assessment. The training is backed up with newsletters, signage, and plenty of heart

felt talk from company leadership. Every worker knows their particular jobs and can

talk about how their job performance affects overall attention to worker and flight

safety. We celebrate accident-free worker safety as much as we celebrate

schedules and maintenance quality performance. When a worker sees or perceives

a serious issue they are encouraged to report the potential hazard immediately. We

have seen management rush to buy new equipment when workers identify potential

safety risk. Voluntary reporting on safety-critical matters is always perceived as a

positive step toward continuing safety in our departments and for the company at

large. As workers we appreciate the quest for continuing safety. We get it!

Size Matters for a Safety Culture

The FAA Aviation Safety Inspectors human factors class includes inspectors from

the airlines, larger repair stations, and small general aviation organizations. That

diverse group of inspectors knows that one size safety culture does not fit all. Large

organizations have multiple shops and locations to manage and there may even be

a designated person to manage activities that foster culture. Small shops have fewer

people and fewer resources to help cultivate the right culture. Size does matter but

that is OK. As stated at the outset the key words include: shared beliefs, knowledge,

values, and commitments where every person in the organization can express their

personal commitment and demonstrated contribution to worker safety and safe

flight. Got safety culture?


Categories: FAA/CAA, News, US